Suchergebnisse

Despite continuing difficulties, European institutions for the management of civil-military operations have developed to the stage where more than brief, tentative experiments can be embarked upon with some confidence. The greatest challenges faced by the EU are not in the efficacious employment of armed force, but rather in formulating and applying the broader political-military strategy which must underlie it. Outside of Europe, the most efficient way for European governments to contribute to international peace operations will be to assign national contingents directly to UN peacekeeping missions. It is, thus, time for European governments, militaries and populations to get over the trauma of Srebrenica and related UN failures in the Balkans in the early 1990s, take on board the subsequent improvement in the UN's performance, and begin once again to do their share in manning, as they are already doing in paying for, these efforts. (Survival / SWP)

In the United States, military and foreign policies are most obviously shaped by the president. Presidential personality clearly influences the sort of decision-making process each incumbent feels comfortable with: whether he prefers oral or written interactions, has an appetite for detail, or can tolerate conflict among and with subordinates. A review of the personal styles of five American presidents reveals three broad approaches that can be categorised as 'formalistic', 'competitive' and 'collegial'. The first approach, often associated with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, emphasises order and hierarchy. The second, epitomised by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, seeks wisdom through the clash of ideas among competing subordinates. The third, identified with George H.W. Bush, encourages greater cooperation among these advisers. As these examples suggest, all three models can yield excellent results. They can also produce quite unsatisfactory outcomes. (Survival / SWP)

James Dobbins; Sarah Harting; Dalia Dassa Kaye ; Summary of a conference held by the RAND Corporation on Mar. 21, 2007 in Washington, D.C. ; "CF-237-NSRD"--P. [4] of cover ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 87) ; Electronic reproduction, Boulder, Colo : NetLibrary, 2007 ; Parallel als Buch-Ausg. erschienen

Preparation for nation-building requires that responsible political leaders consult both with regional and functional experts, those who know why the society in question descended into conflict and those who know from experience elsewhere how to put such societies back together. Goals must be established which transcend the most immediate and normally negative purposes of the inter vention, e.g. halting conflict, stopping genocide or turning back aggression. These positive goals must be commensurate with the scale of military manpower and economic assistance likely to be committed. The larger the social transformation envisaged, the greater the resistance likely to be encountered. The most common cause for the failure of nation-building endeavours is a mismatch between objectives and commitments. (Survival / SWP)