This article argues that power transitions generate not just physical security concerns for states, but also 'ontological' insecurity, as established identities, hierarchies, and relationships are revised and challenged. It is suggested that seeking out 'special relationships' with others is one way in which states seek to mitigate this uncertainty. Through an analysis of the discourse on the 'rise of India' from policymakers and commentators in the United States, it is shown that recent US representations of India seek to consolidate a particular US identity, based on the notion of American exceptionalism, and attempt to construct a new 'special relationship' with India in order to ameliorate the challenge posed by the rise of China to a US-dominated world order and the assumption of the universality of US ideas and institutions. However, while India-US relations have improved, the relationship continues to be hampered by their differing world-views and self-perceptions, which, as in the past, undermine each other's sense of ontological security. Adapted from the source document.
AbstractThis article examines the relationship between India's nuclear programme and its postcolonial identity. In particular, I argue that making sense of the anomalies and contradictions of India's nuclear behaviour, such as the gap of two decades between its nuclear tests, its promotion of nuclear disarmament and its failure to sign non-proliferation and test-ban treaties requires an understanding of the racially gendered construction of India's postcolonial modernity and the central roles given to science and morality within it. I suggest that India's postcolonial identity is anchored in anticolonial discourses that are deeply ambivalent toward what was viewed as a Western modernity that could provide material betterment but was also potentially destructive. What was desired was a better modernity that took into account what was believed to be Indian civilisation's greater propensity toward ethical and moral conduct. India's nuclear policies, such as its pursuit of nuclear technology and its promotion of disarmament cannot be seen in isolation from the successes and failures of this broader project of fashioning an ethical modernity.
Like many other regional powers in the Asia‐Pacific, Australia is a middle‐sized state wedged between two great powers, the United States (US) and the People's Republic of China. While Australia continues to rely upon the US alliance for security, China remains its biggest trading partner. Over the past two decades, Australia's public foreign policy discussions have centred upon Australia's "China Choice" in the context of growing strategic rivalry between these dominant powers. This debate has sought to grapple with the options available to Australia in managing its relations with an increasingly assertive China and an unpredictable US. This article examines the public debate on China policy since the election of the conservative Liberal‐National Coalition government in 2013. It argues the appropriateness of a pragmatic foreign policy in relation to the engagement of great powers has been the central question in Australia's China debate. Yet what constitutes pragmatic action in relation to Australia's China policy is varied and based on differing understandings of how middle‐sized states can and do seek to cope with structural shifts. The paper also argues, however, that an emergent anti‐pragmatist tradition has recently emerged that reflects the unprecedented challenges facing Australian foreign policy and presents "pragmatism" as a threat to Australian sovereignty, principles, and values.