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Cowinner of the International Studies Association's Chadwick F. Alger Prize, Winner of the American Political Science Association's Comparative Democratization Section Best Book Award, and Cowinner of the Yale University MacMillan Center's Gustav Ranis International Book Prize. Why did election monitoring become an international norm? Why do "pseudo-democrats" (undemocratic leaders who present themselves as democratic) invite international observers, even when they are likely to be caught manipulating elections? Is election observation an effective tool of democracy promotion, or is it simply a way to legitimize electoral autocracies? This book uses cross-national data on election observations since 1960 and case studies of Armenia, Indonesia, Haiti, Peru, Togo, and Zimbabwe to explain international election monitoring with a new theory of international norms.

Randomized field experiments have gained attention within the social sciences and the field of democracy promotion as an influential tool for causal inference and a potentially powerful method of impact evaluation. With an eye toward facilitating field experimentation in democracy promotion, I present the first field-experimental study of international election monitoring, which should be of interest to both practitioners and academics. I discuss field experiments as a promising method for evaluating the effects of democracy assistance programs. Applied to the 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia, the random assignment of international election observers reveals that even though the election was widely regarded as democratic, the presence of observers had a measurable effect on votes cast for the incumbent candidate, indicating that such democracy assistance can influence election quality even in the absence of blatant election-day fraud.

Can international relations (IR) be studied productively with field experimental methods? The two most common existing empirical approaches in IR rely on cross-national data, detailed case studies, or a combination of the two. One as yet uncommon approach is the use of randomized field experiments to evaluate causal hypotheses. Applying such methods within IR complements other theoretical, case study, and observational research, and permits a productive research agenda to be built by testing the micro-foundations of theories within IR. This argument is illustrated by exploring how field experimental methods could be applied to two existing areas: how international institutions facilitate cooperation, and whether international actors can promote democracy in sovereign states.

By pressuring governments to hold democratic elections and by becoming directly involved in the electoral process through technical assistance and funding or as election monitors, international actors now play a visible role in domestic elections and other democratic processes throughout the developing world. Although scholars have documented several macrolevel relationships between international-level variables and movement toward democracy, there has been little attention paid to the microlevel effects of international involvement in the democratization process. This article examines the effects of international election observation as a prominent form of international involvement in domestic elections and exploits a natural experiment in order to test whether international observers reduce election fraud. Using data from the 2003 presidential elections in Armenia, the article demonstrates that although observers may not eliminate election fraud, they can reduce election-day fraud at the polling stations they visit. The unusual advantage of experiment-like conditions for this study offers unique causal evidence that international actors can have direct, measurable effects on the level of election-day fraud and, by extension, on the democratization process.

AbstractThis article argues that when democracy is not yet institutionalized, leaders have little incentive to push for clean elections, in part because they are likely to face accusations of fraud from domestic opposition groups regardless of their true behavior. Reputable international election observers can facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of elections, thus increasing citizens' ability to coordinate against the regime when election fraud occurs, and discrediting "sore loser" protests. Patterns of postelection protests are consistent with the argument, including that postelection protests are more likely and last longer following negative reports from international observers. International election observers help promote democracy by making postelection protest more accurate in the short term, thereby increasing incentives for leaders to hold democratic elections in the long term.