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This article investigates the structural causes of ethnic rebellion among the indigenous populations of Latin America. It aims to fill three important gaps in the current understanding of ethnic violence. First, the article's geographical focus brings a broad theoretical literature to a region with which it has had little experience. Second, the article acknowledges and incorporates Fearon and Laitin's argument that theories of ethnic violence should also explain instances of peace and cauterization. Third, the article offers evidence suggesting that democracy reduces the probability of rebellion. This and competing hypotheses are evaluated qualitatively with evidence gathered from secondary sources and historiographical accounts and, quantitatively, with Ted Robert Gurr's Minorities at Risk Phase III Dataset. Based on the finding that regime type is a strong predictor of ethnic violence in Latin America, the author calls for a reevaluation of the link between regime type and violent political behavior.

In recent decades, prominent national leaders like Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez gained power through democratic institutions, only to undermine those institutions once in office as part of a broader effort to consolidate authoritarian power. Yet attempts at "executive aggrandizement" have failed in other countries, with varying consequences for democratic institutions. We develop an agency-based perspective to enhance the understanding of aggrandizement and to explain when it results in democratic breakdown. Relying on comparative case studies of five countries—Bolivia, Ecuador, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela—our analysis suggests that the contingent decisions of opposition actors during the process of aggrandizement have a significant effect on regime outcomes. Irregular opposition attempts to remove incumbents from office, which are especially likely after electoral defeats, contribute to democratic breakdown. More moderate responses to aggrandizement, on the other hand, help the opposition actors to buy time until the next election, hence offering the possibility for democratic survival.

What good are elections in Mexico? -- Elections and democratic responsiveness -- Political participation and democratic responsiveness -- Testing hypotheses about responsiveness : the public services approach -- Testing hypotheses about responsiveness : the public finance approach -- Electoral and participatory mechanisms in action -- Conclusion: The sources of democratic responsiveness in Mexico -- Appendix: Fractionalization indices as measures of electoral competitiveness