Suchergebnisse

We study what determines whether someone is an early Facebook adopter in a context in which Facebook is still relatively new compared to a far more popular Dutch social networking site (SNS) (Hyves). We use representative survey data of 4363 adolescents aged 14–15 years. First, adolescents who participate in more leisure activities, who have more digital resources, and who have more friends who are SNS members are more likely to be SNS members. Second, we hypothesize and show that for adopting communication technology that highly fluctuates in popularity and is highly time-dependent, individuals are more likely to be early Facebook adopters when the number of their friends who are Facebook members increases. Finally, non-native adolescents are also more likely to be early Facebook adopters.

AbstractSharing economy platforms commonly claim to bring about positive social impacts, such as facilitating contact between individuals that would not have met otherwise. According to contact theory, such intergroup contact would change the stereotypes that individuals hold of outgroup members, such as people with a different nationality or ethnicity. We use a large‐scale online Investment Game experiment among Airbnb users to study the effect of Airbnb interactions on cross‐national trust. In contrast with common claims about the positive impact of the sharing economy, we did not find that individuals who had prior experience with a nationality as a host or a guest on Airbnb trusted persons of that nationality more. This may be because monetization, institutionalization and professionalization of Airbnb limits the intensity of contact, or because Airbnb mostly establishes contact between individuals with similar backgrounds.

Reputation systems are commonplace in online markets, such as on peer-to-peer sharing platforms. These systems have been argued to be a solution to (ethnic) discrimination on such platforms. This argument is based on empirical studies showing that ethnic disadvantages are smaller for users with ratings than for users without ratings. We argue that this conclusion may be premature, because minorities have a harder time accumulating ratings. The greater benefit of ratings to minorities may be offset by their troubles acquiring any, thereby diminishing the potential for reputation systems to reduce discrimination. We tested this counterargument using a unique data set that contains information on all interactions on a peer-to-peer motorcycle rental platform. We find that the reputation system does not reduce initial inequalities between otherwise comparable renters of different ethnicity. Platforms that wish to reduce discrimination should not only make their reputation system more effective, but also help users collect ratings.

AbstractReputation systems are commonplace in online markets, such as on peer-to-peer sharing platforms. These systems have been argued to be a solution to (ethnic) discrimination on such platforms. This argument is based on empirical studies showing that ethnic disadvantages are smaller for users with ratings than for users without ratings. We argue that this conclusion may be premature, because minorities have a harder time accumulating ratings. The greater benefit of ratings to minorities may be offset by their troubles acquiring any, thereby diminishing the potential for reputation systems to reduce discrimination. We tested this counterargument using a unique data set that contains information on all interactions on a peer-to-peer motorcycle rental platform. We find that the reputation system does not reduce initial inequalities between otherwise comparable renters of different ethnicity. Platforms that wish to reduce discrimination should not only make their reputation system more effective, but also help users collect ratings.

The traditional understanding of reputation systems is that they secure trust between strangers by publicly calling out cheaters. In modern, online markets, it is increasingly common for providers of a good to also act as consumers, and vice versa. We argue that in such mixed-role markets, reputation systems serve a second important function: They allow providers who lend out their possessions (such as their house, car or tools) to earn reputational credits that can be spent on future borrowing, especially when lending lacks monetary compensation. In an experiment that introduces a new game, "the Lending Game", we show that, consistent with our argument, information on past lending leads subjects to lend to those who have themselves lent before, increasing overall lending. However, when lending is financially compensated, this mechanism of reciprocal lending ceases to operate.

AbstractUsers and potential users of the sharing economy need to place a considerable amount of trust in both the person and the platform with which they are dealing. The consequences of transaction partners' opportunism may be severe, for example damage to goods or endangered personal safety. Trust is, therefore, a key factor in overcoming uncertainty and mitigating risk. However, there is no thorough overview of how trust is developed in this context. To understand how the trust of users in the sharing economy is influenced, we performed a systematic literature review. After screening, 45 articles were included in a qualitative synthesis in which the results were grouped according to a well‐established trust typology. The results show various antecedents of trust in the sharing economy (e.g. reputation, trust in the platform, and interaction experience) related to multiple entities (i.e. seller, buyer, platform, interpersonal, and transaction). Trust in this economy is often reduced to the use of reputation systems alone. However, our study suggests that trust is much more complex than that and extends beyond reputation. Furthermore, our review clearly shows that research on trust in the sharing economy is still scarce and thus more research is needed to understand how trust is established in this context. Our review is the first that brings together antecedents of trust in online peer‐to‐peer transactions and integrates these findings within an existing framework. Additionally, the study suggests directions for future research in order to advance the understanding of trust in the sharing economy.

The book identifies conditions for trust and cooperation. It highlights unintended consequences of individually rational behavior, and shows how trust and cooperation change dependent on social embeddedness. Such analyses inspire experimental tests in lab conditions, but also tests through empirical applications in field studies. The results of this mixed-method approach can in turn be used to inspire further theoretical work.

Abstract
Is peer sanctioning a sustainable solution to the problem of human cooperation? We conducted an exact multilab replication (N = 1,008; 7 labs × 12 groups × 12 participants) of an experiment by Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach published in Science in 2006 (Gürerk Ö, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B. The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. 2006. Science. 312(5770):108–111). In GIR2006 (N = 84; 1 lab × 7 groups × 12 participants), groups that allowed members to reward cooperators and punish defectors were found to outgrow and outperform groups without a peer-sanctioning institution. We find GIR2006 replicated in accordance with all preregistered replication criteria in five of the seven labs we sampled. There, the majority of participants joined groups with a sanctioning institution, and participants cooperated and profited more on average than in groups without a sanctioning institution. In the two other labs, results were weaker but still favored sanctioning institutions. These findings establish the competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions as a robust phenomenon within the European context.