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This paper uses a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the US political economy to explore the impact of public insurance on the way individuals react to partisan changes in economic policy. In response to these aggregate political shocks, individuals rely on public insurance to insulate them from government‐induced volatility in consumption. As a result, the public appears to be relatively less materialistic in its vote choices as well as in "values" surveys, but only because its underlying materialism has less political salience. Thus this insurance model provides an alternative analysis of the rise of "postmaterialist values" and their relation to unemployment.

This article analyzes the distinction between two definitions of rationality, standard expected utility maximization and an alternative that says rational individuals maximize their expected utility given their acts. The latter version can explain important political phenomena that challenge the standard approach. Documenting the empirical advantages of the second definition for political science, the article also argues that conditional expected utility maximizers are normatively rational. Moreover, the article demonstrates that some important and recognized work in political science has unwittingly relied on this version's underlying assumptions. Finally, it formally shows how this decision theory can ground equilibria in two-person games.

In order to explore the formation of partisan preferences, this paper develops a political-economic model of the US providing micro-foundations for both the genesis and consequences of unemployment. It predicts the standard findings (1) that Democratic administrations are associated with higher economic growth than are Republican administrations; and (2) that the electorate's partisan preference is influenced by the relative likelihood of unemployment. These two patterns and the link between them are explained in terms of the decisions of rational agents facing uncertain elections and competitive labor markets. Specifically, differences in the parties' fiscal policies affect individuals' employment decisions. Agents use labor contracts to exploit the resulting economic uncertainty. The partisan preferences of the electorate are then influenced by employment status. This explanation avoids certain limitations in the work of Hibbs and Alesina.

In order to explore the formation of partisan preferences, this paper develops a political-economic model of the US providing micro-foundations for both the genesis & consequences of unemployment. It predicts the standard findings (1) that Democratic administrations are associated with higher economic growth than are Republican administrations; & (2) that the electorate's partisan preference is influenced by the relative likelihood of unemployment. These two patterns & the link between them are explained in terms of the decisions of rational agents facing uncertain elections & competitive labor markets. Specifically, differences in the parties' fiscal policies affect individuals' employment decisions. Agents use labor contracts to exploit the resulting economic uncertainty. The partisan preferences of the electorate are then influenced by employment status. This explanation avoids certain limitations in the work of Hibbs & Alesina. 1 Appendix, 72 References. Adapted from the source document.

Group differences are often associated with increased political mobilization. Yet group identification is surprisingly flexible and opportunistic. This paper reconciles these two findings by modeling group identification in terms of behavioral interdependencies between a rational agent and those with whom the agent identifies. Given this kind of identification, the agent's own decisions provide useful information concerning the behavior of fellow group members, information that rational identifiers can exploit. This understanding of group identification is introduced into a model of mass elections in which there is rational participation by members of a finite number of groups with diverse political preferences. The results of the model are compared with those of existing theoretical and empirical studies of the interaction between class interest and ethnicity, with the finding that while ethnic identification increases turnout, it does not increase the polarization of the political process.