Suchergebnisse

This paper explores the degree to which exposure to reoccurring natural disasters of various kinds explains seven dimensions of severe child poverty in 67 middle- and low-income countries. It also analyzes how certain institutional conditions, namely the quality of government (QoG), have moderating effects on the relationship between disasters and child poverty. Two main hypotheses are tested. The first is that disasters do have an adverse average effect on severe poverty. The second is that disasters reveal a positive coefficient (i.e., more disasters, more deprivation) but that higher levels of QoG negatively moderate this effect, i.e., the adverse effect of disasters is diminished by increasingly high QoG levels. From 70 possible combinations of relationships (7 types of deprivation combined with 10 types of natural disaster measures), 11 have the expected correlation between disasters and child deprivation and only one has the expected interactive correlation between quality of government, disasters, and child poverty. Several unexpected results could also be observed which are discussed in the paper along with recommendations for future research.

This paper explores the degree to which exposure to reoccurring natural disasters of various kinds explains seven dimensions of severe child poverty in 67 middle- and low-income countries. It also analyzes how certain institutional conditions, namely the quality of government (QoG), have moderating effects on the relationship between disasters and child poverty. Two main hypotheses are tested. The first is that disasters do have an adverse average effect on severe poverty. The second is that disasters reveal a positive coefficient (i.e., more disasters, more deprivation) but that higher levels of QoG negatively moderate this effect, i.e., the adverse effect of disasters is diminished by increasingly high QoG levels. From 70 possible combinations of relationships (7 types of deprivation combined with 10 types of natural disaster measures), 11 have the expected correlation between disasters and child deprivation and only one has the expected interactive correlation between quality of government, disasters, and child poverty. Several unexpected results could also be observed which are discussed in the paper along with recommendations for future research.

The following presents a brief analysis of the mortality and nutrition situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2000-2006 based on a summary of surveys, academic articles, and UN documentation over that period. The information was collected for the purpose of analysis in CRED's Complex Emergency Database (CEDAT). At the present time the database has only limited information for the years prior to 2000 and so has not included them in the analysis, although we acknowledge that the conflict began in 1998. N.B. There were ten provinces plus Kinshasa until February 2006 when the government changed the Constitution to include 26 provinces. However as this is not yet reflected in documentation for DRC we will maintain the previously used 11 provinces.

The following presents a brief analysis of the mortality and nutrition situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 2000-2006 based on a summary of surveys, academic articles, and UN documentation over that period. The information was collected for the purpose of analysis in CRED's Complex Emergency Database (CEDAT). At the present time the database has only limited information for the years prior to 2000 and so has not included them in the analysis, although we acknowledge that the conflict began in 1998. N.B. There were ten provinces plus Kinshasa until February 2006 when the government changed the Constitution to include 26 provinces. However as this is not yet reflected in documentation for DRC we will maintain the previously used 11 provinces.

