Suchergebnisse

"This volume discusses the formation of government cabinets within twenty European democracies, providing the institutional background to the selection and de-selection of ministers." "The book is the first output of the Selection and De-selection of Political Elites international network of scholars (SEDEPE) and will provide a major source of information for all scholars interested in the formation, maintenance and termination of cabinets and the nature of ministerial government. The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and firing will also be of broader interest to students of European government and political institutions."--BOOK JACKET.

Abstract. The utility of comparative politics has been questioned from time to time in two ways. Doubts have been cast upon its ability to offer genuine and useful generalisations, and these doubts have been reinforced by the appearance of studies which, while statistically adventurous, are not grounded upon a sufficiently sound theoretical base. In this paper we consider Alasdair MacIntyre's objections to the idea of a science of comparative politics, and discuss the nature of law‐like generalisations. We explore the extent to which MacIntyre's objections may be overcome, and indicate the form that generalisations about political stability could take. We also argue that studies of stability need a clear explanatory linkage between the empirical data they utilise and the hypotheses of a theory about political stability. This is often lacking in such studies, which seem to substitute a sophisticated statistical technique for genuine political theory.

ABSTRACTFew extended analyses of the concept of political stability have been published, much of the literature concentrating on an analysis of its causes. This article discusses the main approaches to stability and examines two recent conceptualizations by Ake and by Sanders. It is argued that both are unsatisfactory, and an alternative definition is developed, starting from first principles. The problems of identity and change are examined, and what counts as the survival of a political object is specified. A stable political object is defined as one that possesses the capacity to prevent its own forced non‐survival. It is argued that stability cannot be quantified and that there are thus no degrees of stability.

FEW EXTENDED ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL STABILITY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, MUCH OF THE LITERATURE CONCENTRATING ON AN ANALYSIS OF ITS CAUSES. THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE MAIN APPROACHES TO STABILITY AND EXAMINES TWO RECENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS BY AKE AND BY SANDERS. IT IS ARGUED THAT BOTH ARE UNSATISFACTORY, AND AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION IS DEVELOPED, STARTING FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES. THE PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY AND CHANGE ARE EXAMINED, AND WHAT COUNTS AS THE SURVIVAL OF A POLITICAL OBJECT IS SPECIFIED. A STABLE POLITICAL OBJECT IN DEFINED AS ONE THAT POSSESSES THE CAPACITY TO PREVENT ITS OWN FORCED NON-SURVIVAL. IT IS ARGUED THAT STABILITY CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED AND THAT THERE ARE THUS NO DEGREES OF STABILITY.

Accounting for Ministers uses the tools of modern political science to analyse the factors which determine the fortunes of Cabinet ministers. Utilising agency theory, it describes Cabinet government as a system of incentives for prime ministerial and parliamentary rule. The authors use a unique dataset of ministers from 1945 to 2007 to examine the structural and individual characteristics that lead to the selection and durability of ministers. Sensitive to historical context, it describes the unique features of different Prime Ministers and the sorts of issues and scandals that lead to the forced exit of ministers. The authors identify the structural factors that determine ministerial performance and tenure, seeing resignation calls as performance indicators. Probing the nature of individual and collective responsibility within Westminster forms of government, its rigorous analysis provides powerful new insights into the nature of Cabinet government

The Tiebout model, which theorizes that residential choice can regulate the supply of local collective goods, has generated much criticism, but few empirical tests of its behavioural assumptions. The article presents the findings of the first British micro-level test of the effect of local taxes and services on geographical mobility, a postal survey of households' moving decisions in four London boroughs during the years of the poll tax. Taxes and services are found to be important factors in the moving decision, corroborating the behavioural assumptions of the model. Respondents acted Tiebout-rationally as those moving into low tax/good service quality boroughs are more likely to cite low taxes and good services as a moving factor than those doing the reverse. The policy implications, however, remain contingent on political orientation. (British Journal of Political Science / AuD)

'Justice' and 'democracy' have alternated as dominant themes in political philosophy over the last fifty years. Since its revival in the middle of the twentieth century, political philosophy has focused on first one and then the other of these two themes. Rarely, however, has it succeeded in holding them in joint focus. This volume brings together leading authors who consider the relationship between democracy and justice in a set of specially written chapters. The intrinsic justness of democracy is challenged, the relationship between justice, democracy and impartiality queried and the relationship between justice, democracy and the common good examined. Further chapters explore the problem of social exclusion and issues surrounding sub-national groups in the context of democracy and justice. Authors include Keith Dowding, Richard Arneson, Norman Schofield, Albert Weale, Robert E. Goodin, Jon Elster, David Miller, Phillip Pettit, Julian LeGrand and Russell Hardin