Not the Third World War: The Heathrow Succession Rights Affair and AngloAmerican Relations 19901991
In: Diplomacy & statecraft, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 529-549
ISSN: 0959-2296
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In: Diplomacy & statecraft, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 529-549
ISSN: 0959-2296
In: Political studies review, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 416-416
ISSN: 1478-9302
In: Political studies review, Band 11, Heft 3, S. 416
ISSN: 1478-9299
In: Diplomacy and statecraft, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 785-786
ISSN: 1557-301X
In: Diplomacy & statecraft, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 785-786
ISSN: 0959-2296
In: Diplomacy & statecraft, Band 23, Heft 4, S. 785-786
ISSN: 0959-2296
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 98-119
ISSN: 1531-3298
The U.S. strategic embargo against the Soviet bloc, adopted in 1947–1948, had been designed to restrict the supply of weapons technology to the Soviet Union and to retard Soviet economic growth. When these objectives failed to materialize by 1957, a lengthy reevaluation of the purpose, benefits, and costs of the embargo ensued. The Kennedy administration eventually concluded that the strategic embargo was an integral part of U.S. Cold War strategy and, as such, could not be abandoned without suffering important diplomatic costs. The embargo became a means of bargaining with the Soviet Union and a medium through which to convey messages. Like any other tool of statecraft, the embargo proved to be as flexible as officials wanted to make it. Even if it failed in its original purpose, it could be used in other ways.
In: Journal of Cold War studies, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 98-119
ISSN: 1520-3972
The U.S. strategic embargo against the Soviet bloc, adopted in 1947-1948, had been designed to restrict the supply of weapons technology to the Soviet Union and to retard Soviet economic growth. When these objectives failed to materialize by 1957, a lengthy reevaluation of the purpose, benefits, and costs of the embargo ensued. The Kennedy administration eventually concluded that the strategic embargo was an integral part of U.S. Cold War strategy and, as such, could not be abandoned without suffering important diplomatic costs. The embargo became a means of bargaining with the Soviet Union and a medium through which to convey messages. Like any other tool of statecraft, the embargo proved to be as flexible as officials wanted to make it. Even if it failed in its original purpose, it could be used in other ways. Adapted from the source document.
In: Diplomacy and statecraft, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 136-160
ISSN: 1557-301X
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 283-284
ISSN: 1875-8223
In: International affairs, Band 84, Heft 6, S. 1335-1336
ISSN: 0020-5850
In: Les relations internationales au temps de la guerre froide, S. 189-226
In: European foreign affairs review, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 600-601
ISSN: 1875-8223
In: Diplomatic history, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 531-556
ISSN: 1467-7709
In: Diplomatic history, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 375-378
ISSN: 1467-7709