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Two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors. A theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony; a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector. The history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes. However, a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory. Hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change. Surplus capacity, in the absence of a hegemon, creates the conditions necessary for change.

Among the books on the world energy crisis, on technological possibilities for self-sufficiency, and on various energy sources, this is one of a very few to address the practicalities of government regulatory responsibilities versus the pursuit of profit in the private sector and to look at the processes, logistics, and complex interactions among private energy companies, financial sectors, and national governments. The authors provide answers to such questions as: How do oil company operations influence government policies? What kinds of energy projects can be financed by existing financial institutions? How does the availability of insurance affect innovations in energy? They also examine how major investors and governments make decisions about the management of the volatile mix of political, economic, and technological risks that buffet the energy sector; critique the conventional wisdom concerning the major fuels; and project the likely evolution of the world energy market over the next decade.

"The Information and Communication Revolution and International Relations" published on by Oxford University Press.

This paper examines the substantial regulatory changes in North American telecommunications markets over the past decade. We argue that a combination of U.S. domestic politics and the logic of international strategic positioning produced substantial and far-reaching reform driven primarily by multilateral actions at the WTO and a set of unilateral U.S. initiatives (primarily benchmarks). Internationally, although NAFTA played an important role as a "building block" for the WTO agreement, we argue the lack of market coverage and more far-reaching WTO agreement ultimately limited NAFTA's role in driving reform. The logic of U.S. domestic politics also played a central role by putting certain constraints on what the U.S. would accept in a telecommunications trade deal. Specifically, there was broad political support for a deal, but the particular problems facing U.S. carriers in competitive international markets meant any deal had to cover all major telecommunications markets and had to address the very real anti-competitive opportunities open to foreign monopolists. Our argument suggests continued reform is likely to be driven primarily by the framework established at the WTO, although the U.S. will continue to use unilateral initiatives to drive reform acceptable to key U.S. political actors. ; Dieses Papier untersucht die erheblichen Regulierungsänderungen auf dem nordamerikanischen Telekommunikationsmarkt während der letzten Dekade. Wir argumentieren, dass die Kombination von amerikanischer Innenpolitik und internationalen strategischen Interessen bedeutende und weit reichende Reformen erzeugte, ausgelöst vor allem von multilateralen Aktivitäten in der WTO und einseitigen Initiativen der USA (insbesondere Benchmarks). Die NAFTA war zwar ein wichtiger ?Baustein? für das WTO-Abkommen, ihr begrenzter Wirkungsbereich und die weiter gehenden WTO-Vereinbarungen beeinträchtigten aber letztlich ihre Rolle als Triebkraft für Reformen. Die amerikanische Innenpolitik spielte einen zentralen Part, da sich hieraus Grenzen bezüglich der Inhalte eines Telekommunikationsabkommens ableiteten, das die USA zu akzeptieren bereit waren. Zwar gab es eine breite politische Unterstützung für ein Abkommen. Angesichts der spezifischen Probleme der amerikanischen Anbieter im internationalen Wettbewerb musste aber jede Vereinbarung alle großen Telekommunikationsmärkte umfassen, und sie musste den sehr konkreten Möglichkeiten ausländischer Monopolanbieter zur Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs Rechnung tragen. Unsere Überlegungen führen zu dem Ergebnis, dass weitere Reformen im Wesentlichen im Rahmen der WTO vorangetrieben werden dürften. Allerdings werden die USA auch in Zukunft einseitig Initiativen ergreifen, um Reformen durchzusetzen, die für ihre politischen Hauptakteure akzeptabel sind.