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Abstract. Do niche parties occupying left‐right policy positions that diverge sharply from the centre of the voter distribution gain more popular support than those moderately positioned along the left‐right continuum? Cross‐sectional analyses, based on observations from twelve Western European countries from 1984–1998, are presented that suggest the answer is 'yes'. By contrast, these analyses strongly suggest that for mainstream parties, policy radicalism depresses popular support. The implication of these findings is that for niche parties, it is the distinctiveness of their left‐right positions that enhances their competitiveness in democratic elections. While this finding runs counter to the intuition of standard spatial theory, it is consistent with recent dynamic accounts of niche party responsiveness to shifts in public opinion and electoral support for niche parties. These findings have implications for party strategies, spatial theories and the understanding of political representation.

Abstract. We present cross‐national analyses – both cross‐sectional and longitudinal – estimating the vote shares for approximately 80 parties across Western Europe from 1984 to 1998. The results indicate that parties' vote shares increase with their proximity to the centre of the voter distribution, although the effects are relatively small. These findings corroborate the theoretical results reported by Lin et al. in their article 'Equilibrium in Multicandidate Probabilistic Spatial Voting' (Public Choice, Vol. 98, pp. 59–82), and provide support for conclusions reported by other authors who rely on simulations of individual‐level data from national election surveys.

Numerous studies conclude that declining turnout is harmful for democracy. However, we uncover the arguably positive effect that political parties become more responsive to the median voter in the election after turnout has decreased. We assume that parties are vote seeking and show that moderate voters are responsible for changes in turnout, and we argue that declining turnout in an election sends a clear signal to political parties that there is an opportunity to mobilize disaffected voters in the following election by responding to changes in public opinion. We report the results of statistical analyses on data from thirteen democracies from 1977 to 2018 that provide evidence that declining voter turnout in one inter-election period is associated with increasing party responsiveness to public opinion in the following period. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of voter turnout, political representation, and parties' election strategies.

AbstractNumerous studies conclude that declining turnout is harmful for democracy. However, we uncover the arguably positive effect that political parties become more responsive to the median voter in the election after turnout has decreased. We assume that parties are vote seeking and show that moderate voters are responsible for changes in turnout, and we argue that declining turnout in an election sends a clear signal to political parties that there is an opportunity to mobilize disaffected voters in the following election by responding to changes in public opinion. We report the results of statistical analyses on data from thirteen democracies from 1977 to 2018 that provide evidence that declining voter turnout in one inter-election period is associated with increasing party responsiveness to public opinion in the following period. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of voter turnout, political representation, and parties' election strategies.

We focus on one of the most salient policy issues of our time, immigration, and evaluate whether the salience of immigration in governing parties' manifestos translates into actual legislative activity on immigration. We contend that democratic policymakers have genuine incentives to do so. Furthermore, we argue that the country context matters for pledge-fulfillment, and we find that the migration salience of governing parties' manifestos more strongly translates into policy activity when the level of immigration restrictions is higher and when countries' economies perform well. This research has important implications for our understanding of the relationships between economic performance, democratic representation, and immigration policy making.

AbstractWe focus on one of the most salient policy issues of our time, immigration, and evaluate whether the salience of immigration in governing parties' manifestos translates into actual legislative activity on immigration. We contend that democratic policymakers have genuine incentives to do so. Furthermore, we argue that the country context matters for pledge fulfillment, and we find that the migration salience of governing parties' manifestos more strongly translates into policy activity when the level of immigration restrictions is higher and when countries' economies perform well. This research has important implications for our understanding of the relationships between economic performance, democratic representation and immigration policy making.

Previous research has argued that while elections motivate parties to respond to public sentiment, global economic ties reduce this responsiveness by redirecting elites from their electorates and toward market actors. In this study, we extend this work to examine the influence of globalization on party responsiveness across different forms of production-welfare regimes. Coordinated market economies (CMEs) accommodate economic interdependence by striking corporatist bargains between political elites, trade union representatives, and organized business. Although these consensual relations facilitate economic stability, they also insulate policymakers from voters. Analyses that pair public opinion and party positions across 18 advanced capitalist democracies from 1977 to 2009 show that while CMEs permit political elites a wide room to maneuver under economic globalization, political parties competing in these organized market economies do not respond to public opinion. This is the case regardless of level of exposure to world markets. In CMEs, party position-taking is uninfluenced by external factors (economic globalization) and domestic factors (public opinion) alike. By examining the consequences for party behavior, our results raise questions about the virtues of coordinated market capitalism for the health of representative democracy.