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This article evaluates emerging progressive ideas about US grand strategy. Progressives' distinctive analytic premise is that structural inequality undermines America's national interests. To combat this problem, progressives recommend retrenching US primacy in a manner that resembles the grand strategy of restraint. However, progressives also seek to build a more democratic international order that can facilitate new forms of global collective action. Progressives thus advocate ambitious international goals at the same time as they reject the institutional arrangements that the United States has traditionally used to promote its global agenda. No other grand strategy shares those attributes. After articulating the core elements of a progressive grand strategy, the article explores that strategy's unique risks and tradeoffs and raises several concerns about the theoretical and practical viability of progressive ideas.

AbstractThis article evaluates emerging progressive ideas about US grand strategy. Progressives' distinctive analytic premise is that structural inequality undermines America's national interests. To combat this problem, progressives recommend retrenching US primacy in a manner that resembles the grand strategy of restraint. However, progressives also seek to build a more democratic international order that can facilitate new forms of global collective action. Progressives thus advocate ambitious international goals at the same time as they reject the institutional arrangements that the United States has traditionally used to promote its global agenda. No other grand strategy shares those attributes. After articulating the core elements of a progressive grand strategy, the article explores that strategy's unique risks and tradeoffs and raises several concerns about the theoretical and practical viability of progressive ideas.

AbstractWhy do Americans' priorities for combating risks like terrorism, climate change, and violent crime often seem so uncorrelated with the dangers that those risks objectively present? Many scholars believe the answer to this question is that heuristics, biases, and ignorance cause voters to misperceive risk magnitudes. By contrast, this article argues that Americans' risk priorities primarily reflect judgments about the extent to which some victims deserve more protection than others and the degree to which it is appropriate for government to intervene in different areas of social life. The article supports this argument with evidence drawn from a survey with 3,000 respondents, using pairwise comparisons to elicit novel measures of how respondents perceive nine dimensions of 100 life‐threatening risks. Respondents were well informed about these risks' relative magnitudes—the correlation between perceived and actual mortality was .82—but those perceptions explained relatively little variation in policy preferences relative to judgments about the status of victims and the appropriate role of government. These findings hold regardless of political party, education, and other demographics. The article thus argues that the key to understanding Americans' divergent reactions to risk lies more with their values than with their grasp of factual information.

Casualty counts are often controversial, and thorough research can only go so far in resolving such debates—there will almost always be missing data, and thus, a need to draw inferences about how comprehensively violence has been recorded. This article addresses that challenge by developing an estimation strategy based on the observation that violent events are generally distributed according to power laws, a pattern that structures expectations about what event data on armed conflict would look like if those data were complete. This technique is applied to estimate the number of Native American and US casualties in the American Indian Wars between 1776 and 1890, demonstrating how scholars can use power laws to estimate conflict size, even (and perhaps especially) where previous literature has been unable to do so.