Suchergebnisse

What are the electoral effects of a change in partisan affiliation for legislators? To answer this question, 6357 state legislative elections from 1972 to 2000 in five southern states are examined. By comparing this subset of party-switching southern legislators to their non-switching colleagues, I am able to examine (1) whether partisan affiliation and changes in party labels affect electoral outcomes over the short- and long-term; and (2) whether switching parties into the majority party in the legislature affects electoral out-comes. The findings are that incumbent legislators who switch parties do worse in general elections following their switch, especially in elections immediately following their switch. However, once these legislators have switched parties, if their party takes control of the legislature, they do no worse than their non-switching colleagues. Interestingly, other results demonstrate that southern legislators who have switched from Democrat to Republican in the 1990s have done worse following their switches, suggesting that partisan realignment among voters has not been realized completely at the state legislative level.

What are the electoral effects of a change in partisan affiliation for legislators? To answer this question, 6,357 state legislative elections from 1972 to 2000 in five southern states are examined. By comparing this subset of party-switching southern legislators to their non-switching colleagues, I am able to examine (1) whether partisan affiliation & changes in party labels affect electoral outcomes over the short- & long-term; & (2) whether switching parties into the majority party in the legislature affects electoral outcomes. The findings are that incumbent legislators who switch parties do worse in general elections following their switch, especially in elections immediately following their switch. However, once these legislators have switched parties, if their party takes control of the legislature, they do no worse than their non-switching colleagues. Interestingly, other results demonstrate that southern legislators who have switched from Democrat to Republican in the 1990s have done worse following their switches, suggesting that partisan realignment among voters has not been realized completely at the state legislative level. 6 Tables, 1 Appendix, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

Do redistricting & change in racial constituency lead to changes in roll-call voting by members of Congress across different issue dimensions? And is this change different depending on the type of the representative (black Democrat, white Republican, & white Democrat)? Previous scholars who have addressed questions of racial redistricting & policy change have typically focused on just one dimension of voting. To answer these questions, we look at districts that were redrawn following court cases invalidating southern black-majority districts in the mid-1990s. This sample of districts allows conclusions to be drawn about black legislators representing white-majority districts & white legislators representing districts with substantial black populations. We find that legislators will sometimes alter their roll-call voting behavior in multiple directions in order to appeal to both white & black constituents following redistricting. Specifically, we find that black legislators who take on whiter districts become more conservative on all roll-call votes, though they become more liberal when looking at just civil rights votes. White legislators are not as responsive to racial population change. 4 Tables, 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Can ideological inconsistency in legislators' voting records be explained by uncertainty about constituent preferences? Do legislators 'hedge their bets' ideologically when faced with constituency uncertainty? This article presents an uncertainty-based theory of ideological hedging. Legislators faced with uncertainty about their constituent preferences have an incentive to present ideologically inconsistent roll-call records. Legislators experiment with a variety of roll-call positions in order to learn the preferences of their constituents. An examination of US senators during 1961–2004 shows that uncertainty due to black enfranchisement and mobilization led to higher ideological inconsistency in legislative voting records. Ideologically inconsistent behaviour by elected officials can be characterized as best responses to a changing and uncertain environment. These results have implications for representation and the stability of democracy.

The largest formal obstacle to voter participation for U.S. citizens today is the policy of felon & ex-felon disenfranchisement. This article examines the conditions under which states are more likely than not to repeal disenfranchisement provisions pertaining to the voting rights of convicted felons. It also addresses two broader questions: (1) Do political parties seek electoral gain by changing the electoral system & voting laws? & (2) Are preferences of party elites more important than the ideology of a state's citizenry in predicting electoral system change? The answer to both questions is yes. This study finds that disenfranchisement provisions are more likely to be repealed under a unified Democratic state government than under a split or Republican party government, but states in which electoral support for Democrats at the presidential level is generally weak are also more likely to repeal such provisions. No evidence is found that citizen ideology affects changes in voting rights. 4 Tables, 48 References. Adapted from the source document.

What are the electoral consequences of switching parties for incumbent members of Congress? Do incumbents who switch fare better or worse after their switch? Aldrich (1995) and Aldrich and Bianco (1992) present a model of party affiliation for all candidates. We empirically extend this model for incumbent legislators who have switched parties. Specifically, we look at the universe of incumbent representatives who have run for Congress under more than one party label since World War II. We find that the primary and general election vote shares for party switchers are not as high after the switch as before. Additionally, we learn that party switching causes the primaries in the switcher's party and in the the opposing party (the switcher's "old" party) to become more competitive in the short run. Over the long run, however, primaries in the switcher's new party are less competitive than those in the old party before the switch.