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While the United States remains the dominant extra-regional superpower as the war between Hamas and Israel threatens to spread more broadly, China's growing presence across the Middle East raises important questions about how it conceives its response to the crisis.Enjoying close ties to Israel and decent relations with major Palestinian and Lebanese players, including Hamas and Hezbollah, Beijing's foreign policy in the post-Mao era has been quite balanced between Israel and Arab actors. But Israel's conduct of the war is pushing Beijing to take a stance that is increasingly pro-Palestinian, which risks harming its relations with Tel Aviv.China's main interestsUltimately, what China wants in the Middle East more than anything else is stability. The region is extremely important to the success of the Belt and Road Initiative, which will face serious problems if wars continue to plague the region. To help stabilize the Gulf, in particular, China played a catalyzing role in the renormalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran almost eight months ago. Now, he escalating conflict in Israel/Palestine and along the Israeli border with Lebanon has raised growing concern in Beijing about the possibility of a wider war. Beijing has called for a ceasefire, followed by a lasting political settlement to the conflict based on the implementation of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians as the best course.China and Israel's multifaceted and complicated bilateral relationship has evolved over the decades. Under Chairman Mao Zedong's rule (1949-76), China supported left-wing and "radical" Arab regimes — namely Algeria, Egypt, South Yemen, and Syria — as well as national liberation movements in the Middle East, including the Palestinian struggle. By contrast, Mao saw Israel as a base of Western imperialism in the Arab world. But since Beijing and Tel Aviv established diplomatic relations in 1992, economic relations between China and Israel have flourished across countless sectors, including technology, infrastructure, tourism, health, education, logistics, ports, and cosmetics. There is also a history of a military-tech exchange between the two countries going back to the 1980s. Sino-Israeli relations have deepened to the point where U.S. officials have pressured Tel Aviv to cool its ties with the Asian giant.Despite these deep economic relations, however, China has opposed Israel's occupation of Palestinian and Syrian territory outside its United Nations-recognized borders and criticized its past bombing campaigns against Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon. Unlike Israel, the United States and some other Western states, China has refused to designate Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, instead viewing them as legitimate representatives of segments of the population in Palestine and Lebanon.Beijing reacts to Hamas' surprise attackIn response to Hamas' unprecedented incursion into southern Israel on October 7 and the Israeli bombing campaign of Gaza that followed, Beijing has stressed three main messages. First, it condemned all attacks on civilians. Second, it called for the reactivation of dialogue between the warring sides. Finally, it has called for the effective establishment of a Palestinian state based alongside Israel's 1949-67 borders."China has tried to maintain [neutrality], criticize attacks on civilians, and call for de-escalation and ceasefire," said Yun Sun, co-director of the China Program at the Washington-based Stimson Center, in an interview with RS. "Hamas's attacks on civilians are inexcusable. But for China, Israel's illegal occupation of Palestinian territory is also the origin of the attacks."China's response to October 7 was similar to the way Beijing positioned itself after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, according to some experts. "If in Ukraine there was talk of a 'pro-Russian neutrality,' in this case it is a 'pro-Palestinian neutrality,'" according to Enrico Fardella, Director of the Italy-based ChinaMED Project."Neutrality is functional to maximize [China's] diplomatic flexibility by presenting itself as the only major power capable of dialogue with both sides," he told RS. "This serves to win consensus at the center (among all those actors critical of the [Benjamin] Netanyahu government but at the same time disgusted by Hamas' brutalities), showing the superiority of its own diplomatic action in the face of the American one that is decidedly pro-Israel. The pro-Palestinian component, on the other hand, serves to gather support on the left, i.e., in the pro-Palestinian, anti-Israel (and therefore anti-American) area inside and outside the Middle East."Can China help de-escalate?Earlier this year, the Chinese offered to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians. Now more than ever, the region could benefit from an outside actor playing an effective peacemaking role. But given Beijing's apparent inability to muster the leverage necessary to bring the Israelis and Palestinians toward a peaceful settlement, it is doubtful that China can succeed."We know that Beijing wants to prevent the escalation of the crisis, but I do not think that it has enough instruments to defuse the crisis," said Nurettin Akçay, of the Center for Global Studies at Shanghai University. He explained that China's limited leverage over Israel is a major obstacle to Beijing successfully de-escalating this conflict through diplomatic means. "It is my belief that China's position in the Middle East is somewhat overstated. Its actual power to shape events in the region is quite limited, despite its economic clout. The ongoing crisis has highlighted the fact that China lacks the necessary hard power to pursue its objectives," he told RS."I think all countries that call for de-escalation will help," noted Sun. "Beijing has relatively good relationships with both Israel and Palestine, as well as other regional players. But such good relationships do not necessarily translate into influence on such a major issue," she added. "To assume that Beijing can effectively help de-escalate is to assume that parties to the conflict are willing to change their course, which I do not see as probable at this point."Implications for U.S.-Israel tiesHow much the ongoing violence in Israel-Palestine and Lebanon will impact China's relationship with Israel is unclear. In recent years, China has become more vocal about the Palestinian cause, which serves to boost Beijing's standing among governments and societies across the Islamic world and much of the Global South. This has served to differentiate China from the U.S. and helps Beijing to depict Washington as the isolated player on this issue while countering Western efforts to use the Xinjiang human rights file to distance Muslim-majority countries from China.While the Chinese and Israelis have generally managed to separate their political disagreements from their economic ties in recent years, China's increasingly pro-Palestinian position has the potential to create considerable irritation in the bilateral relationship. And while Netanyahu was flirting earlier this year with the idea of traveling to China and meeting with President Xi Jinping in the face of Biden administration's criticism of the Israeli leader's far-right domestic agenda, such a show of defiance and independence seems highly unlikely given both Washington's strong backing for Israel in the current conflict and Beijing's more pro-Palestinian position.

On September 14, a Houthi delegation and a team of Omani diplomats flew to Riyadh for talks on resolving the Yemeni conflict(s), constituting the highest-level Houthi-Saudi official negotiations on Saudi soil since Yemen's civil war began nine years ago. On September 20, Saudi officials said the visit produced "positive results." The talks followed a five-month hiatus in peace negotiations since after the last round of Omani-facilitated Houthi-Saudi negotiations that took place in Sana'a in April. The most recent talks appeared to offer more hope for a sustained truce between the Houthis and the kingdom, which would be necessary for bringing lasting peace to Yemen. But concerns persist that a final peace accord between those two parties to what has been a devastating conflict may lead to renewed warfare between the Houthis and other Yemeni factions.New Saudi LanguageIn Riyadh, the Houthi delegation met with Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, who referred to the visiting Houthi representatives as the "Sana'a delegation," rather than "the Houthis" or "Ansar Allah," the official name of the Houthi militia. Such terminology appeared to signal Riyadh's recognition that the Houthis are indeed running a government, underscoring Saudi Arabia's growing willingness to find a modus vivendi with the powerful force that has effectively consolidated power in northern Yemen. "The shift in language to 'Sana'a delegation' is significant," according to Elisabeth Kendall, who teaches Arab studies at the University of Cambridge. "The Houthis and Ansar Allah have long been vilified in the Saudi media, so removing references to them appears designed to de-stigmatize the talks and avoid any notion of a Saudi climb-down," she told RS."The significance of new naming stems from re-positioning and pre-understandings: the desire to improve [the] diplomatic atmosphere, flip the page of full tensions at any cost, confer symbolic recognition, and gradually shift public perceptions," agreed Ibrahim Jalal, a non-resident scholar at the Washington-based Middle East Institute. (Editor's note: MEI counts the Saudi government among its major donors.)Obstacles to a Houthi-Saudi PactDespite recent progress, the Houthis and Saudis have yet to finally reach a permanent truce, and more work will be required. At least four delicate issues remain unresolved. First is the issue of salary payments for public sector employees in the Houthi-controlled north, where approximately 80% of Yemen's population lives. The Houthis demand payments of salaries of public sector workers in areas under their control. But their adversaries worry that the money will fund Ansar Allah's war machine. Nonetheless, there is some vagueness to this Houthi demand because sometimes Ansar Allah frames their demand as if the Houthis want all the back payment while on other occasions making it seem as though they are only demanding salary payments moving forward.The second issue deals with the distribution of Yemen's national oil and gas revenues. "The Houthis will get what they've been demanding for a long time — their share. Or they won't allow the export of oil and gas to proceed in peace," Nabeel Khoury, the former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen who is currently a non-resident Fellow at the Arab Center Washington DC, told RS.The third concern has to do with Houthi demands that the Saudis permit the unrestricted- reopening of Sana'a international airport, as well as other airports in Yemen, and the country's seaports. While these airports and ports have already opened up significantly over the past year, the Houthis demand that they fully reopen. Additionally, Ansar Allah demands flights to and from Sana'a airport from more countries than currently permitted.The final issue regards the Houthis' access to funds in Yemen's Aden-based Central Bank. The talks thus far have addressed how the Central Bank can be reunited, either in Yemen or possibly in another country such as Oman or Jordan. "The idea is again a Houthi demand that money going into the central bank should be available to them as well. The logistics of this will be an important consideration," according to Khoury.Largely thanks to Oman's much-lauded mediation skills, momentum behind the negotiations appears to have accelerated. However, these talks will probably move slowly, with progress coming incrementally given the long-standing distrust that exists between the Houthis and the Saudis. Although trust-building between the two sides can't happen overnight, it is significant that the Houthis sent a senior delegation to Riyadh.Moreover, a September 25 Houthi drone attack along the Yemeni-Saudi border, which resulted in the death of at least three Bahraini soldiers, may set the talks back. According to Jalal, this attack was part of a Houthi effort to "exercise pressure to secure more Saudi concessions…and flip the page at any cost." It will be important to see if and when the Houthis carry out more such attacks and how Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) might respond.Yemen's Bigger Picture There is more to the Yemeni civil war than the Houthi-Saudi conflict. There are many other conflicts in the country that will require hard work to resolve. If a Houthi-Saudi pact is in fact achieved, it will not guarantee peace between Ansar Allah and other armed groups in Yemen. Many communities in Yemen fear that the Houthis could turn their formidable military power on them after they sign a potential truce with Riyadh."This issue is that the Houthis will have reached a deal with the Saudis, not