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International pressures on authoritarian regimes to respect human rights are increasingly common yet their impact is relatively unknown and hotly debated. Recent studies suggest that international pressures can have a limited yet important effect when they strengthen and reinforce favorable domestic processes. I identify three domestic conditions conducive to a limited impact — low costs of easing repression; responsive regime factions; and relatively strong societal human rights norms. In a case study of Chile from 1973 to 1980, I find that extensive international pressures and a soft-line faction combined to alter the political strategy of the authoritarian regime in ways not foreseen or intended by international actors. The research suggests that scholars should more carefully consider the normative dimensions of international pressures and their role in undermining the legitimacy of domestic regimes.

How and to what extent do states influence the level of democracy and autocracy in other states? We argue that states exist internationally in dependence networks with each other and that those networks provide pathways for influence on a state's domestic institutions. For any given state, a dependence network is a set of partner states with whom it regularly engages in exchanges of valued goods, where those exchanges would be costly to break. We find that an index of three such networks–trade, security and shared international organization membership–significantly influences the domestic political institutions in a given state. These changes are substantively large in the long run, similar in size to regional and global levels of democracy. State capabilities figure heavily in our network measures, thus emphasizing the role of power in the diffusion of domestic political institutions. We also find that network-influenced change works both ways: states can become more autocratic or more democratic.

AbstractWhy have states legalised international norms promoting domestic democracy in some regions of the world? This issue poses a difficult puzzle because standard assumptions about state preferences for sovereignty make the creation of strong, binding international rules on democracy unlikely. We identify four possible answers: the interests of powerful states, common government interests in domestic policy lock-in, the absence of fears that powerful states will use the rules to intervene unilaterally in domestic affairs, and the robustness of pre-existing norms. We explore our argument by applying it to the Organization of American States (OAS), a fairly unlikely organisation for the strong legalisation of international rules. Our findings suggest that legalisation of democracy is quite difficult to achieve. State interests in locking in democratic benefits and state power – even hegemonic power – are necessary but insufficient. An important set of new democracies attempted legalisation in the 1950s, yet failed. The United States, as strong a regional hegemon as ever, attempted further legalisation in 2005, yet failed. Motives and power must be accompanied by low fears of unilateral intervention and high levels of norm robustness in order to produce results.