Articles - The Macroeconomic Consequences of Anticipated Price Reform
In: Economics & politics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 311-332
ISSN: 0954-1985
32 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Economics & politics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 311-332
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Economics & politics, Band 10, Heft 3, S. 311
ISSN: 0954-1985
In: Comparative economic studies, Band 35, Heft 2, S. 1-17
ISSN: 1478-3320
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 105-117
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTA two‐period macroeconomic model where consumption and investment decisions are given microeconomic foundations is presented. The model is used to analyse the effects of both current and anticipated fiscal expansion; careful attention is paid to the implications of the government's intertemporal budget constraint. It is shown that anticipated fiscal expansion may, in certain circumstances, be expansionary. Also, current fiscal expansion, if financed by bonds which are retired through future money creation, may be contractionary.
In this paper a two-period two-good open economy macroeconomic model is constructed. Consumption and money holding decision are based on intertemporal optimization. In the first period (in the 'short-un') some prices are inflexible and Keynesian unemployment occurs. In the second period (in the 'long-run') all prices are flexible and markets clear. The model is used to analyze fiscal policy (paying careful attention to the implications of the government's budget constraint), increased domestic output of a resource (oil) and the consequences of a rise in the world price of the resource.
BASE
In: The Economic Journal, Band 94, Heft 373, S. 169
In: The Manchester School, Band 82, Heft 3, S. 322-346
ISSN: 1467-9957
A model where a dictator decides on both the level of public‐sector capital and whether to democratize is constructed. Under dictatorship the labour market is monopsonistic; democratization involves instituting a competitive labour market. Workers sometimes have a credible threat of revolution and this may affect the dictator's investment decision; it may also induce democratization. The possibility of a 'political development trap', where the dictator stifles development to stay in power, emerges. The model is used, inter alia, to explain the effects of the 1832 Reform Act in the UK and the worldwide positive correlation between income and democracy.
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 121, Heft 553, S. 763-792
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: The Economic Journal, Band 106, Heft 434, S. 236
In: The Manchester School, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 257-273
ISSN: 1467-9957
In: Journal of international economics, Band 37, Heft 1-2, S. 49-63
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Economica, Band 59, Heft 233, S. 131
In: The Economic Journal, Band 99, Heft 397, S. 806
In: The Economic Journal, Band 97, Heft 385, S. 106
In: The Economic Journal, Band 96, Heft 383, S. 862