The exact number of deaths in the Darfur region due to the conflict will probably never be known. But most certainly, it is far too many. Estimating mortality in conflicts is a notoriously difficult exercise, even more so in Darfur where the conditions causing death are extremely variable. Malnutrition, epidemics and violence occur sporadically, claiming many lives in some areas and none in others. Recognising the importance of tracking mortality and estimating deaths, humanitarian aid agencies working in the region have undertaken mortality surveys among their beneficiaries at different times to assess the condition of their status and the severity of the crises. These are based on sound statistical and epidemiological techniques and provide insights into the varying levels of mortality over the entire region. Estimating numbers of deaths from surveys depends on representativeness of the sample, double counting of deaths, under or over-reporting by respondents. Another key concern is that intensity of the conflict varies over time and in different areas of Darfur and therefore a blanket application of rates from a few surveys will invariably distort results. The humanitarian assistance, although slow in early stages, since the first half of 2004 in Darfur has been massive and is widely acknowledged to have saved many lives. As humanitarian needs continue to grow the situation today is deteriorating again and it is clear to the authors that humanitarian aid has to be increased and important international measures to end the aggression must be taken. From a majority of deaths being caused by military/violence in the wars in the first half of the 20th century, armed conflicts over the last 20 years have taken their toll among the civil populations. Disease and malnutrition have been the main causes of deaths among civilians in most of the major conflicts of the past two decades. These include deaths due to lack of access to health care, to food or harvests leading to starvation, dehydration and disease during displacement. Direct war-related violence on civilians leading to death (massacres, shootings), while heinous, contributes a small part of the total deaths, but remains the only direct evidence of the blunt hostility of armed groups on unarmed inhabitants. 6 In this paper we present two alternate methods that were used to calculate estimations of mortality in Darfur. The first one was elaborated by epidemiologists at the Brussels-based Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). The second one was performed by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the US Department of State. In summary, the CRED method estimated approximately 134,000 total deaths in Darfur and Eastern Chad over the 17 months from September 2003 to January 2005. Of these deaths, 120,000 were excess deaths directly attributable to the conflict, 35,000 of which were violent deaths. The US State Department method estimated a possible range of 98,000 – 181,000 total deaths over 23 months - from March 2003 to January 2005. Estimates of excess deaths due to the conflict ranged from 63,000 – 146,000 over the same period.

The exact number of deaths in the Darfur region due to the conflict will probably never be known. But most certainly, it is far too many. Estimating mortality in conflicts is a notoriously difficult exercise, even more so in Darfur where the conditions causing death are extremely variable. Malnutrition, epidemics and violence occur sporadically, claiming many lives in some areas and none in others. Recognising the importance of tracking mortality and estimating deaths, humanitarian aid agencies working in the region have undertaken mortality surveys among their beneficiaries at different times to assess the condition of their status and the severity of the crises. These are based on sound statistical and epidemiological techniques and provide insights into the varying levels of mortality over the entire region. Estimating numbers of deaths from surveys depends on representativeness of the sample, double counting of deaths, under or over-reporting by respondents. Another key concern is that intensity of the conflict varies over time and in different areas of Darfur and therefore a blanket application of rates from a few surveys will invariably distort results. The humanitarian assistance, although slow in early stages, since the first half of 2004 in Darfur has been massive and is widely acknowledged to have saved many lives. As humanitarian needs continue to grow the situation today is deteriorating again and it is clear to the authors that humanitarian aid has to be increased and important international measures to end the aggression must be taken. From a majority of deaths being caused by military/violence in the wars in the first half of the 20th century, armed conflicts over the last 20 years have taken their toll among the civil populations. Disease and malnutrition have been the main causes of deaths among civilians in most of the major conflicts of the past two decades. These include deaths due to lack of access to health care, to food or harvests leading to starvation, dehydration and disease during displacement. Direct war-related violence on civilians leading to death (massacres, shootings), while heinous, contributes a small part of the total deaths, but remains the only direct evidence of the blunt hostility of armed groups on unarmed inhabitants. 6 In this paper we present two alternate methods that were used to calculate estimations of mortality in Darfur. The first one was elaborated by epidemiologists at the Brussels-based Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). The second one was performed by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the US Department of State. In summary, the CRED method estimated approximately 134,000 total deaths in Darfur and Eastern Chad over the 17 months from September 2003 to January 2005. Of these deaths, 120,000 were excess deaths directly attributable to the conflict, 35,000 of which were violent deaths. The US State Department method estimated a possible range of 98,000 – 181,000 total deaths over 23 months - from March 2003 to January 2005. Estimates of excess deaths due to the conflict ranged from 63,000 – 146,000 over the same period.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments around the world have implemented public health policies that limit individual freedoms in order to control disease transmission. While such limitations on liberties are sometimes necessary for pandemic control, many of these policies have been overly broad or have neglected to consider the costs for populations already susceptible to human rights violations. Furthermore, the pandemic has exacerbated preexisting inequities based on health care access, poverty, racial injustice, refugee crises, and lack of education. The worsening of such human rights violations increases the need to utilize a human rights approach in the response to COVID-19. This paper provides a global overview of COVID-19 public health policy interventions implemented from January 1 to June 30, 2020, and identifies their impacts on the human rights of marginalized populations. We find that over 70% of these public health policies negatively affect human rights in at least one way or for at least one population. We recommend that policy makers take a human rights approach to COVID-19 pandemic control by designing public health policies focused on the most marginalized groups in society. Doing so would allow for a more equitable, realistic, and sustainable pandemic response that is centered on the needs of those at highest risk of COVID-19 and human rights violations.

