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AbstractChina's need to ensure food sufficiency for its people is nothing new. What is new is the country's recent active search for food from around the world, including small states in Africa and Latin America. The country has begun to acquire food of a high quality, in competition with other countries. China can make use of its politico-economic power to influence the behaviour of others to achieve food security, thereby highlighting a puzzling question: How does China balance its national interests against its global responsibility? China competes with other countries for a steady supply of food at an affordable price, while at the same time it wants to be seen as a peaceful country and a responsible member of the international community. As the largest developing country in the world, how does China see its role in the global management of food security, and how do others see China in this role? In addressing these questions, this paper argues that China begins to shoulder greater responsibility globally in this area, based on its bilateral and multilateral engagements, especially with small states, in a win-win way. The paper concludes that China has to do more to allay the fears of the outside world and to clear the suspicions harboured by others about its intentions and behaviour, a lesson which carries wide implications for China's global governance in other issue areas.

This paper aims to identify and assess the challenges facing global financial governance as a result of the shift of power from the West to the East in the world. It argues that these challenges are too weak to be able to alter the pattern of global financial governance in any significant way in the foreseeable future. The paper explains why this is the case. It points out that the resilience of the current system of governance, which owes a great deal to the embedded hegemonic structure, is sufficiently adaptive to resist, withstand, or soften the challenges. To test this argument, the paper proposes to focus our attention on the International Monetary Fund at the global level and the Chiang Mai Initiative at the regional level. It discusses some initiatives taken by certain emerging economies to tackle the current global financial crisis. The paper analyzes the role played by the West in global financial governance led by the U.S. and the role played by the emerging economies spearheaded by China. (Asien/GIGA)

The Supreme Court of Canada constitutionalized the open court principle under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in its groundbreaking ruling in Edmonton Journal (1989). The Court's holding was premised on three propositions: (1) the courts play an important role in our democratic society; (2) freedom of expression protects listeners as well as speakers; and (3) most individuals are dependent on the press to learn of what is transpiring in the courts. Taken together, these propositions suggested a broad conception of section 2(b) that could act as the primary guarantor of transparency in our democracy, not just within the courthouse but beyond. In 2010, however, the Supreme Court decided three cases that together rejected this vision. This paper reviews these three decisions and examines the manner in which they reined in the robust conception of section 2(b) that once seemed within reach.

Three recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada signal a departure from the broad and generous manner in which the Court has previously interpreted and applied section 24(1) of the Charter. In each of R. v. Bjelland, Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr and R. v. Nasogaluak, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge's finding of a breach of Charter rights but overturned the trial judge's choice of remedy under section 24(1) in order to grant a more limited remedy in its place. In doing so, the Court shifted the analytical focus away from the promotion of remedial efficacy and toward the minimization of the burdens imposed by the remedy on government. This article reviews each of these judgments and examines the extent to which they are consistent with previous section 24(1) jurisprudence and the purpose of the Charter's broadest remedial provision.