Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- 20 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Inconsistency Paradox (aka Reinforcement Paradox) in a Restricted Domain -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- Which of the 20 Voting Procedures Satisfy or Violate the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) in a Restricted Domain? -- The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the Preference Inversion Paradox in a Restricted Domain -- Summary

Intro -- Preface -- References -- Contents -- 1 Introduction -- Abstract -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 2 Voting Paradoxes -- Abstract -- 2.1 Simple Paradoxes -- 2.1.1 The Condorcet Winner Paradox (Condorcet de 1785 -- Black 1958) -- 2.1.2 The Absolute Majority Winner Paradox -- 2.1.3 The Condorcet Loser or Borda Paradox (Borda de 1784 -- Black 1958) -- 2.1.4 The Absolute Majority Loser Paradox -- 2.1.5 The Pareto (or Dominated Candidate) Paradox (Fishburn 1974) -- 2.2 Conditional Paradoxes -- 2.2.1 Additional Support (or Lack of Monotonicity or Negative Responsiveness) Paradox (Smith 1973 -- Fishburn 1974a -- Fishburn and Brams 1983) -- 2.2.2 Reinforcement (or Inconsistency or Multiple Districts) Paradox (Young 1974) -- 2.2.3 Truncation Paradox (Brams 1982 -- Fishburn and Brams 1983) -- 2.2.4 No-Show Paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983 -- Ray 1986 -- Moulin 1988b -- Holzman 1988/1989 -- Perez 1995) -- 2.2.5 Twin Paradox (Moulin 1988b) -- 2.2.6 Violation of the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) (Fishburn 1974b, c -- 1977) -- 2.2.7 Preference Inversion Paradox -- 2.2.8 Dependence on Order of Voting (DOV) Paradox (Farquharson 1969) -- Exercises -- Answers to Exercises -- References -- 3 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single Candidate -- Abstract -- 3.1 Non-Ranked Voting Procedures -- 3.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure -- 3.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure -- 3.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983) -- 3.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson 1969) -- 3.2 Ranked Voting Procedures that are not Condorcet-Consistent -- 3.2.1 Borda's Count (Borda 1784 -- Black 1958) -- 3.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff) -- 3.2.3 Coombs' Method (Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399 -- Straffin 1980 -- Coombs et al. 1984) -- 3.2.4 Bucklin's Method (Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491

This book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.

Annotation This volume presents theoretical and empirical aspects of single- and multi-winner voting procedures. It examines the susceptibility of procedures to the main voting paradoxes and discusses the relevance of the theoretical results to the choice of voting system.

This work measures a priori voting power in social choice theory, presenting a systematic and critical examination of a priori voting, and analyzing the foundations and methodological assumptions underlying the theory. At the same time, it presents case study examples