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In allocating blame for the intelligence failure over Iraq, critics of the Bush administration focus on former CIA Director George Tenet's bending to White House pressure or the administration's mishandling of intelligence. Supporters of the president downplay White House responsibility and focus instead on the failings of the intelligence community and the possible need for structural reforms. Neither side has it completely wrong - or right. There is substantial evidence that the Bush administration - like many of its predecessors - oversold the threat to sell its preferred policy choice. But any quest to 'fix' intelligence merely through reorganisation will be futile insofar as it avoids the more prosaic but more critical matter of intelligence effectiveness. This depends far less on structural reform than on the quality of collected intelligence, the nature of the analytic process and, ultimately, the relationship between intelligence and policymaking officials. (Survival / SWP)

The American-led coalition's 21-day march to Baghdad confirmed the extraordinary capacity of tightly integrated and carefully orchestrated offensive forces to achieve rapid success. American missile defences performed less impressively, however. While Patriot batteries intercepted nine threatening Iraq ballistic missiles, they were not so successful against Iraqi cruise missiles and other low-flying threats. Iraq's use of non-ballistic missiles also contributed to a series of friendly fire accidents and the loss of two coalition aircraft and three crew members. America's adversaries will likely absorb these lessons and accelerate their acquisition of non-ballistic missiles. Without a degree of joint-service integration comparable to that which has transformed its offensive forces, American missile defences could become increasingly vulnerable to adversaries who combine ballistic and cruise missiles attacks with flights of unmanned air vehicles. And if these delivery vehicles are armed with weapons of mass destruction, this vulnerability could be catastrophic. (Survival / SWP)

The use of armed Predator unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) by the US raises important questions about the kind of expanded roles that UAVs may be adapted to perform in the future &, more immediately, to what extent other countries or terrorist groups might emulate US actions & transform their own unarmed UAVs or piloted light aircraft into unmanned weapon-delivery systems or crude terrorist weapons. If UAV & land-attack cruise missile proliferation proceeds unimpeded, it could have unstable consequences for homeland defense, regional stability, & the spread of powerful terrorist capabilities. This reality should energize the search for more effective brakes through improved nonproliferation policies. Adapted from the source document.

'Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons' edited by Jonathon B. Tucker is reviewed.