Search results

Evidence for the argument that enforcement makes environmental policies effective is limited with respect to geography, scope, enforcement tools and regulatory context. Non-US evidence on criminal enforcement of illegal waste disposal is examined using a panel dataset of 44 counties from the German state of Baden-Württemberg for the period 1995–2005. The results support the pro-enforcement argument. Cumulatively, there is clear evidence for a general deterrence effect of enforcement intensity on the amount of waste crime. However, regional economic and political economy factors matter significantly for environmental outcomes. Violations appear to be treated differently depending on their local political economy context.

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment stage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differences between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differently than second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» (the supply of non-strategic punishment decreases), a «blind punishment effect» (players punish without resolving the information imperfection) and a «diffusion effect» (defectors make up a smaller share of the punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less, the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a «pure role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish differently from second parties, not just more weakly.

This paper studies monitoring and punishment behavior by second and third parties in a cooperation experiment with endogenous information structures: Players are uninformed whether the target player cooperated or defected at the cooperation stage, but can decide to resolve the information imperfection at non-negative cost at the punishment stage. We examine how monitoring and punishment respond to changes in monitoring costs, and exploit the evidence to gain new insights about commonalities and differences between second and third party behavior. We establish three effects of positive monitoring costs relative to the zero-cost baseline and find that each one affects third parties differently than second parties: A «direct punishment cost effect» (the supply of non-strategic punishment decreases), a «blind punishment effect» (players punish without resolving the information imperfection) and a «diffusion effect» (defectors make up a smaller share of the punished and receive weaker punishment). The first effect affects third parties less, the other two more. As a result, third party punishment leads to increasingly weaker incentives for cooperation relative to second party punishment as monitoring costs rise. In addition, the differences between second and third parties suggest the presence of a «pure role effect»: Taking into account elicited beliefs and risk preferences, third parties punish differently from second parties, not just more weakly.

In the climate policy debate, a rhetoric has evolved that attributes a high potential to "voluntary climate action". We turn to the population of Germany, the fourth largest cumulative GHG emitter, to obtain an Internet-)representative estimate of the individual willingness to abate one ton of CO2, the equivalent of 10 percent of annual per-capita CO2 emissions. The estimate derives from a large-scale (n=2,440) framed field experiment in which subjects choose between a guaranteed reduction of one ton of EU CO2 emissions and a randomly drawn cash award between €2 and €100. At €6.30, estimated mean WTP is considerably lower than prior hypothetical or non-representative estimates. Median WTP is non-positive. The almost bimodal nature of WTP in the population has important policy implications.

In the climate policy debate, a rhetoric has evolved that attributes a high potential to "voluntary climate action". We turn to the population of Germany, the fourth largest cumulative GHG emitter, to obtain an Internet-)representative estimate of the individual willingness to abate one ton of CO2, the equivalent of 10 percent of annual per-capita CO2 emissions. The estimate derives from a large-scale (n=2,440) framed field experiment in which subjects choose between a guaranteed reduction of one ton of EU CO2 emissions and a randomly drawn cash award between €2 and €100. At €6.30, estimated mean WTP is considerably lower than prior hypothetical or non-representative estimates. Median WTP is non-positive. The almost bimodal nature of WTP in the population has important policy implications.

The criminal justice system combines at least three distinct institutions, police, prosecutors, and courts, in order to enforce key regulations. Focusing on criminal environmental law contained in the German Penal Code, this paper empirically studies the determinants of enforcement decisions at the levels of the police, prosecutors, and judges using a production function approach. We focus particularly on the role of economic and political factors and their comparison across institutions. The results of the panel data analysis show evidence for the presence of economic factors determining behavior at all levels. Political factors impact especially on police and court behavior. Adapted from the source document.

Teil 1: Begrüßung durch Prof. Dr. Bernhard Eitel, Rektor der Universität Heidelberg Teil 2: Einleitung der Lecture durch Prof. Timo Goeschl Teil 3: Alfred-Weber-Lecture mit Kardinal Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Marx Teil 4: Abschliessende Publikumsdiskussion Am Dienstag, den 30. November 2010, fand in der Alten Aula der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg die siebte Alfred-Weber-Lecture statt. Der Referent, Kardinal Dr. Dr. h.c. Reinhard Marx, Erzbischof von München und Freising, ist einer der bekanntesten und politisch engagiertesten Vertreter der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland. So wurde unter anderem sein 2008 erschienenes Buch "Das Kapital: Ein Plädoyer für den Menschen" zum vieldiskutierten Bestseller. Als Gastgeber möchte das Alfred-Weber-Institut den Studierenden, den MitarbeiterInnen des Instituts und der Universität sowie einem interessierten Publikum aus der Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar das Zusammenspiel von Wirtschaft, Politik und Gesellschaft durch Vorträge namhafter Referenten näher bringen.

The literature on environmental R&D frequently studies innovation as a two-stage process, with a single R&D event leading from a conventional polluting technology to a perfectly clean backstop. We allow for uncertainty in innovation in that the new technology may turn out to generate a new pollution problem. R&D may therefore be optimally undertaken more than once. Using and externding recent results from multi-stage optimal control theory, we provide a full characterization of the optimal pollution and R&D policies. The optimal R&D program is strictly sequential and has an endogenous stopping point. Uncertainty drives total R&D effort and its timing.