Suchergebnisse

Once an agreement is signed at the international level, it can no longer be modified during the domestic decision‐making process. However, it is possible to compensate potential veto players by a purely domestic legislative act. Under which circumstances do such side‐payments make sense, and what is the role played by political strategies? In order to be compensated, an actor needs to be considered a veto player. Furthermore, the defenders of the international agreement must have a sufficiently large interest in its ratification to be willing to offer compensations. These basic conditions fulfilled, the existence or not of side‐payments depends on the strategic interactions between the political actors. In the last ten years, Swiss citizens had to vote twice on an international agreement establishing free movement of persons. In both cases, the unions asked for flanking measures; while they failed in their attempt in the context of the European Economic Area, they succeeded in the case of the bilateral agreements. This difference in outcome is all the more surprising since in both cases the unions were in a veto player position and the export oriented economy had a strong interest in the ratification of the agreements. This article explains the different fate of the unions' claims by stressing the role of changes in actor strategies. The credibility of the threat to block the decision‐making process and the succession of the game sequences are in this perspective of paramount importance. By using strategically the veto threat, domestic groups such as unions are able to benefit from internationalisation.

By using some simple tools of game theory, this contribution examines the impact of Europeanization on the strategic bargaining capacities of the unions in Switzerland. To this end, the bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons -- as an example of Europeanization by international treaty -- is compared to the process of the unbundling of the local loop, an example where Switzerland adopts European law without contractual commitment. In the case of Europeanization by treaty, the unions always have the possibility of resorting to the referendum. Thus, provided that the unions can credibly present themselves as an important veto player in the process, they can either block the ratification or receive side-payments in exchange for their support. In this perspective, Europeanization does not weaken their position compared to a purely national law-making process; depending on the actor constellation, their position may even be strengthened. With regard to "autonomous adaptation," however, the threat of blocking the procedure is only available if the ordinary law-making procedure is chosen. Yet, given that Europeanization leads to delegation of important competencies to executive authorities, possibilities to circumvent these veto points often exist. In this case, the unions lose their veto player position. 1 Table, 3 Graphs, 44 References. Adapted from the source document.

Once an agreement is signed at the international level, it can no longer be modified during the domestic decision-making process. However, it is possible to compensate potential veto players by a purely domestic legislative act. Under which circumstances do such side-payments make sense, & what is the role played by political strategies? In order to be compensated, an actor needs to be considered a veto player. Furthermore, the defenders of the international agreement must have a sufficiently large interest in its ratification to be willing to offer compensations. These basic conditions fulfilled, the existence or not of side-payments depends on the strategic interactions between the political actors. In the last ten years, Swiss citizens had to vote twice on an international agreement establishing free movement of persons. In both cases, the unions asked for flanking measures; while they failed in their attempt in the context of the European Economic Area, they succeeded in the case of the bilateral agreements. This difference in outcome is all the more surprising since in both cases the unions were in a veto player position & the export oriented economy had a strong interest in the ratification of the agreements. This article explains the different fate of the unions' claims by stressing the role of changes in actor strategies. The credibility of the threat to block the decision-making process & the succession of the game sequences are in this perspective of paramount importance. By using strategically the veto threat, domestic groups such as unions are able to benefit from internationalization. 4 Graphs, 51 References. Adapted from the source document.

"Dieser Beitrag untersucht mit einem einfachen spieltheoretischen Instrumentarium, wie sich die Europäisierung auf die strategischen Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Gewerkschaften in der Schweiz auswirkt. Dazu wird als Beispiel für die Europäisierung über einen Staatsvertrag das Personenverkehrs-Abkommen mit dem Entscheidungsprozess über die Entbündelung der letzten Meile verglichen, der als Beispiel für den 'autonomen Nachvollzug' untersucht wird. Bei der vertraglichen Europäisierung steht den Gewerkschaften in jedem Fall eine Referendumsmöglichkeit zur Verfügung. Sofern die Gewerkschaften sich als Vetospielerin präsentieren können, sind sie in der Lage, entweder die Ratifizierung zu verhindern oder Side-Payments zum Vertrag einzufordern. Insofern ist ihre Stellung im Vergleich zu einem rein nationalen Gesetzgebungsprozess nicht geschwächt - je nach Akteurs-Konstellation kann sie sogar gestärkt werden. Beim autonomen Nachvollzug steht diese Blockadedrohung hingegen nur dann zur Verfügung, wenn das EU-Recht über eine Gesetzesrevision implementiert werden soll. Weil die ausführenden Behörden in europäisierten Politikbereichen vielfach weit reichende Kompetenzen erhalten haben, kann jedoch der Vetopunkt des Referendums oft umgangen werden. Damit verlieren die Gewerkschaften ihre Rolle als Vetospielerin." (Autorenreferat)

'Dieser Beitrag untersucht mit einem einfachen spieltheoretischen Instrumentarium, wie sich die Europäisierung auf die strategischen Handlungsmöglichkeiten der Gewerkschaften in der Schweiz auswirkt. Dazu wird als Beispiel für die Europäisierung über einen Staatsvertrag das Personenverkehrs-Abkommen mit dem Entscheidungsprozess über die Entbündelung der letzten Meile verglichen, der als Beispiel für den 'autonomen Nachvollzug' untersucht wird. Bei der vertraglichen Europäisierung steht den Gewerkschaften in jedem Fall eine Referendumsmöglichkeit zur Verfügung. Sofern die Gewerkschaften sich als Vetospielerin präsentieren können, sind sie in der Lage, entweder die Ratifizierung zu verhindern oder Side-Payments zum Vertrag einzufordern. Insofern ist ihre Stellung im Vergleich zu einem rein nationalen Gesetzgebungsprozess nicht geschwächt - je nach Akteurs-Konstellation kann sie sogar gestärkt werden. Beim autonomen Nachvollzug steht diese Blockadedrohung hingegen nur dann zur Verfügung, wenn das EU-Recht über eine Gesetzesrevision implementiert werden soll. Weil die ausführenden Behörden in europäisierten Politikbereichen vielfach weit reichende Kompetenzen erhalten haben, kann jedoch der Vetopunkt des Referendums oft umgangen werden. Damit verlieren die Gewerkschaften ihre Rolle als Vetospielerin.' (Autorenreferat)