with their domestic enemies and rivals," according to Kendall. "If the Houthis no longer face any military threat from Saudi, they may feel empowered to push their advantage domestically to gain further territory, more resources and greater political power." "Currently, there is no shared domestic vision for the future shape of Yemen, neither between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government, nor even between the nominally allied members of that government. With the domestic parties themselves so heavily factionalized, the risk of civil war or a frozen conflict remains high," she added.Jalal echoed those concerns. "While efforts to end the conflict are welcome, all non-Houthi Yemeni groups and political parties have legitimate concerns, as they should, given the very domestic root causes of the conflict and multiplicity of stakes and interests. "Ongoing Saudi-Houthi talks are one layer but have yet to address the complexity of what matters most to Yemenis, who shall the seek to improve the quality, content and design of any peace agreement because in the past [they] paid the price of fragile peace," he noted.The weak and fragile Presidential Leadership Council, which is Yemen's internationally recognized government, has not participated in the Houthi-Saudi talks. Nor has the UAE. As Khoury told RS, there are signs that Abu Dhabi is "quite miffed" by its exclusion. What this means is that a potential Houthi-Saudi Arabia truce could result in Ansar Allah consolidating its hold on the north, while a regime led by the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) that governs Aden and other parts of southern Yemen declares its independence. The STC has been clear that it will not accept a Houthi-Saudi pact imposed on all of Yemen without its agreement.Ultimately, the latest talks held in Riyadh with the Houthi delegation will ideally pave the way for inclusive Yemeni-Yemeni talks to establish a roadmap toward broader peace across all of Yemen. But the fear is that Yemen's civil war will reignite once Saudi Arabia exits. Time will tell whether a Houthi-Saudi pact would push Ansar Allah toward making concessions to other Yemeni groups or wage war against them.

After seven years of severed diplomatic relations, the China-brokered renormalization deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia, signed on March 10, marked a major breakthrough in the Middle East's shift toward de-escalation between regional rivals. Nearly six months later, the Iranian-Saudi détente remains on track. Last month, Iran's chief diplomat, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, met with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, or MbS, in Jeddah and invited him to Tehran. Then on September 5, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, who was previously the Kingdom's ambassador to Oman, arrived in Tehran. That same day, Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, who previously served as the Islamic Republic's Kuwait envoy, arrived in Riyadh. Such developments speak to both sides' interest in further improving bilateral ties. As Ambassador Alanazi put it, Saudi officials recognize the "importance of strengthening ties, increasing engagement…and taking the [relationship] to broader horizons."Tehran and Riyadh did not sign the diplomatic agreement in Beijing after almost two years of Iraqi- and Omani-facilitated mediation out of mutual love. Instead, the deal resulted from their respective interests in détente at a particular time. Ultimately, hostilities between the two regional powers over the past decade were not serving either side. Rather than continuing down the path of steadily mounting tension, Tehran and Riyadh both saw a "cold peace" as their best option, albeit for different reasons.Motivations for détenteCentral to the Ebrahim Raisi administration's foreign policy is the "Neighbors First" doctrine. As relations between Iran and the West continue deteriorating, Tehran wants not only to cultivate closer ties with China and Russia, but also have better relationships with Islamic countries in its own neighborhood, including with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Central Asian states and Pakistan. Iran hopes this will reap economic benefits while better positioning the Islamic Republic to circumvent U.S. sanctions and pressure.Riyadh understood that attracting sufficient foreign investment to make MbS's Vision 2030 succeed requires greater stability at home and throughout the region. This made de-escalating tensions with Iran necessary, especially given Tehran's influence over Yemen's Houthi insurgents, whose drone and missile attacks against Saudi infrastructure had caused considerable damage until the April 2022 truce's implementation."The decision to restore relations was made by both sides with cold calculation," Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center, told RS. "Iran wants to prove it is not isolated regionally while Saudi Arabia wants an insurance policy against external attacks while it tries to realize its ambitious economic goals."Yet Tehran and Riyadh continue harboring suspicions of each other. From Iran's vantagepoint, Riyadh's partnership with Washington remains a major threat to Gulf security, while Saudi Arabia still sees Iran's regional conduct as destabilizing.Indeed, nearly six months in, the Iranian-Saudi diplomatic agreement has only gone so far. "It hasn't evolved into a real rapprochement, but that was always far-fetched as long as Iran is at daggers-drawn with Riyadh's key strategic ally: the United States," said