Suchergebnisse

Christine Lagarde verband die Ankündigung ihres ersten, moderaten Rettungspakets mit der Aufforderung an die Mitgliedstaaten, fiskalische Hilfen bereitzustellen. Die Märkte scheinen sich das Vertrauen in die Fiskalpolitik indessen abgewöhnt zu haben. Da starke geldpolitische Signale zunächst ausblieben, ging die Talfahrt weiter, bis Lagarde im zweiten Versuch in die Fußstapfen ihres Vorgängers trat und die Schleusen öffnete.

When prudential supervision was put in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), it was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation between monetary policy and financial supervision. However, the financial crisis showed that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other and that an overly strict separation might generate systemic risk. As a consequence, the prevalent model of "functional separation" - central banking and financial supervision in separate entities - has been questioned and calls for a more holistic approach increased. This policy letter states that from a legal perspective, such a holistic approach would be in conformity with the current legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. Although the realization of a holistic approach might intensify the doubts of democratic legitimation under the framework of the ESCB, the independence of the ECB should not be given up. As viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem that would render central bank independence moot do not seem to be available and given the great importance of the independence of the European institutions for the European integration, the democratic control over the ECB should be strengthened instead of stripping the ECB of its independence.

Nicht nur die Geräuschkulisse des Brexits absorbierte ein Stück weit die Aufmerksamkeit für das Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) zur Zulässigkeit des Anleihenkaufprogramms der EZB. Denn immerhin entschied Luxemburg damit über eine der nach wie vor seltenen Vorlagen aus Karlsruhe. Dazu mag auch beigetragen haben, dass seit der Stellungnahme des Generalanwalts Wathelet nicht mehr damit gerechnet wurde, dass der EuGH der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) einen sprichwörtlichen Strich durch die Rechnung machen würde. Dennoch ist das Urteil aus einigen Gründen bemerkenswert.

When prudential supervision was put in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), it was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation between monetary policy and financial supervision. However, the financial crisis showed that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other and that an overly strict separation might generate systemic risk. As a consequence, the prevalent model of "functional separation" – central banking and financial supervision in separate entities – has been questioned and calls for a more holistic approach increased. This policy letter states that from a legal perspective, such a holistic approach would be in conformity with the current legal framework of the Economic and Monetary Union. Although the realization of a holistic approach might intensify the doubts of democratic legitimation under the framework of the ESCB, the independence of the ECB should not be given up. As viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem that would render central bank independence moot do not seem to be available and given the great importance of the independence of the European institutions for the European integration, the democratic control over the ECB should be strengthened instead of stripping the ECB of its independence.

This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy-making on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might conflict with each other. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes supervisory considerations into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to monetary policy. The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and supervisory decision-making, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy mandate and the SSM Regulation, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or smooth monetary policy transmission). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation – in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy. As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor's legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law's indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving.

Die hochproblematische Verfassungsreform in der Türkei führt innerhalb der EU zu ungewöhnlichen Allianzen: In seltener Einmütigkeit wird länderübergreifend von ganz rechts bis weit ins linke politische Spektrum hinein ein Auftrittsverbot für türkische Politiker gefordert. Das gefühlt häufigste Argument bemüht dabei die Souveränität: Man möchte die Kampagne der türkischen Regierung für ihre die Gewaltenteilung gefährdende Verfassungsreform nicht auch noch im eigenen Land haben. In einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft weckt solche Einmütigkeit Zweifel, die sich bei näherem Hinschauen verfestigen – und zwar in juristischer wie politischer Hinsicht.

I. Einleitung: Zwei Probleme und eine Lösung? II. Handelsabkommen und Beschäftigungssituation III. Beschäftigungssituation und WSK-Rechte IV. Bekämpfung von Steuervermeidung und Steuerhinterziehung als Gegenmaßnahme? V. Schlussfolgerungen

This paper analyzes the relationship between monetary policy and prudential supervision in the Banking Union. There is no uniform global model regarding the relationship between monetary policy on the one hand, and prudential supervision on the other. Before the crisis, EU Member States followed different approaches, some of them uniting monetary and supervisory functions in one institution, others assigning them to different, neatly separated institutions. The financial crisis has underlined that monetary policy and prudential supervision deeply affect each other, especially in case of systemic events. Even in normal times, monetary and supervisory decisions might corroborate each other, or get into conflict. After the crisis, some jurisdictions have moved towards a more holistic approach under which monetary policy takes considerations of financial stability into account, while supervisory decisions pay due regard to price stability. The Banking Union puts prudential supervision in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), the institution responsible for monetary policy. Nevertheless, at its establishment there was the political understanding that the ECB should follow a policy of meticulous separation in the discharge of its different functions. This raises the question whether the ECB may still pursue a holistic approach to monetary policy and prudential supervision, respectively. On the basis of a purposive reading of the monetary policy and supervisory mandates of the ECB, the paper answers this question in the affirmative. Effective monetary policy (or supervision) requires financial stability (or price stability). Moreover, without a holistic approach, the SSM Regulation is more likely to provoke the adoption of mutually defeating decisions by the Governing Board. The reputation of the ECB would suffer considerably under such a situation − in a field where reputation is of paramount importance for effective policy. As any meticulous separation between monetary and supervisory functions turns out to be infeasible, the paper explores the reasons. Parting from Katharina Pistor's legal theory of finance, which puts the emphasis on exogenous factors to explain the (non)enforcement of legal rules, the paper suggests a legal instability theorem which focuses on endogenous reasons, such as law's indeterminacy, contextuality, and responsiveness to democratic deliberation. This raises the question whether the holistic approach would be democratically legitimate under the current framework of the ESCB. The idea of technocratic legitimacy that exempts the ECB from representative structures is effectively called into question by the legal instability theorem. This does not imply that the independence of the ECB should be given up, as there are no viable alternatives to protect monetary policy against the time inconsistency problem. Rather, any solution might benefit from recognizing the ECB in its mixed technocratic and political shape as a centerpiece of European integration and improving its transparency, responsiveness, and representativeness without removing its technocratic character. ; December 2017