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This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central bankers take into account the fact that they might not be re-elected. Thus, the publication of voting records is beneficial since the government can distinguish central bankers' ; in terms of their preferences and can align the central bank council's preferences with those of the general public over time by means of its re-election decisions.

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and elections can alleviate such inefficient decision-making in politics. This mechanism still works if the public cannot commit itself to a reelection scheme or if the public is unsure about the politicians' time preferences. In the non-commitment case, incentive contracts may need to include a golden parachute clause.

AbstractIn the third decade of the 21st century, digitization and artificial intelligence, global events, challenges from authoritarian states, and difficulties of particular democracies to function properly confront democracy with a new series of challenges and opportunities that will force it to reinvent itself. The last decades have produced an accelerating flow of ideas for new forms of democracy. We survey a long period in the quest for such new forms and point to next inventions for such forms. We suggest to experiment with new ways for democracy to extend the choice of democratic processes that can be implemented in real-life situations, with the beneficial side-effect that democracy might remain the only sustainable structure for self-governing societies.

How society should deal with the self-strengthening Tech Giants is a much-discussed issue. We suggest to democratize them by giving users a say in their decisions. With newly-developed collective decision rules and user councils, democratization of Tech Giants becomes feasible and complements, e.g., competition and basic data protection laws. ; ISSN:1435-8131 ; ISSN:1435-6104

Demokratische Entscheidungsprozesse werden zurzeit vielfach angegriffen. Insbesondere in der Digitalisierung sehen viele eine Gefahr für die Demokratie. Der Autor sieht hingegen Chancen für die Demokratie und plädiert dafür, digitale Instrumente auszuprobieren. Digitale Instrumente wie Co-Voting (in repräsentativen Demokratien) bzw. Assessment Voting (in direkten Demokratien) könnten demokratische Verfahren verbessern und das Band zwischen Stimmbürgern und Demokratie stärken.

How society should deal with the self-strengthening Tech Giants is a muchdiscussed issue. We suggest to democratize them by giving users a say in their decisions. With newly-developed collective decision rules and user councils, democratization of Tech Giants becomes feasible.

We outline a new voting procedure for representative democracies. This procedure should be used for important decisions only and consists of two voting rounds: a randomly-selected subset of the citizens is awarded a one-time voting right. The parliament also votes, and the two decisions are weighted according to a pre-defined key. The final decision is implemented. As this procedure gives the society – represented by the randomly-chosen subset – a better say for important decisions, the citizens might be more willing to accept the consequences of these decisions.