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AbstractThis article investigates the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the rise of China's centrally controlled businesses (yangqi 央企), a batch of large business groups and financial institutions controlled by China's central party-state. It starts by comparing two competing policy approaches to defining the relations between the Party and state enterprise sector: the separation approach versus the adaptation approach. It then examines how the Party's "pro-big business" policies have shaped China's large enterprise reform since the 1960s and led to the formation of the yangqi. It also describes the key mechanisms used by the CCP to control the yangqi, including its personnel management system and disciplinary force. It further identifies and summarizes three key modes of the Party's intervention in the rise of the yangqi: institutional and policy entrepreneurship; leveraged personnel control; and residual mobilization capacity. The article concludes by discussing the future prospects for reforming the relations between the Party and big business in China.

This article investigates the role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the rise of China's centrally controlled businesses (yangqi 央企), a batch of large business groups and financial institutions controlled by China's central party-state. It starts by comparing two competing policy approaches to defining the relations between the Party and state enterprise sector: the separation approach versus the adaptation approach. It then examines how the Party's "pro-big business" policies have shaped China's large enterprise reform since the 1960s and led to the formation of the yangqi. It also describes the key mechanisms used by the CCP to control the yangqi, including its personnel management system and disciplinary force. It further identifies and summarizes three key modes of the Party's intervention in the rise of the yangqi: institutional and policy entrepreneurship; leveraged personnel control; and residual mobilization capacity. The article concludes by discussing the future prospects for reforming the relations between the Party and big business in China. (China Q/GIGA)

We develop a theoretical model of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to analyze their effects on firm profits and government welfare with heterogeneous firms. We explicitly model the trade-off between attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and protecting the government's scope to regulate. We show that BITs can improve overall efficiency by internalizing externalities, but with firms gaining at the government's expense. The efficiency improvement does not hold for less profitable industries. We also show that attracting new FDI through a BIT may decrease welfare, while the protection of existing FDI unambiguously raises it. We propose redesigning BITs by including a tax on firm profits, in order to redistribute gains from a BIT such that both firms and the government see a Pareto improvement. In an empirical exercise, we estimate the expected annual cost for Germany resulting from an EU-US BIT to be $27mn, and the compensating profit tax to be 0.5%.

Abstract
The article analyzes the performance of the Chinese Nationalist army in the First Burma Campaign in 1942. This combat demonstrated new challenges that faced the Chinese army. After more than four years of fighting, a weakened Chinese army struggled to open a new front in the remote southwestern border area and Burma. The Chinese forces deployed in Burma included some of the best Chinese divisions, but the rest were ordinary or even weak formations. Hence their performance in Burma was no better than those back in China. Their doctrine of defense in depth (and their tactics) did not suit warfare in Burma. Although they succeeded in defending Toungoo for ten days, in other engagements the Chinese units failed to halt the Japanese. They suffered further losses during the retreat since they were not familiar with jungle warfare. In addition, the Chinese troops did not handle their relations with the British forces and local Burmese population well. These failures contributed to the collapse of the front.