Abstract
Background
The Syrian conflict has dramatically changed the public health landscape of Syria since its onset in March of 2011. Depleted resources, fractured health systems, and increased security risks have disrupted many routine services, including vaccinations, across several regions in Syria. Improving our understanding of infectious disease transmission in conflict-affected communities is imperative, particularly in the Syrian conflict. We utilize surveillance data from the Early Warning Alert and Response Network (EWARN) database managed by the Assistance Coordination Unit (ACU) to explore trends in the incidence of measles in conflict-affected northern Syria and analyze two consecutive epidemics in 2017 and 2018.

Methods
We conducted a retrospective time-series analysis of the incidence of clinically suspected cases of measles using EWARN data between January 2015 and June 2019. We compared regional and temporal trends to assess differences between geographic areas and across time.

Results
Between January 2015 and June 2019, there were 30,241 clinically suspected cases of measles reported, compared to 3193 cases reported across the whole country in the decade leading up to the conflict. There were 960 regional events that met the measles outbreak threshold and significant differences in the medians of measles incidence across all years (p-value < 0.001) and in each pairwise comparison of years as well as across all geographic regions (p-value < 0.001). Although most governorates faced an elevated burden of cases in every year of the study, the measles epidemics of 2017 and 2018 in the governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Deir-Ez-Zor, and Idlib accounted for over 71% of the total suspected cases over the entire study period.

Conclusions
The 2017 and 2018 measles epidemics were the largest since Syria eliminated the disease in 1999. The regions most affected by these outbreaks were areas of intense conflict and displacement between 2014 and 2018, including districts in Ar-Raqqa, Deir-Ez-Zor, and Idlib. The spread of measles in northern Syria serves as an indicator of low immunization coverage and limited access to care and highlights the Syrian peoples' vulnerability to infectious diseases and vaccine preventable diseases in the setting of the current conflict.

In an incredible story of human adaptation, the aggregate global risk of mortality to extreme weather declined by over two orders of magnitude over the past century. Yet the data show that large losses of lives to extreme weather disasters persist in nations typified by poor economic development, weak institutions, and political instability. And currently we are seeing spikes in mortality from extreme heat events in rich nations, including a wave of new reported deaths in Japan, Europe, and Canada during 2018. These events and future projections of increasing exposure suggest that we need to revisit adaptation strategies to deal with the adverse effects of extreme weather disasters across the world.

In an incredible story of human adaptation, the aggregate global risk of mortality to extreme weather declined by over two orders of magnitude over the past century. Yet the data show that large losses of lives to extreme weather disasters persist in nations typified by poor economic development, weak institutions, and political instability. And currently we are seeing spikes in mortality from extreme heat events in rich nations, including a wave of new reported deaths in Japan, Europe, and Canada during 2018. These events and future projections ofincreasing exposure suggest that we need to revisit adaptation strategies to deal with the adverse effects of extreme weather disasters across the world.

In an incredible story of human adaptation, the aggregate global risk of mortality to extreme weather declined by over two orders of magnitude over the past century. Yet the data show that large losses of lives to extreme weather disasters persist in nations typified by poor economic development, weak institutions, and political instability. And currently we are seeing spikes in mortality from extreme heat events in rich nations, including a wave of new reported deaths in Japan, Europe, and Canada during 2018. These events and future projections ofincreasing exposure suggest that we need to revisit adaptation strategies to deal with the adverse effects of extreme weather disasters across the world.