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AbstractIn this paper I assess the presence of post‐announcement drifts associated with dividend changes after controlling for earnings surprises. All quarterly cash dividend changes announced by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1974 through 1989 are examined. The results show that significant post‐announcement drifts associated with dividend changes are present after controlling for earnings surprises. However, the results are not conclusive on whether the market fully incorporates the simple time‐series properties of dividends.

This book focuses on the role of interest groups and their lobbying efforts in public policy. It applies strategic contest theory as the basic methodology and clarifies the fundamental parameters that determine the behavior of the government and the interest groups. It illustrates the proposed approach in five specific cases: determination of monopoly price, privatization policy, migration quotas, minimum wage and promotion in tournaments.

AbstractWe present a basic theoretical framework of ethnic identity, i.e., the level of immigrant's commitment to his or her host society as well as the immigrant's commitment to his or her home society. Our model can explain the emerging empirical literature which studies the effect of the immigrants' characteristics, such as age, gender, education, religion, age at arrival, stock of immigrants in the host country, etc., on their ethnic identity (such as theEthnosizer). In addition, this paper can be used as a basis for future empirical and theoretical research on this topic.JEL classification:F22, J15, Z13.

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player's type is known to both players, the other is private information and known only to the player himself. We compare the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-sided private information contest to the Nash equilibrium with no private information, in which both players know the type of the other player. We show conditions under which uncertainty increases the investment of the uninformed player and the rent dissipation of the contest, while decreasing the expected net payoff of the informed player. In addition, we consider conditions under which the informed player - before knowing his own type - prefers that the uninformed player knows his type. Moreover, we show conditions for the existence/non-existence of equilibrium in a two-stage contest in which the informed player declares his type (or does not declare) in the first stage and in the second stage the two players play according to the information available to them.

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.