the International Crisis Group's Ali Vaez in an interview with RS. "The long shadow of the nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will prevent the reestablishment of economic ties between Tehran and Riyadh and could eventually flare up regional tensions that could once again spill over into the bilateral relationship."The recent deployment of 3,000 American sailors and Marines to waters near Iran has only resulted in more threats from Tehran to the U.S. This development could have major implications for Iranian-Saudi relations."Like all diplomatic deals, the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iranian diplomatic effort, is—at best—a work in progress," Joseph A. Kechichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, told RS. "While many hastened to conclude that the two countries, under close Chinese supervision, would rapidly embark on fresh initiatives, reality stepped in because Riyadh was and still is wary of Tehran's pledges to end its interferences in internal Arab affairs. (Almost) six months in, neither side seems ready to be blinded by lofty declarations, which often belie serious differences."Enter IsraelSaudi Arabia has thus far refused to follow in Abu Dhabi's footsteps and join the Abraham Accords. Riyadh stresses that normalization with Tel Aviv would require significant Israeli concessions to the Palestinians, and with Israel's far-right government that is currently in power, such concessions are unlikely to be offered. Nonetheless, trying to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords is a top foreign policy priority for Team Biden. It is worth asking how this stands to impact the Iranian-Saudi détente.Depending on the degree to which there is convergence between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, there could be negative consequences for Iranian-Saudi relations. Ultimately, Tehran does not see diplomatic relations between GCC states and Israel as a threat per se. It is far more concerned with how the Abraham Accords could lead to a growing Israeli military footprint near Iranian territory."Iran will feel obliged to condemn Riyadh if it normalizes with Israel and will be on the alert for any military or intelligence component to such a deal. That it will not tolerate," explained Slavin."Iran is afraid of greater military and security convergence of the Persian Gulf Arabs with Israel in formats such as the joint air defense system," Javad Heiran-Nia, the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told RS."Iran knows that by forming such a system, a 'balance deficit' will be detrimental to it. For this reason, Iran has announced the unveiling of hypersonic missiles capable of passing through any missile defense system. Iran sends the message to the Persian Gulf states that expanding their relations and forming a strong convergence in the region with Israel will not ensure their security," added Heiran-Nia.Signs of improved tiesLooking ahead, certain indicators can help assess the evolving state of Iranian-Saudi relations.As Iran and Saudi Arabia have previously enjoyed periods of détente, such as during the 1990s and early 2000s, Vaez told RS that "this one is unlikely to withstand the test of time unless it is institutionalized in the form of frequent high-level political engagement, standing bilateral committees that would proactively work to deepen ties between the two nations on multiple levels, and an inclusive regional security dialogue that starts thinking about a mutually tolerable and sustainable modus vivendi for all the key stakeholders."The main indicator of how Iranian-Saudi relations develop will not be the absence of conflict or disagreement, explained Aziz Alghashian, a fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. "Rather, it is how both Iran and Saudi react to these sensitive issues [such as the Dorra/Arash Gas Field dispute and unresolved tensions over Yemen], what kind of language will they use, and what kind of sentiments will they have in negotiating these sensitivities."Roughly six months after the diplomatic deal was announced in China, Slavin has somewhat low expectations for improved bilateral ties. "I would expect an improved atmosphere for Iranian pilgrims going on the hajj and a modest uptick in sports and other exchanges, plus limited trade in non-sanctioned goods." But she assesses that Iranian-Saudi reconciliation will be "very superficial."Nonetheless, as much as any optimism about a full rapprochement must be tempered, the current state of Iranian-Saudi relations is far more stable than the 2011-22 period. That is positive for the whole Middle East. The Gulf and the wider region stand to benefit, at least to some degree, from Tehran and Riyadh finding a way to "share the neighborhood," as former President Barack Obama once put it."A cold peace is…better than the alternative," said Slavin.

Earlier this month, King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud became the first Saudi monarch to visit the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, spending one day in this Southeast Asian Muslim-majority country 20 years after his first visit as the then-governor of Riyadh. As part of his three-week Asia tour, King Salman went to Brunei as well as China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and the Maldives, with the expressed intention to boost the kingdom's investment, commercial, security and cultural relations with Asian states, including four Muslim-majority nations. Although his visit to the monarchy in Borneo was brief, it was significant for several reasons.