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One of the most fundamental of democratic rights is the right to representation in a free parliament. A legislature which is in a position to prolong its own life indefinitely can nullify that right.That is why the United States Constitution lays it down that there must be a general election for the House of Representatives, and for one-third of the Senate, every two years. Nothing except a constitutional amendment can change this; and the process of amendment is so elaborate and difficult, and takes so long, that we can be certain that there will never be any lengthening of the term of either House of Congress unless American public opinion emphatically and overwhelmingly desires it. The same is true of the individual states. If Congress or any state legislature tried to prolong its own life, the "act" would be void, and any citizen could have it annulled by appealing to the courts.In Canada, the Dominion Parliament can prolong its own life, but only "in time of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection" and only "if such continuation is not opposed by the votes of more than one-third of the members" of the House of Commons. In other words, one-third plus one of the members of the House of Commons can prevent prolongation even in the midst of war, invasion, or insurrection. Any extension "act" passed contrary to these provisions would be void, and any citizen could have it annulled by appealing to the courts.

One of the marching songs of the labour movement on this continent is "Solidarity Forever!" But in Canada, its exhortation has sometimes been more honoured in the breach than in the observance. At intervals over the last half-century and more, Canadian trade unionism has been "by schisms rent asunder, by heresies distrest." In 1902, the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada (T.L.C.) threw out the Knights of Labor and national unions which were "dual" to international unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.). The twenty-three expelled organizations promptly formed the National Trades and Labour Congress. In 1908, this became the Canadian Federation of Labour, a name which has kept cropping up in Canadian labour history ever since. In 1919, just after the Winnipeg strike, and partly as a result of it, a considerable number of western unionists left the T.L.C. to form the One Big Union (O.B.U.). Between 1901 and 1921, small local Roman Catholic unions sprang up in the province of Quebec, and in 1921 these formed the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (C.C.C.L.). In 1927, the Canadian Federation of Labour and other national unions formed the All-Canadian Congress of Labour (A.C.C.L.). In 1936, some of the officers of the A.C.C.L. seceded to form the present Canadian Federation of Labour, which is no longer even mentioned in the Department of Labour's annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada (and has not been since the 1950–1 edition), and which the orthodox union movement never considered a genuine labour organization at all. (About ten years ago, a secession from the Canadian Federation of Labour formed the National Council of Canadian Labour, which —in spite of its grandiose title, and the faint air of respectability imparted to it by inclusion in the Department of Labour's report, which gives it 42 locals and 5,640 members—is also beyond the pale of orthodox unionism.) In 1939, the executive of the T.L.C. suspended the Canadian unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) in the United States. These unions formed a Canadian C.I.O. Committee.

What Mr. King said and did about parliamentary government constitutes his most important and distinctive contribution to the development of our constitution, and to Canadian political ideas. This is partly because parliamentary government is the very essence of our constitution; partly because Mr. King had an enormous amount to say about it, and an unrivalled opportunity to put his ideas into practice; and partly because this is the one field in which his ideas were completely original.This is notably true of his theory of the Crown. Two facts about it are unmistakable. First, he did not believe in the "rubber stamp" theory. In the 1926 crisis, he said three times, once in the House of Commons and twice in his opening campaign speech, that there would be circumstances in which the Crown would be justified in refusing dissolution. He also said, before the vote on the Robb motion, that if Mr. Meighen's Government were defeated, and did not resign, the Governor-General should dismiss it, and he himself would take responsibility for the dismissal. This is about as far from the "rubber stamp" theory as anybody could get. Second, except in its remoteness from the "rubber stamp" theory, Mr. King's theory was startlingly different from the received doctrine of British parliamentary government. A single example will dispel any doubts. If there is one firmly established point in British constitutional practice, it is that a retiring Prime Minister has no right even to offer advice as to his successor, let alone have it accepted.