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AbstractProminent theories of state formation hold that states formed because of warfare and competition on the one hand, or the diffusion of organizational templates and practices through learning and emulation on the other. We propose that the two strands of theory can be linked to more accurately account for mechanisms of state formation. War, we argue, is an important source of social diffusion. War establishes contacts between political elites across borders, generates migratory flows, and establishes new economic networks. We examine the validity of the theory through a comparative case study of Nordic political units from the dawn of the Viking Age to the end of the High Middle Ages (CE 800–1300), finding that raids, settlements, and conquests by Norwegian and Danish rulers in England, Europe's most advanced kingdom, set in motion state formation processes in Norway and Denmark. In these cases, the winners emulated the losers.

AbstractInternational arbitration is a distinctive feature of both contemporary international politics and the ancient world. Explanations of arbitration in the international relations literature generally posit that states engage in arbitration to mitigate the effects of competition in an anarchical system, or that the practice of arbitration reflects democratic norms. However, an examination of arbitration during the paradigmatic case of the Hellenistic period (338–90bce) casts doubt on the existing literature. Hierarchy rather than anarchy better characterizes the political context in which arbitration took place: the Greeks often organized themselves into alliances or leagues in which a hegemon dominated decision making, or into federal states with a common foreign policy. This hierarchical setting was a necessary condition for international arbitration where the practice of arbitration was a tool to legitimize hierarchical powers. We assemble an original data set of Hellenistic arbitrations, and use qualitative comparative analysis to show that hierarchy was almost always a necessary condition for international arbitration. Process-tracing of arbitration under three political orders—hegemonic kingdoms in the Greek world, Greek federations, and the Roman Empire—shows that arbitration as a particular means of dispute resolution was used as an ideological device to build and legitimize international order. We then analyze the contemporary record, finding a role for hierarchy in modern international arbitration.

The observation that agents and structures are co-constituted is now commonplace, yet scholars continue to struggle to incorporate this insight. Rationalists tend to overemphasize actors' agency in the constitution of social order while constructivists tend to overstate the degree to which structures determine action. This article uses The Gift to rethink the agent–structure debate, arguing that the model of social relations Mauss outlines in this work sheds new light on basic concepts in international relations theory such as reciprocity, hierarchy, and obligation. Mauss' social theory locates the generative structure of social order in diffuse exchange relations, what he terms gift exchange, and assumes that actors are both socially positioned within hierarchical relations of exchange and reflexive agents who are able to understand and strive to change those relations. In so doing, he avoids reducing social order to either deeply internalized social norms or instrumental interests, navigating between agents and structures to develop a more dynamic model of social relations. This model of social order permits a richer understanding of hierarchy in world politics that appreciates the experience of domination and the possibility of resistance. It also provides a distinct understanding of the nature of social obligation and the "compliance pull" of social norms, locating their force in the reflexive recognition by actors that they are dependent on shared social relations for meaningful social agency. This points toward an ethics of stewardship that opens up new perspectives on the duties that states and others owe to each other, a duty grounded in an acknowledgment of our mutual vulnerability as socially constituted agents.