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Abstract. The paper provides an account of Marx's position of Schumpeter's three categories: capitalism, socialism and democracy. Marx's conception of capitalism is established as more wide‐ranging than sometimes thought, covering any form of society where commodities predominate, and implying a polarized class structure independent of considerations of manual or lowly labour. It is not therefore essentially a political conception, nor does its application turn on the question of private ownership. Socialism, for Marx, involves the abolition of commodities and therefore of money and the wages system. Accordingly, his conception of socialism is not one of state ownership or nationalization, as Schumpeter claims. His commitment to democracy arises from the nature of socialist society and sets him apart from vanguardist political theory. It is therefore more deeply‐rooted than Schumpeter suggests.

Some of the features of the ordinary language method in philosophy have survived in recent political theory. The method's drawback is its conceptual conservatism, which may go unnoticed when it is employed rather than discussed. Pennock's recent arguments about liberty are shown to rely on the method at crucial points, in such a way as to give unjustified support to the concept of negative liberty. More surprisingly, there is common ground between the ordinary language method and empirical democratic theory. Recent attempts to show the ideological nature of such theory are criticized in the light of further considerations about the illocutionary force attaching to the concept of democracy. Finally, an alternative to the ordinary language method of enquiry is sketched.

SOME OF THE FEATURES OF THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY HAVE SURVIVED IN RECENT POLITICAL THEORY. THE METHOD'S DRAWBACK IS ITS CONCEPTUAL CONSERVATISM, WHICH MAY GO UNNOTICED WHEN IT IS EMPLOYED RATHER THAN DISCUSSED. PENNOCK'S RECENT ARGUMENTS ABOUT LIBERTY ARE SHOWN TO RELY ON THE METHOD AT CRUCIAL POINTS, IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE UNJUSTIFIED SUPPORT TO THE CONCEPT OF NEGATIVE LIBERTY. MORE SURPRISINGLY, THERE IS COMMON GROUND BETWEEN THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE METHOD AND EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO SHOW THE IDEOLOGICAL NATURE OF SUCH THEORY ARE CRITICIZED IN THE LIGHT OF FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE ATTACHING TO THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY. FINALLY, AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ORDINARY LANGUAGE METHOD OF ENQUIRY IS SKETCHED.