Suchergebnisse

EU-Biodiesel (Indonesia) is the latest in two lines of cases. On the one hand, the case offers yet another example of the Dispute Settlement Body striking down creative interpretations of antidumping rules by developed countries. Applying the Appellate Body's decision in EU-Biodiesel (Argentina), the panel found that the EU could not use antidumping duties to counteract the effects of Indonesia's export tax on palm oil. On the other hand, the decision is another chapter in the battle over renewable energy markets. Both the EU and Indonesia had intervened in their markets to promote the development of domestic biodiesel industries. The panel's decision prevents the EU from using antidumping duties to preserve market opportunities created by its Renewable Energy Directive for its domestic biodiesel producers. The EU has responded in two ways. First, through regulations that disfavor palm-based biodiesel, but not biodiesel made from other foodstocks, such as rapeseed oil commonly produced in the EU. Second, the EU has imposed countervailing duties on Indonesian biodiesel, finding that Indonesia's export tax on crude palm oil constitutes a subsidy to Indonesian biodiesel producers. The EU's apparently inelastic demand for protection raises two questions: First, when domestic political bargains rest on both protectionist and non-protectionist motives and policies have both protectionist and non-protectionist effects, what are the welfare consequences of restraining only overt protectionism? Second, under what circumstances may regulatory approaches be even less desirable than duties for addressing combined protectionist and environmental interests, and would the WTO have the right powers to discipline them in an environmentally sound way?

In the first dispute on renewable energy to come to WTO dispute settlement, the domestic content requirement of Ontario's feed-in tariff was challenged as a discriminatory investment-related measure and as a prohibited import substitution subsidy. The panel and Appellate Body agreed that Canada was violating the GATT and the TRIMS Agreement. But the SCM Article 3 claim by Japan and the European Union remains unadjudicated, because neither tribunal made a finding that the price guaranteed for electricity from renewable sources constitutes a 'benefit' pursuant to the SCM Agreement. Although the Appellate Body provides useful guidance to future panels on how the existence of a benefit could be calculated, the most noteworthy aspect of the new jurisprudence is the Appellate Body's reasoning that delineating the proper market for 'benefit' analysis entails respect for the policy choices made by a government. Thus, in this dispute, the proper market is electricity produced only from wind and solar energy.

In the first dispute on renewable energy to come to WTO dispute settlement, the domestic content requirement of Ontario's feed-in tariff was challenged as a discriminatory investment-related measure and as a prohibited import substitution subsidy. The panel and Appellate Body agreed that Canada was violating the GATT and the TRIMS Agreement. But the SCM Article 3 claim by Japan and the European Union remains unadjudicated, because neither tribunal made a finding that the price guaranteed for electricity from renewable sources constitutes a 'benefit' pursuant to the SCM Agreement. Although the Appellate Body provides useful guidance to future panels on how the existence of a benefit could be calculated, the most noteworthy aspect of the new jurisprudence is the Appellate Body's reasoning that delineating the proper market for 'benefit' analysis entails respect for the policy choices made by a government. Thus, in this dispute, the proper market is electricity produced only from wind and solar energy.

Abstract.  Although much has been written about monopoly extraction of natural resources, the case of a resource being sold in two separate markets has escaped notice. We find that a monopolist facing two different iso‐elastic demand schedules extracts more rapidly than the social planner, whether or not arbitrage prevents price discrimination between markets. JEL classification: D42, Q3

AbstractIf one region of the world switches its research effort from dirty to clean technologies, will other regions follow? To investigate this question, this paper builds a North–South model that combines insights from directed technological change and quality-ladder endogenous growth models with business-stealing innovations. While North represents the region with climate ambitions, both regions have researchers choosing between clean and dirty applications, and the resulting technologies are traded. Three main results emerge: (1) In the long run, if the North's research and development (R&D) sector is sufficiently large, researchers in South will follow the switch from dirty to clean R&D made by researchers in North, motivated by the growing value of clean markets. (2) If the two regions direct research effort toward different sectors and the outputs of the two sectors are gross substitutes, then the long-run growth rates in both regions will be lower than if the global research effort were invested in one sector. (3) If the North's government induces its researchers to switch to clean R&D through clean technology subsidies, the welfare-maximising choice for South is to ensure that all of its researchers switch too, unless the social discount rate is high. The last result is true even if the South's R&D sector is large.