Suchergebnisse

Just a few years after becoming Africa's newest nation, South Sudan is embroiled in civil war and faces bankruptcy despite its ample oil wealth, thanks to a cynical scramble for the spoils of power.

When they celebrated independence on Jul 9, 2011, the people of South Sudan hoped that the fundamental problems that had doomed the united nation of Sudan over the previous 55 years had finally been resolved. At long last, as citizens of their own independent sovereign nation, South Sudanese would no longer be a minority subject to racial and religious discrimination, and robbed of their immense natural resources-water, farmland, and oil-by northern compatriots, who often bore a greater resemblance to colonizers than fellow citizens. Sudan achieved independence on Jan 1, 1956, as a huge and dysfunctional legacy of nineteenth-century conquest and twentieth-century colonial rule. Of the many tensions within Sudan, the most visible and recurrently violent was between a metropolitan elite that aspired to be part of the Arab Islamic world and the peoples of a southern periphery that experienced only repression and exploitation at the hands of the Khartoum elite. Adapted from the source document.

Libya's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa has been complex, troubled and misunderstood, both during the rule of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the conflict that culminated in his overthrow and death. The Libyan conflict of 2011 divided Africa, but nonetheless the African Union (AU) was able to agree on a political strategy aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement and power transition. The AU's peace initiative was launched in March 2011 and, contrary to widespread perception that the AU sought to prop up Gaddafi, it offered a credible and balanced option of a negotiated solution. United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 expressed support for the initiative, but in the event France, Britain and the United States blocked its chances of success. This article draws on evidence and analysis provided by the AU officials involved. It details the process whereby the AU adopted and implemented its decisions, and describes the AU's diplomatic engagement with Gaddafi and the National Transitional Council. The article also draws on information provided by Sudanese military and intelligence officials, providing an account, hitherto untold, of how the Sudanese government supported the Libyan opposition with military supplies, training and intelligence, in tacit cooperation with NATO countries. The article concludes with reflections on how the Libyan conflict has had an impact on the doctrine of the 'responsibility to protect', on the AU, and on Libya's relations with Africa. (International Affairs (Oxford) / SWP)

In the months following his death on 20 August, Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has been eulogized and demonized in equal measure. But his policies, and the transformational paradigm on which they were based, have rarely been elucidated. While alive, Meles was equally indifferent to praise and blame. To those who acclaimed Ethiopia's remarkable economic growth, he would ask, do they understand that his policies completely contradicted the neo-liberal Washington Consensus? To those who condemned his measures against the political opposition and civil society organizations, he demanded to know how they would define democracy and seek a feasible path to it, in a political economy dominated by patronage and rent seeking? Meles did not hide his views, but neither did he ever fully present his theory of the 'democratic developmental state' to an international audience. Over nearly 25 years, I was fortunate to be able to discuss political economy with him regularly, including critiquing his incomplete and unpublished master's dissertation. During this time, his thinking evolved, but his basic principles and sensibilities remained constant. World leaders have lauded Meles' economic achievements without acknowledging their theoretical basis. Human rights organizations have decried his political record as though he were a routine despot with no agenda other than hanging on to power. Reviewing his writings on the developmental state, this essay shows the unity of his theory and practice. Meles had the quiet certitude of someone who had been tested -- and seen his people tested -- to the limit. Along with his comrades in arms in the leadership of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), he had looked into the abyss of collective destruction, and his career was coloured by the knowledge that Ethiopia could still go over that precipice. Many times during sixteen years of armed struggle in the mountains ... Adapted from the source document.

Sudan experienced two inspirational popular uprisings that brought down military dictatorships, but the 'Arab Spring' passed it by. This paper analyses social movements and armed resistance within the dualistic structure of Sudan's centre and periphery. A pattern of alternating military and parliamentary government has been superceded by a militarised political marketplace, in which patrons and clients bargain over temporary loyalties, alongside secessionist movements and a residual urban civic activism. The paper examines the popular uprisings of 1964 and 1985, examining their short-term success but long-term failure, and reviews the last 20 years' of abortive efforts to stage a 'third intifada', noting the difficulties of simultaneously pursuing civic uprising and armed insurrection, and of aligning the objectives of liberal democracy and ethnic self-determination. Adapted from the source document.