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The paper revisits the empirical link between fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability. Our basic presumption is that by definition, the operation of automatic stabilizers should always and everywhere contribute to greater macroeconomic stability (output and consumption). However, two stylized facts seem at odds with that prediction. First, the moderating effect of automaticstabilizers appears to have weakened in advanced economies betweenthe mid-1990s and 2006 (the end of our main sample). Second, automatic stabilizers do not seem to be effective in developing economies. Our analysisaddresses these apparent puzzles by accounting for the government's ambivalent role as a shock absorber and a shock inducer for determinants of macroeconomic volatility over time. Results provide strong support for theview that fiscal stabilization operates mainly through automatic stabilizers. ; Este documento retoma el estudio de la relación empírica entre la políticafiscal y la estabilidad macroeconómica. Nuestro supuesto básico es que, pordefinición, el funcionamiento de los estabilizadores automáticas deberíasiempre y en todas partes contribuir a una mayor estabilidad macroeconómica(producción y consumo). Sin embargo, dos hechos estilizados parecen estar endesacuerdo con esa predicción. En primer lugar, el efecto moderador de losestabilizadores automáticos parece haberse debilitado en las economíasavanzadas entre los años 1990 y 2006. En segundo lugar, los estabilizadoresautomáticos no parecen ser eficaces en las economías en desarrollo. Nuestroanálisis aborda estos enigmas aparentes por medio del análisis del papelambivalente del gobierno como un amortiguador e inductor de shocks sobrelos determinantes de la volatilidad macroeconómica en el tiempo. Losresultados proporcionan un fuerte apoyo a la opinión de que la estabilizaciónfiscal opera principalmente a través de los estabilizadores automáticos.Palabras clave: Estabilización Económica; Política Fiscal; Estabilidad FiscalClasificación JEL: E62; H6 AbstractThe paper revisits the empirical link between fi scal policy and macroeconomicstability. Our basic presumption is that by defi nition, the operationof automatic stabilizers should always and everywhere contribute to greatermacroeconomic stability (output and consumption). However, two stylizedfacts seem at odds with that prediction. First, the moderating effect of automaticstabilizers appears to have weakened in advanced economies betweenthe mid-1990s and 2006 (the end of our main sample). Second, automaticstabilizers do not seem to be effective in developing economies. Our analysisaddresses these apparent puzzles by accounting for the government's ambivalentrole as a shock absorber and a shock inducer for determinants ofmacroeconomic volatility over time. Results provide strong support for theview that fi scal stabilization operates mainly through automatic stabilizers.Keywords: Economic stabilization ; Fiscal policy ; Fiscal stability.JEL Classifi cation: E62; H6.

The paper proposes a theoretical analysis illustrating some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of a rules-based fiscal framework reminiscent of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The analysis offers some insights on the current debate about the SGP. Specifically, greater "procedural" flexibility in the implementation of existing rules may improve welfare, thus increasing the Pact's political acceptability. Here, procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply well-informed judgment on the basis of underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality policy measures. Yet budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy, possibly destroying the case for flexibility. Also, improved budget monitoring and greater transparency increase the benefits from greater procedural flexibility. Overall, we establish that a fiscal pact based on a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can simultaneously contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality outlays.

This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A dynamic model of fiscal policy shows that optimal institutions lack credibility unless the costs to bypass them are sufficiently high. In our model, a combination of complete budgetary transparency and strong democratic accountability suffice to establish credibility. Under incomplete budgetary transparency, accountable governments may also use institutions as a signal of competence to increase their reelection chances, which in turn erodes the penchant for

Visiting scholar Xavier Debrun, and Bruegel director Jean Pisani-Ferry contribute to the emerging discussion on reform strategies in the euro area. An earlier version of this note was presented to the Eurogroup Working Group of the Economic Policy Committee of the EU.

The global surge in independent fiscal councils (IFCs) raises three related questions: How can IFCs improve the conduct of fiscal policy? Are they simultaneously desirable for voters and elected policymakers? And are they resilient to changes in political conditions? We build a model in which voters cannot observe the true competence of elected policymakers. IFCs' role is to mitigate this imperfection. Equilibrium public debt is excessive because policymakers are "partisan" and "opportunistic." If voters only care about policymakers' competence, both the incumbent and the voters would be better off with an IFC as the debt bias would fall. However, when other considerations eclipse competence and give the incumbent a strong electoral advantage or disadvantage, setting up an IFC may be counterproductive as the debt bias would increase. If the incumbent holds a moderate electoral advantage or disadvantage, voters would prefer an IFC, but an incumbent with a large advantage may prefer not to have an IFC. The main policy implications are that (i) establishing an IFC can only lower the debt bias if voters care sufficiently about policymakers' competence; (ii) not all political environments are conducive to the emergence of IFCs; and (iii) IFCs are vulnerable to shifts in political conditions.

Abstract.  We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal‐monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs. JEL classification: E58, E61, E62, F33

It is widely argued that Europe's unified monetary policy calls for the international coordination at the fiscal level. We survey the issues involved with such coordination of fiscal policy as a demand management tool and we use a simple model to investigate the circumstances under which coordination may be desirable. It turns out that coordination is beneficial when the correlation of the shocks hitting the various economies is low. However, given the potentially adverse reaction by the ECB (as a result of free-riding and/or a conflict on the orientation of the policy mix), fiscal coordination is likely to be counterproductive when demand or supply shocks are highly symmetric across countries and the governments are unable to acquire a strategic leadership position vis-à-vis the ECB.

We propose a fiscal rule that fulfills a specific debt reduction objective while maintaining significant fiscal flexibility-two overarching concerns in Israel. Not unlike the Swiss ""debt brake,"" the rule incorporates an error-correction mechanism (ECM) through which departure from the debt objective affects binding medium-run expenditure ceilings. Two variants of our ECM rule are shown to be superior to a comparable deficit rule in terms of attaining the debt objective and allowing for fiscal stabilization while supporting medium-term expenditure planning. Given its relative sophistication

The paper takes stock of the debate on the positive link between output volatility and the size of government-which reflects automatic stabilizers. After a survey of the literature, we show that the contribution of automatic stabilizers to output stability may have disappeared since the 1990s. However, econometric analysis suggests that the breakdown in the government size-volatility relationship largely reflects temporary developments (better monetary management and financial intermediation). Once these factors are taken into account, the stabilizing role of government size remains important