Suchergebnisse

IntroduzioneUno degli aspetti più influenti del discusso processo della globalizzazione, con le sue molteplici ripercussioni economiche, sociali e politiche, è rappresentato dalla propagazione su scala mondiale della democrazia. Sappiamo che la democrazia è oggi il sistema politico più diffuso e che gran parte dell'umanità vive oramai in regimi eletti democraticamente, con ripercussioni ampiamente positive: a livello nazionale i regimi democratici garantiscono, rispetto ai loro predecessori autoritari, una migliore protezione dei principali diritti civili e politici, pur se questa rimane in alcuni casi insoddisfacente. A livello internazionale il prevalere della democrazia garantisce, tra le altre cose, scenari meno conflittuali, riducendo lechancesdi ostilità o vere e proprie guerre tra Stati (Bonanate 2000, 204-210 per una discussione). Il successo democratico in aree geopolitiche molto diverse, tuttavia, ne rende particolarmente complessa l'analisi: decine di paesi sono impegnati, con alterne fortune, nelle fasi della transizione alla democrazia o in quelle successive del rafforzamento del nuovo regime. E inevitabile, in casi del genere, valutare con maggiore attenzione i processi politici che per primi si sono sviluppati ed hanno attecchito, lasciando in ombra quelli successivi. Dei processi più recenti, anzi, è spesso arduo offrire una descrizione accurata, per il turbinio di eventi e personaggi che spesso ne caratterizzano le vicende.

This article evaluates the trends of democratization over the last 10 years, focusing on the new transitions to democracy taking place in Central-Eastern Europe & sub-Saharan Africa, the two regions where this political process has lately been more pervasive. The basic question addressed is whether the conditions that favored the democratic wave originating in Portugal in the mid-1970s are still able to explain the political transformations that followed the breakdown of the Berlin Wall. For many, the implosion of communism makes any such comparisons impossible. After summarizing some crucial variables suggested by the literature to explain democratic transitions & consolidation, the author tests this hypothesis in both Central-Eastern Europe & sub-Saharan Africa. Initial findings show that, in many cases, the variables that favored democratic transitions before 1989 continued to operate in similar ways thereafter. A few differences aside, in the most recent cases, a number of basic economic, institutional, & cultural conditions continue, as they did earlier, to favor or frustrate democratization. 8 Tables, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractAn increasing number of investigations have dealt with particular aspects of democratic consolidation in Latin America. The multitude of geographic, historical and social conditions underlying the process, however, have often constituted a formidable hurdle for comparative study and generalization. In this paper I undertake a preliminary screening of the existing data and present a summary of facts and theories on democratic consolidation in the region. After an extensive analysis of different sources, I compare the experiences of Latin American countries and define a series of factors that seem to facilitate the consolidation of new democratic regimes. These factors include the beneficial role of earlier democratic traditions, the negotiation of agreements among political elites, diffuse support for the regime, solid party systems, effective control over military participation in society and, to a lesser extent, a favorable economy, especially when accompanied by less unequal income distribution.

IntroduzioneLe recenti transizioni democratiche in America latina e nell'Europa del Sud hanno messo in evidenza la speciale posizione dei sindacati tra le forze della società civile che reagiscono con un'accresciuta mobilitazione all'avvio della liberalizzazione in seno a regimi autoritari (Berins Collier e Mahoney 1997). Le organizzazioni sindacali, infatti, hanno generalmente la capacità di promuovere, in momenti critici, una mobilitazione più ampia ed efficace rispetto ad altri gruppi sociali. Esse non solo possiedono reti organizzative che, attraverso strutture più o meno permanenti, facilitano lo svolgimento di proteste e dimostrazioni, ma possono anche contare su schiere di militanti con specifici interessi in comune e su identità collettive politicamente definite. A differenza di gruppi come le organizzazioni degli studenti e le associazioni religiose o di quartiere, inoltre, i sindacati possono colpire e danneggiare direttamente l'economia attraverso rivendicazioni salariali e scioperi (Valenzuela 1988, 3; Cella 1990, 17). La concomitanza delle transizioni politiche più recenti con una perdurante e diffusa crisi economica e con ripetuti tentativi di stabilizzazione e riforma hanno reso ancora più temibile questa capacità. Utilizzando poteri coercitivi garantiti dallo stato, o la semplice forza della persuasione, il sindacato, d'altra parte, può convincere la propria base ad aspettare sino a che le riforme producano dei risultati, contribuendo così a ridurre i livelli del conflitto sociale (Przeworski 1991, 181).

Abstract Although often unable to satisfactorily solve the problem, democracy (especially enduring democracy) is commonly believed to reduce corruption. Yet, both Transparency International and the World Bank continue to attach a high risk of corruption to Latin American countries: corruption and impunity remain prevalent in the area, despite consolidating democratic regimes and recent anticorruption reforms. Using level of democracy and its endurance, as well as information on the perceptions of democratic performance and corruption obtained from the Latinobarometro, we analyzed a panel data covering the period 2005-2010 in 14 Latin American countries. Our main results show that levels of democracy and citizens' assessment of government fairness have a positive impact on corruption. However, satisfaction towards democracy has the opposite effect: when citizens believed democratic governments and public administrations to be efficient, they also perceived that gains against corruption had significantly decreased.

Although often unable to satisfactorily solve the problem, democracy (especially enduring democracy) is commonly believed to reduce corruption. Yet, both Transparency International and the World Bank continue to attach a high risk of corruption to Latin American countries: corruption and impunity remain prevalent in the area, despite consolidating democratic regimes and recent anticorruption reforms. Using level of democracy and its endurance, as well as information on the perceptions of democratic performance and corruption obtained from the Latinobarometro, we analyzed a panel data covering the period 2005-2010 in 14 Latin American countries. Our main results show that levels of democracy and citizens' assessment of government fairness have a positive impact on corruption. However, satisfaction towards democracy has the opposite effect: when citizens believed democratic governments and public administrations to be efficient, they also perceived that gains against corruption had significantly decreased.

Social scientists have often neglected, or not sufficiently explored, the role of political factors in shaping state capacity. When they did, they mostly focused on key institutional features of political regimes, especially democracy. In this paper, we broaden this approach: besides the institutional traits of democracy, we analyze how governments and their ideologies influence state capacity. In particular, we assess the impact of democracy and executives' partisanship on a composite index of state capacity, based on political order, administrative ability, and extractive capacity. To this end, we apply a pooled cross-sectional time-series model to 18 Latin American countries between 1995 and 2009. Our findings suggest that, in recent years, state capacity in the region was significantly affected by both democratic features and the ideological bearing of elected governments.