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Abstract
Simple game experiments of the reward allocation, dictator and ultimatum type are used to demonstrate that true explanations of social phenomena cannot conceivably be derived in terms of the perfect rationality concept underlying neo-classical economics. We explore in some depth, if speculatively, how experimental game theory might bring us closer to a new synthesis or at least the nucleus of a general theory of 'games and boundedly rational economic behavior' with enhanced explanatory power.

The paper introduces and discusses some of the most important conceptual ideas in game theory by exploring their implicit answer to the question: Who is a player? It will be illustrated that some of the most celebrated results in game theory rely on different notions of a player, global players or more independent local decision-makers. The examples are the durable monopoly game, the Folk Theorem for supergames, forward induction solutions for outside option games and games with incomplete information. We also discuss the empirical relevance of the game theoretic concepts, mostly by briefly reviewing some related experimental results.

This volume contains sixteen original articles documenting recent progress in understanding strategic behaviour. In their variety they reflect an entire spectrum of coexisting approaches: from orthodox game theory via behavioural game theory, bounded rationality and economic psychology to experimental economics. There are plenty of new models and insights but the book also illustrates the boundaries of what we know today and explains the frontiers of tomorrow. The articles were written in honour of Werner Güth