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Union responses to the threat of large-scale work-force reductions dependent on whether seniority-based mechanisms are used; British Leyland and Italian Fiat as case studies.

Abstract. This article reviews two decades of survey evidence regarding the attitudes of Italian industrial workers towards labour politics. Convention has it that, whereas Italian industrial workers were probably the most radical in western Europe at the time of the hot autumn (1969), they have since then become progressively more disenchanted with trade union involvement in politics and increasingly more cynical and apolitical. Using the numerous sample surveys conducted since the hot autumn, I show that there is no evidence to support this view. Rather, industrial workers in Italy have always been highly differentiated in their views of union politics and it is the politically‐relevant behaviour of union elites that is more important than the attitudes of the rank and file in shaping union interaction with the political sphere. Theoretical context is provided by a discussion of trade unions as institutions, and by attention to the analytic distinction between preferences, behaviour, and context.

Considerable research conducted during the 1970s & 1980s led to a generally accepted view that industrial workers in Italy, who were Europe's most radical labor force in 1969, have since become more cynical & apolitical, & even overtly displeased with the political involvement of the labor unions that represent them. Based on reanalysis of data from opinion surveys conducted during that time, this argument is refuted as incomplete & misleading. It is suggested that Italian workers have always held varying views in term of union politics, & of the fact that they do not play, nor have they ever played, as important a role in the unions' interaction with political entities as do the union elites. A theoretical discussion of trade unions as institutions is included, & analytical distinctions are drawn between preferences, behavior, & context. 2 Tables, 43 References. J. W. Stanton

Throughout the twentieth century, the city of Turin, Italy, has maintained an unusually pure & persistent Wc culture. Several major tendencies have been evident in this culture: productivism, workerism, council democracy, avant-gardism, apoliticism, & localism. However, these ideas & tendencies have limitations that will eventually create problems for the Turinese. At some point, the Left will govern in Italy, & then a tradition that has long ignored the state will have to learn how to control it. In fact, one likely eventuality is conflict of the Turinese labor movement with even a leftist state over control of the factories. W. H. Stoddard

A thought-provoking examination of the causes and consequences of corruption, as well as ways to overcome it, Corruption: What Everyone Needs to Know® provides a wide-ranging overview of the key questions and issues.

We study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy's lower house of representatives over 10 legislatures (1948–92) elected using open‐list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters.

We inventory more than 150 studies of distributive politics in more than three dozen countries other than the United States. We organize existing studies under two theories: theories of democratic accountability and theories of government responsiveness. Studies that concern democratic accountability conceptualize distributive allocations as attempts by politicians to protect themselves electorally by targeting specific groups of voters. We identify four subsets: (a) studies of whether politicians target goods to core or swing voters; (b) studies of general political favoritism in targeting government goods; (c) studies of whether goods are disbursed according to the electoral cycle; and (d) studies of whether elected officials gain votes from the disbursement of government goods. We illustrate each with examples from the literature. We then discuss distributive politics as responsiveness to the median voter. This perspective entails a focus on the redistributive consequences of government policy and investigates whether special interests capture a disproportionate share of goods coming from government. To illustrate the utility of both perspectives, we analyze original data on electricity provision in India's largest state.