Suchergebnisse

Examines the efforts of the Unión del Centro Democrático (UCEDE) to become the new face of conservatism in Argentine democratic politics; 1980s, chiefly.

Three outcomes & their causes in the creation of federalism are distinguished: the causes of national unification, the adoption of a federal regime, & the degree of centralization in the regime, with reference to William H. Riker's (1964, 1987) theory on federalism. This framework & a regional conflict perspective are used to study the evolution of federalism in the 19th century in Argentina. Interregional conflicts affected the balance of power between the national & provincial government, because coalitions of provinces weaker than Buenos Aires supported a strong central government to hold the Buenos Aires province in check. A centralized plural federalism emerged between 1853-1880. This case shows that federalism is driven more by internal dynamics than external threats as Riker surmised. The value of studying federalism within the framework of the three development outcomes is discussed. 1 Table, 1 Figure, 20 References. M. Pflum

Federal countries & the federal institutions in these countries are characterized by asymmetries. One common asymmetrical feature is the overrepresentation of subnational territorial units like states & provinces in national legislatures. The hypothesis that this asymmetry affects the territorial distribution of federally-funded public spending is examined with economic data from the US, Brazil, Mexico, & Argentina. The US & Mexico have a more proportional allotment of legislative seats to population vs. brazil & Argentina, where several provinces are significantly overrepresented. The latter situation yields a greater impact of disproportionate public spending than other variables like senate overrepresentation, per statistical analysis. The implications of reallocative federalism in Brazil & Argentina are contrasted with the proportional federalism of the US & Mexico. The particular case of the political economy in Argentina's metropolitan vs. non-metropolitan regions is analyzed, contrasting public spending policy during different regimes. These results contrast with William H. Riker's (1964) popular theory on federalism's impacts. 10 Tables, 27 References. M. Pflum

Este artigo trata da economia política do federalismo e a questão básica examinada é se a sobre-representação de territórios (estados e províncias) nas legislaturas nacionais dos sistemas federais afeta a distribuição territorial dos gastos públicos dos governos federais. A hipótese testada é que afeta e a sobre-representação territorial produz uma distorção dos gastos federais que beneficia as populações que vivem em territórios sobre-representados. Para captar essa conexão entre sobre-representação territorial e a distribuição não-proporcional de fundos públicos foi introduzida uma distinção conceitual: os países em que essa conexão existe são identificados como casos de federalismo realocativo, enquanto que os países com padrões territoriais de gastos públicos que são proporcionais à população são identificados como casos de federalismo proporcional. Os argumentos baseiam-se em dados subnacionais dos quatro maiores países federais do hemisfério ocidental: Estados Unidos, Brasil, México e Argentina.

Enthält Rezensionen u.a. von: Burdick, Michael A.: For god and the fatherland: religion and politics in Argentina. - Albany/N.Y. : State Univ. of New York Press, 1995. - 283 S