The rules of the game in the sense of the legal framework are of major importance for negotiations between social partners. In Switzerland, these rules have changed with the adoption of the flanking measures to the free movement of persons' treaty. One has, among other modifications, eased the conditions for declaring a collective wage agreement compulsory in the case of wage dumping. The employers associations had divergent preferences with regard to this modification. So far, one has explained this difference by the opposition between domestic and export oriented economy. However, the analysis of employers associations' statements shows that the domestic economy did not unanimously accept the flanking measures. This contribution examines the divergence of interests inside the domestic economy and explains it by variations in the strength of the unions. Domestic sectors that are confronted with strong unions (for instance the construction sector), have an interest in facilitating the extension of compulsory wage agreements whereas domestic sectors with weak unions do not differ from the export oriented sector.

"Für die sozialpartnerschaftlichen Verhandlungen sind die Spielregeln im Sinne der gesetzlichen Rahmenbedingungen von großer Bedeutung. Diese wurden in der Schweiz mit den flankierenden Maßnahmen zur Personenfreizügigkeit verändert. Unter anderem wurde bei Lohndruck die erleichterte Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung von Gesamtarbeitsverträgen eingeführt. Die Arbeitgeberverbände äußerten sich unterschiedlich zu dieser Neuregelung, was bisher vor allem mit dem Gegensatz von Export- und Binnenwirtschaft erklärt wurde. Die Analyse der Stellungnahmen der Arbeitgeberverbände zeigt jedoch, dass sich die Binnenwirtschaft nicht einheitlich äußerte. In diesem Beitrag werden die unterschiedlichen Interessen verschiedener Binnenbranchen untersucht und mit den Unterschieden in der Gewerkschaftsstärke erklärt. Binnenorientierte Branchen wie die Bauwirtschaft, die starken Gewerkschaften gegenüberstehen, haben ein Eigeninteresse an einer erleichterten Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärung, während Binnenbranchen mit schwachen Gewerkschaften sich nicht von den exportorientierten Branchen unterscheiden." (Autorenreferat)

The rules of the game in the sense of the legal framework are of major importance for negotiations between social partners. In Switzerland, these rules have changed with the adoption of the ranking measures to the free movement of persons treaty. One has, among other modifications, eased the conditions for declaring a collective wage agreement compulsory in the case of wage dumping. The employers associations had divergent preferences with regard to this modification. So far, one has explained this difference by the opposition between domestic & export-oriented economy. However, the analysis of employers associations' statements shows that the domestic economy did not unanimously accept the flanking measures. This contribution examines the divergence of interests inside the domestic economy & explains it by variations in the strength of the unions. Domestic sectors that are confronted with strong unions (for instance the construction sector) have an interest in facilitating the extension of compulsory wage agreements whereas domestic sectors with weak unions do not differ from the export-oriented sector. 1 Table, 1 Graph, 27 References. Adapted from the source document.

Die Verschiebungen in der Kantonsdemografie, die Zusammensetzung des Ständerates und das fundamental gewandelte Demokratieverständnis, das zu einer Verschärfung des Antagonismus zwischen Demokratie und Föderalismus beigetragen hat, legen den notwendigen Reformbedarf des schweizerischen politischen Systems offen. Bis heute fehlt eine vertiefte poltikwissenschaftliche Analyse zur Wirkungsweise und zu den Reformansätzen der häufig kritisierten Mitwirkungsrechte der Kantone beim Bund. Diese Lücke schliesst das vorliegende Buch. (Quelle: Klappentext Schutzumschlag).

This is the first data-driven pilot study that is focused on the micro-scaled but burgeoning Bruneian screen industry. The scope of the study includes employment modes, frequency of productions, payment codes of practice and exhibition platforms, based on the data collected by both online surveys and semi-structured, face-to-face interviews between January to June 2021. The aim of this paper is to investigate the possible creation of a temporarily closed system of interaction between the local screen industry and other Bruneian businesses. It is hypothesised that the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent action taken by the Bruneian Government to restrict international travel and border crossings resulted in a new and rare interchange of production-based activity. The study targets a wide variety of parties, from industry professionals, e.g., production house managers, senior producers, freelancers, and the so-called gig-lancers, to governmental policymakers, i.e., representatives from Authority Info-communications Technology Industry (AITI) in Brunei.

Since Kriesi's (1980) pioneering work no study has attempted to provide an overall picture of power configuration among the Swiss political elite. To fill this gap we aggregate recent network analyses carried out in various policy domains. Based on meta‐hypotheses regarding the likely effects of the contextual changes that have taken place during the last thirty years, we compare the structure of the Swiss political elite existing in the 1970s to that of the last decade with respect to reputational power, collaboration and conflict. Our results suggest that important transformations have indeed occurred. Thus, both political parties and some specific state bodies could increase their power, whereas most interest groups have lost some. While the internationalization of politics has overall had the expected effects with respect to the power structure and to conflict among political parties, it did not lead to the hypothesized, new conflict among interest groups.