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AbstractThe triumphalism of the immediate post‐ColdWar period in theUnitedStates has faded, and concern about decline has returned. In the field of international relations, the return of power transition models is exemplary of the new mood. This article argues that realist models misjudge the source of foreign policy risks for theUnitedStates and its allies. Rather, the standard canon of liberal international relations theory also suggests sources of pessimism. These include the enduring nature of authoritarian rule, the difficulty of coordinating emerging actors through existing international institutions, and the ambiguous effects of increased interdependence on the foreign policy behaviour and leverage of emerging powers.

This policy brief links debates about the economic development of the Asia-Pacific to possible security implications. The brief makes four points. Past periods of high growth in the region have inevitably slowed, and China's will too. The main question is whether thishappens gradually or as a result of crisis. Second, the global imbalances associated with export-oriented strategies and reserve accumulation have created strong dependence on the U.S. market. Third, the growth of intra-regional trade does not necessarily indicate a "decoupling" of the region. Increased Chinese leverage within the region may be exaggerated because of the continued role of international production networks in which Japanese, American, and European firms continue to play an important role. Finally, regional institutions are evolving and contributing to ongoing liberalization at the margin. But the institutional architecture remains fragmented and hamstrung by the tremendous diversity of the region's political systems and economies.

This paper surveys recent literature on the design of international institutions and applies the insights from it to the prospects for regional economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The political and economic heterogeneity of the region has served the process of regional economic integration. But this heterogeneity has limited the extent of institutional development and contributed to well-known features of it, including a proliferation of competing institutions, consensus decision-making, "shallow" cooperation, and limited delegation to standing international secretariats. Changes in voting rules could, in principle, change these outcomes but are not likely to arise. Deepening cooperation will come, rather, from marginal changes in the extent of delegation. Several proposals are suggested about how this might occur, including more independent sources of information on regional trends, enhanced dispute settlement, and common projects that involve more extensive transfers from richer to poorer members.

The end of the Cold War has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the future of international relations in the Asia-Pacific. This debate has been difficult to assess in part because of the elusive quality of the outcomes being explored, such as whether the region is characterized by "stability" or "rivalry." What exactly do we want to explain?