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This introductory article reflects research perspectives central to the study of governmental and administrative coordination. The article studies early contributions in organization and decision theory, the political planning debate, studies in policy analysis and discussions in research related to the European Union by addressing their respective contributions to the study of coordination. In particular, the article studies the explanatory factors identified in the varying strands of research for problems of coordination. It is shown that the disparate strands of research identify rather similar factors accounting for coordination problems: Organizational self-interests, prevailing selective perceptions and costs of coordination are widely discussed as hampering coordination in government and administration. Adapted from the source document.

The paper analyses the processes of central government coordination in Denmark, Germany and Sweden. First it gives an account of the existing coordination patterns, second it analyses changes within these coordination patterns over time and finally it asks, whether these changes can be attributed to an intentional institutional design. To answer this set of questions, we introduce an institutional policy analytic perspective to the study of central government change. This perspective focuses on central actors, interests, strategic motivations and the degree of the actors reflexivity as a promoter of intentional institutional change in government coordination. The empirical analysis shows the prevalence of negative coordination as the dominant pattern of coordination in all three countries. However, country-specific constitutional and political traditions result in a variety of different coordination techniques actually used. The paper concludes by identifying three different patterns of change, depending on the degree of change and the reflexivity involved : "fragmented institutional politics" in Denmark, "policy-driven institutional politics" in Germany and "adaptive and symbolic institutional politics" in the case of Sweden.

Although politicization is a perennial research topic in public administration to investigate relationships between ministers and civil servants, the concept still lacks clarification. This article contributes to this literature by systematically identifying different conceptualizations of politicization and suggests a typology including three politicization mechanisms to strengthen the political responsiveness of the ministerial bureaucracy: formal, functional and administrative politicization. The typology is empirically validated through a comparative case analysis of politicization mechanisms in Germany, Belgium, the UK and Denmark. The empirical analysis further refines the general idea of Western democracies becoming 'simply' more politicized, by illustrating how some politicization mechanisms do not continue to increase, but stabilize – at least for the time being.

Ministerial advisers are said to strengthen the political control of bureaucracy. Using a comparative case design, this article investigates this claim by studying the roles of ministerial advisers in government coordination in Denmark and Sweden. The article demonstrates how the roles of advisers differ in coordination: Swedish advisers directly control government coordination through hierarchical authority. The roles of advisers and bureaucrats are functionally differentiated in coordination. In contrast, Danish advisers play a more indirect role in coordination. Rather than controlling coordination, they serve to reproduce the functional politicization of the permanent bureaucracy in government coordination. The findings underline the relevance of including advisers in the future study of government coordination. The analysis is based on 48 interviews with advisers and top civil servants in Denmark and Sweden.

Même si la politisation est un éternel thème de recherche dans l'administration publique lorsqu'il s'agit d'étudier les relations entre les ministres et les agents de l'État, le concept est encore peu précis. Avec le présent article, nous entendons enrichir cette littérature en épinglant différentes conceptualisations de la politisation. Nous proposons par ailleurs une typologie comprenant trois mécanismes de politisation visant à renforcer la réactivité politique de la bureaucratie ministérielle : la politisation formelle, fonctionnelle et administrative. La typologie est validée sur le plan empirique au moyen d'une analyse de cas comparative des mécanismes de politisation en Allemagne, en Belgique, au Royaume-Uni et au Danemark. L'analyse empirique affine encore l'idée générale selon laquelle les démocraties occidentales deviennent « tout simplement » plus politisées, puisqu'elle indique que certains mécanismes de politisation, plutôt que de continuer à se renforcer, se stabilisent – du moins pour l'instant. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens On entend souvent dire dans les recherches et la pratique administrative que la politisation augmente dans les rapports entre les ministres et les agents de l'État. La neutralité absolue de la bureaucratie étant davantage un mythe qu'une réalité empirique, les démocraties sont toutes obligées de concilier les revendications en faveur d'une expertise neutre et de réactivité politique. Celle-ci passe souvent par l'introduction de mécanismes de politisation. La politisation peut prendre toute une série de formes et nous proposons, dans cet article, une typologie portant sur la politisation formelle, fonctionnelle et administrative. Nous verrons en outre comment les mécanismes de politisation non seulement se renforcent, mais aussi comment ils se développent et interagissent, modifiant les équilibres faits de neutralité et de réactivité de manière potentiellement contradictoire.

Although politicization is a perennial research topic in public administration to investigate relationships between ministers and civil servants, the concept still lacks clarification. This article contributes to this literature by systematically identifying different conceptualizations of politicization and suggests a typology including three politicization mechanisms to strengthen the political responsiveness of the ministerial bureaucracy: formal, functional and administrative politicization. The typology is empirically validated through a comparative case analysis of politicization mechanisms in Germany, Belgium, the UK and Denmark. The empirical analysis further refines the general idea of Western democracies becoming 'simply' more politicized, by illustrating how some politicization mechanisms do not continue to increase, but stabilize – at least for the time being.Points for practitionersThe claim of increasing politicization of the interaction between ministers and civil servants is often made in research and government practice. As the completely neutral bureaucracy is a myth rather than empirical reality, all democracies have to balance demands for both neutral expertise and political responsiveness. The latter often involves the introduction of politicization mechanisms. Politicization comes in a variety of forms, and the article develops a typology covering formal, functional and administrative politicization. Further it empirically demonstrates how politicization mechanisms not only increase, but how they develop and interact, altering balances of neutrality and responsiveness in potentially conflicting ways.

To unlock the full potential of ICT-related public sector innovation and digital transformation, governments must embrace collaborative working structures and leadership, is commonly argued. However, little is known about the dynamics of such collaborations in contexts of hierarchy, silo cultures, and procedural accountability. A widely voiced but empirically insufficiently substantiated claim is that bringing cross-cutting digital endeavours forward requires more lateral, network-based approaches to governance beyond traditional Weberian ideals. We test this claim by shedding light on three distinct challenges (complexity, risk, and power imbalance) encountered when implementing the specific collaborative case of the German Online Access Act (OAA) and by examining how they have been addressed in institutional design and leadership. Our analysis, which combines desk research and semi-structured expert interviews, reveals that flexible, horizontal approaches are on the rise. Taking a closer look, however, vertical coordination continues to serve as complementary means to problem-solving capability.

To unlock the full potential of ICT-related public sector innovation and digital transformation, governments must embrace collaborative working structures and leadership, is commonly argued. However, little is known about the dynamics of such collaborations in contexts of hierarchy, silo cultures, and procedural accountability. A widely voiced but empirically insufficiently substantiated claim is that bringing cross-cutting digital endeavours forward requires more lateral, network-based approaches to governance beyond traditional Weberian ideals. We test this claim by shedding light on three distinct challenges (complexity, risk, and power imbalance) encountered when implementing the specific collaborative case of the German Online Access Act (OAA) and by examining how they have been addressed in institutional design and leadership. Our analysis, which combines desk research and semi-structured expert interviews, reveals that flexible, horizontal approaches are on the rise. Taking a closer look, however, vertical coordination continues to serve as complementary means to problem-solving capability.

Symposium aus Anlass des 10-jährigen Jubiläums der Zeitschrift "dms - der moderne staat" und zu Ehren von Prof. Dr. Bernhard Blanke