Suchergebnisse

An analytical framework predicts that, in response to an exogenous increase in resource based government revenue, a benevolent government will partially substitute away from taxing income, increase spending and save. Forty-two years of U.S. state-level data are consistent with this theory. Specifically, a baseline fixed effects model predicts that a 1% point increase in resource revenue results in a .20% point decrease in non-resource revenue, a .50% point increase in spending and a .30% point increase in savings. These results are generally robust to alternative model specifications and the instrumentation of resource-based government revenue. Interaction effects reveal some asymmetry in the fiscal response to revenue shocks according to state political leanings.

THE AUTHOR CLAIMS THAT DISCUSSIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY FALL INTO THREE BROAD GROUPS. IN THIS THEY REFLECT THE CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS OF THE DISCIPLINE AND THE ASSOCIATED LITERATURE. IN THE FIRST PLACE, SOVEREIGNTY IS USED TO REFER TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH A STATE IS FREE TO BEHAVE AS IT WISHES. THE SECOND BROAD APPROACH FOCUSES NOT ON THE ACTIVITY OF SOVEREIGN STATES BUT ON THE IDENTITY OF THOSE WHO CONTROL ITS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES. THE THIRD CONCEPT APPROACHES THE STATE ONLY INDIRECTLY. IT RESTS ON THE PREMISE THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS AN IMMEDIATE ATTRIBUTE NOT OF THE STATE BUT OF THE NATION. THE AUTHOR STATES THAT THESE THREE USAGES ARE NOT ASPECTS OF A SINGLE INSTITUTION KNOWN AS STATE SOVEREIGNTY. THEY ARE ARE NOT EACH OF THEM FACETS OF THE SAME CONCEPT OR PHENOMENON. RATHER, THEY REPRESENT DIFFERENT USES OF THE TERM SOVEREIGNTY, AND HENCE DISTINCT CONCEPTS OF SOVEREIGNTY. THE AUTHOR GOES ON TO DEFINE CONSTITUENTS OF STATEHOOD, AND KEY FEATURES OF ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY.