With the "more economic approach" the EU is taking a new tack on merger control policy. This is visible not only in the new SIEC prohibition criterion and the criteria for appraising horizontal mergers but also in more recent decision-making practice. Greater legal certainty, on the one hand, and improved decision-making, on the other, have been cited as the aims of the (increased) use of industrial economics models and quantitative analysis. The objective of a (better) economic foundation in EU merger control is expressly welcomed. However, on closer analysis it is found that in point of fact the more economic approach in its present form creates less legal certainty, while the upshot in terms of the quality of the decision-making is at least unclear. At the same time, the (administrative) burden is likely to rise. Moreover, certain problems emerge for instance from the increasing involvement of economic experts or the possibilities for (industrial policy-related) political intervention. In conclusion, a broader perception of an economics-based approach which takes account especially of the institutional implications is called for. Specific recommendations are the establishment of an independent competition authority and the stronger orientation of merger control to (more) general rules.
Mit dem "more economic approach" wird ein neuer Ansatz in der EU-Fusionskontrolle verfolgt. Die Zielsetzung einer (besseren) ökonomischen Fundierung ist ausdrücklich zu begrüßen. Allerdings zeigt die genauere Analyse, dass faktisch die Rechtssicherheit verringert wird, während die Auswirkungen auf die Entscheidungsqualität zumindest unklar bleiben. Gleichzeitig ist eine deutliche Zunahme des (Verfahrens-)Aufwandes zu konstatieren. Hinzu kommen wichtige institutionelle Implikationen, die bisher weitgehend unberücksichtigt geblieben sind. Im Ergebnis ist daher ein breiteres Verständnis von ökonomischer Fundierung notwendig. Als Handlungsempfehlungen ergeben sich die Unabhängigkeit der Wettbewerbsbehörde und die stärkere Regelorientierung der Fusionskontrolle.
In: Legal issues of economic integration: law journal of the Europa Instituut and the Amsterdam Center for International Law, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Band 34, Heft 2, S. 133-166
An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in order to quantify the price effects in each specific case. The review of the merger between the software firms Oracle and PeopleSoft in 2003/04 has been the most important instance of parallel application of these sophisticated economic tools by the EU and US authorities so far. This makes an in-depth study of the case going from the controversial issue of market definition to the specificities of the competitive assessment worthwhile. Therefore, we highlight certain similarities as well as (minor) differences between the EU and US proceedings. Interestingly, despite serious initial concerns the transaction was not blocked nor even required to be modified in the two jurisdictions. We derive a number of interesting insights and, in particular, point out problems and lessons associated with the use of sophisticated economic tools in contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific factors, the major insights encompass the continued relevance of market definition, the need to accompany predictive economic evidence with compatible reasoning and the benefits of including the economics of dynamic and evolutionary competition.
Both in US antitrust and EU competition policy a development to a broader appli-cation of rule of reason instead of per se rules can be observed. In the European discussion the attempt to base competition policy on a more economic approach is mainly viewed as im-proving the economic analysis in the assessment of specific cases. In this paper it is shown from a general law and economics perspective that the application of rules instead of focus-sing on case-by-case analyses can have many advantages (less regulation costs, rent seeking and knowledge problems), although an additional differentiation of rules through a deeper assessment can also have advantages in regard to the reduction of decision errors of type I and II. After introducing the notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules, we show - based upon law and economics literature upon the optimal complexity of rules - in a simple model that a competition rule is optimally differentiated, if the marginal reduction of the sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation) equals the marginal costs of differen-tiation. This model also allows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determi-nants of the optimal degree of rule-differentia¬tion. From this law and economics perspective, competition policy should consist mainly of (more or less differentiated) rules and should only rarely rely on case-by-case analysis. Therefore the main task of a more economic ap-proach is to use economics for the formulation of appropriate competition rules.
Seit der 3. Auflage wurden die früher getrennt erscheinenden Themen Politik und Wirtschaft in einem Band zusammengelegt. Das Kapitel zu Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik nimmt allerdings nur etwa ein Fünftel des Buches ein. Eine DVD liegt nicht mehr bei, sondern man setzt nun "hybrid" auf eine Online-Plattform "www.lernhelfer.de" und eine App. Nun muss man für Lernkarteien und Übungsklausuren bezahlen. Die App wird von den Nutzern überwiegend kritisch gesehen. Inhaltlich ist wenig zu bemerken, die Themen orientieren sich am Lehrplan-Mainstream. Das Layout ist übersichtlich und bunt. Es ist allerdings die Frage, ob Schüler nicht lieber zu den weniger umfangreichen, optisch unattraktiveren Titeln des Stark-Verlages greifen (z.B. M. Bormann: "Demokratie", zuletzt ID-A 51/12), die jeweils nur ein Semesterthema behandeln. Da Aktualisierungen bei einer Vermittlung von Grundwissen weniger relevant sind, kann die Vorauflage unbeschadet weiterlaufen. (1 A,S)