Suchergebnisse

Political Obligations, George Klosko, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005, pp. x, 266.Jacobins and Utopians: The Political Theory of Fundamental Moral
Reform, George Klosko, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2003, pp. xii, 200.Perhaps two of the most persistent and perplexing questions in
political theory are: Why should I obey the law (or the state)? And, what
is the relation between human perfection and politics? Can (or must) human
beings realize their true nature through politics? Or is any such hope not
only misplaced, but dangerous—one that is itself a problem that
political theory must confront? In these two thoughtful books, George
Klosko sets out to address them, drawing on a remarkably diverse range of
material to do so.

According to an essentially Hobbesian account of political order, the claims of cultural and national minorities within a state to some form of constitutional or institutional recognition are morally suspect and politically undesirable. Underlying this Hobbesian logic is a particular understanding of the relation between law and politics. 'Negative constitutionalism' is focused primarily on limiting the damage government can do. However the pursuit of constitutional minimalism runs up against the challenges presented by deeply diverse political communities. By investigating the manner in which Hobbes has been invoked in arguments concerning the relation between the rule of law and the 'politics of recognition', I argue (i) that the distinction between the rule of law and politics is fundamentally unstable, and (ii) that in invoking Hobbes, modern theorists have missed an important element of Hobbes's own argument – namely, his appreciation of this instability. As an example, I examine the way Hobbes is used in some of John Gray's recent writings on pluralism and liberalism.

Traditionally, the rule of law is differentiated into two domains: one in which it is created & another in which it is applied. Michel Foucault challenges this distinction by arguing that the rule of law is simultaneously implicated in the creation & maintenance of specific forms of political order. However, a close analysis of Foucault's later writings reveals that his views on the rule of law were more ambiguous than is commonly supposed. Instead of ruling out the possibility of law outside the exercise of political power, Foucault offers at least two notions, the practices of liberty & nonpolemical dialogue, which might form the foundations for law. It is suggested that, in such notions, Foucault implicitly agrees with the sense that something has to create the conditions for social order & social identity. Though that something for Foucault was not the state or civil society -- two liberal answers to the issue -- his later works indicate that he held out the possibility of some foundational basis for the law. D. Ryfe