Erratum to: Psychological Effects of Poverty on Time Preferences
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 131, Heft 640, S. 3417-3417
ISSN: 1468-0297
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 131, Heft 640, S. 3417-3417
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 131, Heft 638, S. 2357-2382
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
We test whether an environment of poverty affects time preferences through purely psychological channels. We measured discount rates among farmers in Uganda who made decisions about when to enjoy entertainment instead of working. To circumvent the role of economic constraints, we experimentally induced thoughts about poverty-related problems, using priming techniques. We find that thinking about poverty increases the preference to consume entertainment early and to delay work. Using monitoring tools similar to eye tracking, a novel feature for this subject pool, we show that this effect is unlikely to be driven by less careful decision-making processes.
In: Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2020-03
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8309
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14821
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In: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series No. 623
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13102
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In: American economic review, Band 106, Heft 6, S. 1437-1475
ISSN: 1944-7981
We integrate tools to monitor information acquisition in field experiments on discrimination and examine whether gaps arise already when decision makers choose the effort level for reading an application. In both countries we study, negatively stereotyped minority names reduce employers' effort to inspect resumes. In contrast, minority names increase information acquisition in the rental housing market. Both results are consistent with a model of endogenous allocation of costly attention, which magnifies the role of prior beliefs and preferences beyond the one considered in standard models of discrimination. The findings have implications for magnitude of discrimination, returns to human capital and policy. (JEL C93, D83, J15, J16, J24, J71, R31)
In: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series No. 499
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 16590
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 13250
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8058
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 14607
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 133, Heft 652, S. 1626-1640
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment 'passed' onto innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.