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"This book examines the evidence for the theory that there are fundamental differences between American and European public attitudes about the acceptability of military force. Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia show that Americans and Europeans share similar attitudes on international affairs but do indeed differ considerably on the issue of military force. This became evident in a number of recent cases of international conflict and military interventions, such as the war over Kosovo just before the millennium, as well as the military actions in the fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. Using new data Everts and Isernia chart and explain these attitudes and their determinants. Public Opinion, Transatlantic Relations and the Use of Force takes a deliberately comparative and transatlantic perspective in exploring the sources of these differences and in discussing the political implications of the transatlantic gap on the use of force, as well as in its assessment of the conditions under which it could be bridged or might be aggravated"--

This book examines the ways in which the relationship between public opinion and the use of military force has developed since the end of the Cold War. It addresses the question of whether a democratic foreign policy is possible.

It is often argued today that a deep and troublesome gap across the Atlantic has been developing and that Europeans and Americans no longer share the same view of the world. On the basis of data gathered in the 2002 Transatlantic Trends Survey, held in the USA and six European countries, this article assesses whether there is indeed such a gap at the mass level. It focuses on three major dimensions of world views: (1) perceptions of threats (2) the sense of affinity with other countries in terms of allies, friends or foes, and (3) attitudes toward the use of force, both in general and in specific circumstances, more particularly the war over Iraq. It concludes that European publics in 2002 looked at the world in a way that is rather similar to that of many ordinary Americans including harbouring deep reservations about the conduct of certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Both publics share fundamental worldviews. On Iraq, Europeans and Americans agreed in some respects (such as the necessary role of the UN) but disagreed on other. In many respects at the mass level the differences across the Atlantic are of degree, and not fundamental. They result from disaffection with the present administration rather than with US policies in general. Moreover, the alleged European 'anti-Americanism' is a misnomer, which hides the considerable sympathies and warm feelings towards America, and the perceived common interests and values.

Draws on 2002 & 2003 Transatlantic Trends survey data to explore the nature & structure of the transatlantic divide with regard to war & peace. Public opinion findings indicate that Americans & Europeans both want to be engaged in the world, still basically like one another, would like to work together as partners, & also see the threats facing both sides of the Atlantic in similar ways. In this light, how & why did such a dramatic divergence in public opinion over the war in Iraq occurred is examined. Fundamental beliefs that drive & shape public opinion are identified. To shed light on differences across the Atlantic as well as differences within the US & European countries, a typology of foreign policy attitudes is devised, its validity is tested, & what it indicates is discussed. The typology is then used to address the divide on Iraq & what might occur with regard to future conflicts with Iran & North Korea. The typology suggests that the transatlantic divide is less a "gap" between US & Europe than the effect of the differing structures of attitudes on the use of force & the relative size & weight of differing groupings in different countries of the alliance. In closing, the importance of building policy support, particularly related to use of force, is noted. Figures. Adapted from the source document.

This essay examines the premise that coalition decision units can produce a variety of decision outcomes, despite fragmentation of political authority. It presents examples to illustrate each of the basic coalition configurations in decision rules: (1) a multiparty coalition cabinet that requires unanimous agreement, (2) interbureaucratic decisions requiring only a majority vote, & (3) a revolutionary coalition in an authoritarian regime with no decision rules. The authors begin with a theoretical overview of coalition decision units & foreign policy, & then proceed to a discussion of how decision rules shape policy. Examples include the Dutch government's decision regarding NATO deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe in the early 1980s; the Japanese government's handling of the 1971 exchange rate crisis; & the events surrounding the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis & seizure of the American Embassy. The authors conclude that a coalition of multiple autonomous actors is a dynamic process that can produce a wide range of outcomes. 1 Figure, 119 References. J. R. Callahan