Suchergebnisse

Zwei Arten von Veto-Akteuren beeinflussen die Wahl von geldpolitischen Instititutionen: Akteure auf Parteiebene oder Regierungen unterhalb der nationalen Ebene, die stark in föderalen aber schwach in zentralistischen Systemen sind. Eine entscheidende Frage ist, ob Wähler imstande sind, die Manipulation der Wirtschaft durch Parteiakteure zu erkennen. Eine zweite Frage betrifft die Fähigkeit eines Akteurs einer nationalen Partei, entweder Geld- oder Fiskalpolitik zu kontrollieren. In zentralistischen Einparteiensystemen sind Kontrolle und Identifikation klar; Parteien in einem solchen System bevorzugen flexible Wechselkurse und abhängige Zentralbanken. Für einen zentralistischen Staat mit Mehrparteiensystem ist die Wahl traditionell schwierig, und die Fähigkeit, den Nutzen fiskalpolitischer Massnahmen bestimmten Wählern zukommen zu lassen, macht fiskalische Autonomie attraktiver für Koalitionsregierungen. Solche Regierungen bevorzugen politisch abhängige Zentralbanken, die jedoch die Regierungsschulden finanzieren. Im Föderalismus haben Parteien der nationalen Regierung weniger Kontrolle über die Fiskalpolitik und bevorzugen flexible Wechselkurs. Subnationale Regierungen unterstützen keine abhängige Zentralbank, die der nationalen Regierung mehr Macht gibt. (SWP-Jns)

I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government.

Why and how did the two European Union countries with the worst debt levels and with yearly deficit levels double the Maastricht target in 1993 manage to get their financial affairs in shape to qualify for Economic and Monetary Union? This paper presents an explicitly institutional approach to the political economy of budget deficits. It discusses the role of one external actor, the European Union, in promoting tighter fiscal discipline in the two countries. The European Union provided an important stick for any failure not to make needed changes, namely exclusion from EMU. This stick alone, however, was not sufficient to promote change in both countries. Indeed, each state made fundamental institutional changes that put the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria within reach. Consistent with their respective electoral systems and coalition structures, Italy delegated significant power on the making and the enforcement of the budget to a strong finance minister, while Belgium strengthened its High Council of Finance and resorted to budgetary targets in the form of fiscal contracts.

Die Mitgliedsstaaten der EU zögern, bei der Harmonisierung der direkten Steuern voranzuschreiten. Bisher waren sie weiterhin nur im geringen Maße bereit, Kontrolle über ihre indirekten Steuern abzugeben. Der Beitrag erklärt, warum die fortschreitende wirtschaftliche Integration zu größerer Ineffizienz in dieser Frage führt: Wenn sich die Steuerlasten von Land zu Land erheblich unterscheiden, haben diese Lasten einen großen Einfluß auf den Wirtschaftsstandort. Der Beitrag beschreibt die Bemühungen, die bis heute auf der Ebene der Europäischen Union im Hinblick auf die Koordinierung der direkten Besteuerung unternommen worden sind. Es zeigt sich, daß es hier kaum Fortschritte gegeben hat. Dieser Befund resultiert aus dem Vergleich der Steuersätze und der steuerlichen Belastungen innerhalb der Europäischen Union, wie sie sich von 1990 bis 1995 entwickelt haben. (pre)

The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I. This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator state, but pressure from the national government, especially to increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates. These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor.