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This article compares constituency opinion and roll call voting behavior of U.S. representatives in the 96th (1979-1980) and 97th (1981-1982) Congresses for four classes of district types: those that switched party in the 1980 election, those that replaced a representative with a new member of the same party, those that returned Democrats, and those that returned Republicans to Congress. Switched-seat districts exhibit the largest changes in voting behavior from the 96th to the 97th Congress, yet the behavior of the new representative is not always consistent with constituency preferences. All four groups of representatives voted more conservatively in the 97th Congress than they or their counterparts had in the 96th, suggesting that House members may have interpreted the 1980 election as a mandate for conservatism. Yet more often than not this conservatism moved representatives away from, rather than toward, constituency preferences, suggesting that voters made retrospective rather than prospective choices in 1980.

THIS ARTICLE COMPARES CONSTITUENCY OPINION AND ROLL CALL VOTING BEHAVIOR OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVES IN THE 96TH (1979-1980) AND 97TH (1981-1982) CONGRESSES FOR FOUR CLASSES OF DISTRICT TYPES: THOSE THAT SWITCHED PARTY IN THE 1980 ELECTION, THOSE THAT REPLACED A REPRESENTATIVE WITH A NEW MEMBER OF THE SAME PARTY, THOSE THAT RETURNED DEMOCRATS, AND THOSE THAT RETURNED REPUBLICANS TO CONGRESS. SWITCHED-SEAT DISTRICTS EXHIBIT THE LARGEST CHANGES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR FROM THE 96TH TO THE 97TH CONGRESS, YET THE BEHAVIOR OF THE NEW REPRESENTATIVE IS NOT ALWAYS CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUENCY PREFERENCES. ALL FOUR GROUPS OF REPRESENTATIVES VOTED MORE CONSERVATIVELY IN THE 97TH CONGRESS THAN THEY OR THEIR COUNTERPARTS HAD IN THE 96TH, SUGGESTING THAT HOUSE MEMBERS MAY HAVE INTERPRETED THE 1980 ELECTION AS A MANDATE FOR CONSERVATISM. YET MORE OFTEN THAN NOT THIS CONSERVATISM MOVED REPRESENTATIVES AWAY FROM, RATHER THAN TOWARD, CONSTITUENCY PREFERENCES, SUGGESTING THAT VOTERS MADE RETROSPECTIVE RATHER THAN PROSPECTIVE CHOICES IN 1980.

If one were asked to describe the process of policy change in the United States in one word, that word would surely be 'incremental'. Students of the Congressional process can point to a number of factors which account for delay in changes of policy; it is only recently that they have begun to examine the occasional departures from Congressional intractability in matter of public policy. This paper seeks to further our understanding of how internal legislative conditions can produce or inhibit policy change. While the first scholars to call attention to this phenomenon noted that policy changes followed critical realignments, others have made a more general case for the ability of Congress to pass important legislation, arguing that Congressional potential for policy change depends largely upon the interactive effects of both majority and minority size and unity. Policy changes have been enacted by those Congresses with large and/or cohesive majorities and small and/or disorganized minorities. These conditions often follow realigning elections, but occur at other times as well.