Suchergebnisse

Scholars and commentators have long debated a `unilateralist' tendency in US foreign policy, but have largely neglected the question of how other states attempt to deal with the problem, particularly with increasing US opposition to multilateral treaty intiatives. This article describes and explains European responses to US unilateralism in three transatlantic conflicts over multilateral arms control agreements: the AntiPersonnel Landmines Ban, the UN Process on Small Arms, and the Biological Weapons Protocol. The article shows that European responses have varied between accommodation and resistance, and tests hypotheses about four potential determinants of European choices: expected treaty effectiveness, transatlantic rivalry, consensus norms, and the influence of non-government activists. The findings suggest that European responses reflect a strong concern for treaty effectiveness, but are also constrained by norms of consensual decision-making. Activist pressure can overcome this `compromise bias' of government diplomacy.

Unlike other articles on the International Criminal Court (ICC) that focus on the question of the court's future effectiveness, this article seeks to explain the creation of the court and its institutional design as established in its statute. It applies theoretical arguments from the rationalist and constructivist literature on international institutions to the ICC case; and demonstrates how both theoretical perspectives can be combined in different ways. The ICC's establishment can be explained with rationalist arguments focusing on cooperation problems and transaction cost, yet a constructivist view can 'deepen' the argument by explaining the perception of problems, and provide an alternative argument focusing on legitimacy concerns. Regarding institutional design, rationalist theory helps identify a tradeoff between a weak court backed by the US and a strong court without US support; a complementary constructivist approach can explain why states opted for the latter.