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AbstractHistorians have rarely considered the political views of electorates in small constituencies with strong proprietorial interests, or 'pocket' boroughs. However, through a detailed case study of the Cornish borough of Mitchell, this article reveals a rural settlement with a multifaceted and divided community, which experienced a high degree of partisan conflict during the later Stuart period as its inhabitants engaged in an ongoing struggle over the nature of the franchise. A group of often‐disenfranchised inhabitants launched a sustained and independent assault on the lord of the borough's limited franchise, in favour of an inhabitant‐based vote; they were opposed by a group which oscillated between loyalty to the borough's patron and attempts to secure its own influence. Party allegiances and political ideologies can occasionally be identified on both sides, but the franchise dispute did not always align with these divisions. The article argues that while partisan conflict occurred in 'pocket' boroughs, it took extraordinary circumstances for this to boil over and facilitate change – in Mitchell's case, these circumstances were the frequent elections to the Exclusion Parliaments, and the patron's self‐imposed exile in France. Yet even once a popular inhabitant‐based vote was established, the widened electorate still found it difficult to determine the outcome of elections, as the borough's patron and local gentry families soon reasserted their authority. Therefore, while the electorates of boroughs such as Mitchell were not supine or monolithic, their ability to actively participate in the electoral process was ultimately fragile.

In 1917, the Bolsheviks promised the liberation of the working masses from exploitation. And yet, within twenty years, they had delivered a regime that was substantially more exploitative and repressive than that of the Tsarist regime they had overthrown. This article argues that more than a quarter of a century after the opening of the archives, we still misapprehend how it happened. Historians tend to see the process as programmatic, or planned and intentional: that the Bolsheviks were authoritarian by nature, or that Stalin hijacked the Revolution and satisfied his lust for power by building a personal dictatorship. The articleargues that we have failed to grasp the extent to which the positive programme of liberation continued to motivate the Bolshevik leadership throughout the interwar period. But they had underestimated the obstacles to creating a consensual, participatory political order. Considerable progress was made overcoming basic illiteracy, but it was another matter altogether to establish a functioning administrative apparatus, to fight and win the civil war, and to rebuild a shatteredeconomy. The breakdown of liberal ("bourgeois") democracies in Europe encouraged complacency about the superiority of the "transitional" proletarian dictatorship. The struggle for power after Lenin's death turned local organisations against inner party democracy. It did not seem appropriate to revive it either in the midst of collectivisation and rapid industrialisation. The survival of the Revolution and catching up to the advanced capitalist countries took precedence. But if we treat extreme political violence and dictatorship as ends in themselves, we will fail adequately to grasp the fate of the Revolution. ; В 1917 г. большевики обещали освобождение трудящихся масс от эксплуатации. Но в течение 20 лет они установили режим гораздо более эксплуататорский и репрессивный по своей сути, чем побежденный ими царизм. Автор утверждает, что спустя более четверти века после открытия архивов мы все еще остаемся в неведении по поводу того, почему так случилось. Историки склонны рассматривать этот исход как запрограммированный либо преднамеренно спланированный, поскольку большевики были авторитарны по своей природе, или же Сталин «оседлал» революцию и установил личную диктатуру, удовлетворяя жажду власти. До сих пор нет ясности в понимании того, в какой степени положительная программа освобождения народа продолжала мотивировать большевистское руководство в межвоенный период. Большевики недооценили препятствия на пути создания общественного порядка, основанного на согласованном политическом участии. Существенный прогресс был достигнут на пути ликвидации неграмотности, но значительно труднее было создать функционирующий государственный аппарат, бороться и выиграть Гражданскую войну, а также восстановить разрушенную экономику. Падение либеральных («буржуазных») демократий в Европе укрепляло ощущение превосходства «переходной» пролетарской диктатуры. Борьба за власть после смерти Ленина направила местные партийные организации на борьбу с внутрипартийной демократией. Возрождать ее в условиях коллективизации и ускоренной индустриализации казалось неуместным. Гораздо более важным представлялось выживание революции и стремление догнать передовые капиталистические страны. Автор отмечает, что если относиться к проявлениям политического насилия и диктатуре как к конечной цели советской власти, невозможно должным образом понять судьбу революции.