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To what extent is citizen political participation, such as electronic or personal contact with members of Congress, stimulated by membership in organized interest groups? I use data from a nationwide survey conducted by Zogby in 2007 to assess the extent to which Americans contact congressional offices, and whether membership in more activist-oriented groups, such as citizen groups, stimulates greater rates of contact than membership in professional associations or no group membership at all. I also examine whether this group 'effect' on participation breaks down by the method used, low-effort electronic contact (mail, email, web-based contact pages, on-line petitions) versus high-effort contact such as personal meetings with lawmakers. I find that the role played by interest groups in facilitating communication can be substantial. In the case of members from lower socio-economic backgrounds in particular, membership in a citizen group helps compensate for lack of knowledge and resources regarding how to contact Congress. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

To what extent is citizen political participation, such as electronic or personal contact with members of Congress, stimulated by membership in organized interest groups? I use data from a nationwide survey conducted by Zogby in 2007 to assess the extent to which Americans contact congressional offices, and whether membership in more activist-oriented groups, such as citizen groups, stimulates greater rates of contact than membership in professional associations or no group membership at all. I also examine whether this group 'effect' on participation breaks down by the method used, low-effort electronic contact (mail, email, web-based contact pages, on-line petitions) versus high-effort contact such as personal meetings with lawmakers. I find that the role played by interest groups in facilitating communication can be substantial. In the case of members from lower socio-economic backgrounds in particular, membership in a citizen group helps compensate for lack of knowledge and resources regarding how to contact Congress.

This article investigates how interest group competition, a state of conflicting policy preferences stemming from how organizational memberships are defined, can resolve into conflict or cooperation. The strategic choices of competing lobbyists are modeled as the results of a trade‐off between the need to represent members and please legislators, and the additional advocacy resources they hope to gain by agreeing to form coalitions with their competitors rather than fight them in resource‐draining conflicts. Hypotheses derived from the model are tested with data from interviews with lobbyists on six issues taken up by the U.S. Congress from 1999 to 2002. The results suggest that while group members do have some limited power to constrain the policy positions taken on issues by their lobbyists, it is primarily the pressures from legislators and competitor groups that push lobbyists into collectively supporting coalition positions different from those desired by their members.

In 1997, lobbyists for the Independent Insurance Agents of America,
under pressure from then Senate Banking Committee Chair Alfonse
D'Amato (R-NY), threw in the towel and agreed to negotiate with
their long time enemies, the banking and Wall Street investment
industries, on new laws structuring the financial industry for the
21st century. Their compromise removed a major
legislative barrier to facilitating the emergence of large, one-stop
shopping financial corporations. More surprisingly, the Consumer
Federation of America and other public interest groups also started
bargaining over the shape of the consumer protection laws governing
these new institutions. Getting something through bargaining, they
believed, was better than letting the financial industry write these
laws themselves. Not all consumer groups participated in these
negotiations or gave support to the final bill; there were just not
enough consumer protection provisions included to please their
ideologically motivated members. Nor did every banking and insurance
agent organization support the final deal, largely because their
members felt threatened by the prospect of an industry dominated by
a few financial behemoths. Yet the final interest group coalition
that drove the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 across President Bill
Clinton's desk was truly surprising in its ideological breadth.

Objective. Recent trends in urban research emphasize the importance of local nonprofits and social capital in the revitalization of poor and minority neighborhoods. This article tests the idea that urban communities able to mobilize themselves by establishing development nonprofits and overcoming collective action problems will be better able to make use of urban‐development policies.Methods. Measures operationalizing nonprofit presence and social capital are used in an empirical test to see if they can, through the medium of the Community Reinvestment Act, increase the number of mortgage and business loans in Washington, D.C.Results. These variables show only weak effects on mortgage lending, but very strong results for small‐business lending in all types of communities.Conclusions. The results suggest that nonprofits and social capital may have only limited benefit in the revitalization of urban neighborhoods and researchers and practitioners should be careful when relying on them.

Does the exchange model used to explain interest group influence with Congress & the bureaucracy hold leverage over patterns of lobbyist Contact with the president? In this paper I argue that there is good reason to believe that it does not. Rather, I argue that the president & his immediate staff often keep interest groups at arm's length. Instead of being able to acquire face time with senior administration staff to press their own cases, lobbyists are largely granted access only when they are needed to build support for the president's policy agenda in Congress or with the public. Using data drawn in part from the 1996 filings of interest groups under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 1 analyze lobbyists' contact with the White House to learn what types of circumstances appear to drive contact between interest groups & the president. The evidence suggests that the president -- interest group connection is largely determined by the White House based on ideological congruence rather than a two-way flow of communication & influence. 3 Tables, 49 References. Adapted from the source document.

Objective. Recent trends in urban research emphasize the importance of local nonprofits & social capital in the revitalization of poor & minority neighborhoods. This article tests the idea that urban communities able to mobilize themselves by establishing development nonprofits & overcoming collective action problems will be better able to make use of urban-development policies. Methods. Measures operationalizing nonprofit presence & social capital are used in an empirical test to see if they can, through the medium of the Community Reinvestment Act, increase the number of mortgage & business loans in Washington, DC. Results. These variables show only weak effects on mortgage lending, but very strong results for small-business lending in all types of communities. Conclusions. The results suggest that nonprofits & social capital may have only limited benefit in the revitalization of urban neighborhoods & researchers & practitioners should be careful when relying on them. 4 Tables, 4 Figures, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.