Suchergebnisse

A partire dagli anni Settanta si è assistito alla diffusione a livello globale di politiche di riforma amministrativa basate sul New Public Management, un insieme di misure che avrebbe dovuto garantire il suo sicuro successo in ogni paese e in ogni stagione. L'idea di applicare in modo aprioristico le medesime soluzioni in contesti istituzionali molto diversi tra loro, spesso poco adatti a recepirle, si è però mostrata scarsamente efficace. In risposta alla crisi del New Public Management, è emersa l'ipotesi di analizzare singoli processi di innovazione mettendo in luce le scelte degli attori che, operando in uno specifico contesto in continuo movimento, hanno modellato il design del cambiamento. Per questa via, diventa possibile estrapolare da questi studi delle lezioni di policy che possono essere apprese da altri innovatori per progettare interventi di riforma in diversi contesti. Il volume si colloca in questo filone emergente di ricerche.

A widespread strategy to enhance political control over permanent bureaucracy consists of the politicization of personnel policy through the appointment of ministerial advisers. This study sets out to investigate the appointment of ministerial advisers from an historical institutionalist perspective emphasizing the influence of institutional legacies on current empirical patterns. Drawing on this perspective, it identifies three patterns of institutional stability, radical, and gradual change in terms of ministerial advisers' policy competence and political loyalty, which guide the empirical analysis. Empirical patterns are illustrated with data collected in Italy, based on an analysis of a combination of career pathways and expert interviews. The Italian case is noteworthy since it experienced an abrupt party system breakdown in the early 1990s. Yet, the empirical analysis reveals that the massive re-alignment of the party system has not implied a pattern of radical change in Italy. The legacy of stable administrative structures has only left room for gradual change to occur on the dimensions of ministerial advisers' policy competence and political loyalty.

This article analyzes the Italian government's response to the sovereign debt crisis. Given the severity of the fiscal crisis affecting Italy, this article provides insights about the crisis's implication for public administration in such a politically sensitive environment where drastic and far-reaching measures had to be taken by the government. Drawing on the historical institutionalist approach, the impact of the crisis is not considered in isolation but in the context of the historical trajectory that has shaped the government's capacity to respond. To assess the crisis's implications for public administration, the empirical analysis focuses on public employment as an area that is especially exposed to fiscal restraint. The findings reveal that the current crisis has been managed with straight cutback management, as public administration has been considered by policy makers just as a source of public expenditure to be squeezed rather than as a provider of public services in need of modernization so as to sustain economic growth.

Dans le présent article, nous examinons les transformations dont font l'objet les cabinets ministériels en tant que structures consultatives bien établies dans l'exécutif italien depuis le début des années 90, lorsque le système de partis s'est effondré et qu'un cycle permanent de réformes de la gestion publique a été mis en place. Nous allons examiner comment l'influence des conseillers ministériels s'est peu à peu renforcée dans la coordination de l'exécutif, en venant combler le vide laissé en termes de capacité de gouvernance par l'institutionnalisation manquée du nouveau système des partis. Notre analyse empirique épingle ainsi la constellation d'acteurs qui ont reproduit les cabinets ministériels en tant qu'héritage du passé dans la structure actuelle du système italien, entravant au final l'innovation visée par les structures de gouvernance conformes aux normes internationales. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Le présent article entend enrichir la littérature sur le développement du personnel ministériel en tant que manifestation essentielle de la politisation grandissante de la fonction publique. Grâce à son explication plus nuancées de l'héritage, axée sur l'identification des mécanismes causaux qui relient les systèmes institutionnels et les choix des acteurs dans les processus de réforme, notre article peut également enrichir les débats généraux sur le rôle du temps dans la gestion publique. Il porte également un regard intégré sur les différentes politiques de réforme de la fonction publique afin d'analyser les interrelations des évolutions administratives.

The article explores the transformations which have occurred in ministerial cabinets as entrenched advisory structures in the Italian executive since the early 1990s when the party system collapsed and a permanent cycle of public management reforms was introduced. It examines how ministerial advisers have acquired a greater role in executive coordination filling the void of governing capacity left by the failed institutionalization of the new party system. In doing so, the empirical analysis identifies the constellation of actors that reproduced ministerial cabinets as a legacy of the past in the present set-up of the Italian system, eventually hindering the innovation of governance structures according to international standards.Points for practitionersThis article seeks to contribute to the literature on the development of ministerial staff as a key manifestation of increasing public service politicization. With its more nuanced type of legacy explanation, focused on the identification of causal mechanisms that link institutional arrangements and actor choices in reform processes, the article can also contribute to general debates on the role of time in public management. It also recommends an integrated focus on the different policies of civil service reform in order to map interrelations of administrative changes.