Suchergebnisse

Trotz zahlreicher Studien zum Föderalismus in Wirtschafts- und Politikwissenschaft besteht bis heute noch kein Konsens über die Wirkung des Föderalismus auf die makroökonomische Performanz. Ich fokussiere in diesem Beitrag auf ein spezifisches Element dieser Debatte: die Rolle des Föderalismus auf den Zugang von Nationalstaaten auf internationale Kapitalmärkte. In einer empirischen Untersuchung von 60 Staaten im Zeitraum 1975 bis 1995 finde ich keinen klaren Effekt des finanzpolitischen Föderalismus auf den Zufluss von Auslandsdirektinvestitionen. In einer zweiten Analyse von 40 Staaten im Zeitraum 1980 bis 1998 kann gezeigt werden, dass finanzpolitischer Föderalismus zu einer besseren Beurteilung der nationalstaatlichen Schuldenbonität führt. (Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft / FUB)

A selection model for 68 countries between 1970 and 1998 is used to test the impact of International Monetary Fund(IMF) programs on international capital markets and examine how agreements are perceived by multinational investors. Results reveal that even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements lead to lower levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). Countries that sign IMF agreements, ceteris paribus, attract 25% less FDI inflows than countries not under IMF agreements.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important element of the global economy and a central component of economic development strategies of both developed and developing countries. Numerous scholars theorize that the economic benefits of attracting multinational corporations come at tremendous political costs, arguing that democratic political systems attract lower levels of international investment than their authoritarian counterparts. Using both cross-sectional and time-series cross-sectional tests of the determinants of FDI for more than 100 countries, I generate results that are inconsistent with these dire predictions. Democratic political systems attract higher levels of FDI inflows both across countries and within countries over time. Democratic countries are predicted to attract as much as 70 percent more FDI than their authoritarian counterparts. In a final empirical test, I examine how democratic institutions affect country credibility by empirically analyzing the link between democracy and sovereign debt risk for about eighty countries from 1980 to 1998. These empirical tests challenge the conventional wisdom on the preferences of multinationals for authoritarian regimes.

The debate on the political obstacles to economic reform in postcommunist countries has centered around two interrelated theories. Adam Przeworski argues that short-term negative distributional consequences can stall economic reform. Joel Hellman contends that industry insiders and political elites have incentives to stall economic reform. Although both sets of theories contend that the distributional aspects of economic transition affect reform, important differences remain in their interpretation of the relationship between the rising levels of poverty and income inequality in transition economies. This article empirically examines the relationship between the pretransition levels of poverty and income inequality in 17 postcommunist transition economies using cross-sectional regressions. The central finding in this article is that countries with large spans of the population hovering above poverty are less likely to achieve high levels of economic reform, lending support to theory that adverse socioeconomic conditions prior to transition can impede economic reform.

Ausländische Direktinvestitionen sind ein wichtiges Element in der Weltwirtschaft und eine zentrale Komponente wirtschaftlicher Entwicklungsstrategien sowohl von Industrie- als auch von Entwicklungsländern. Zahlreiche Wissenschaftler vermuten, dass ADI beträchtliche politische Kosten mit sich bringen, da demokratische Systeme weniger ADI als ihre autoritären Alternativen anziehen. Mit Hilfe von Querschnitts- und Paneldaten zu ADI in über 100 Ländern werden Ergebnisse erzeugt, die nicht konsistent mit dieser Behauptung sind. Demokratische politische Systeme attrahieren mehr ADI sowohl in der Quer- als auch in der Längsschnittbetrachtung. Demokratische Länder ziehen etwa 70 Prozent mehr ADI an als autoritäre Systeme. In einem letzten empirischen Test wird die Kreditwürdigkeit demokratischer Systeme überprüft, indem empirisch die Verbindung zwischen Demokratie und dem Länderrisiko für etwa 80 Länder zwischen 1980 und 1998 überprüft wird. Diese empirischen Tests ziehen die konventionelle Annahme, multinationale Unternehmen bevorzugten autoritäre Regime, in Zweifel. (SWP-Jns)

AbstractFirms and governments often negotiate economic development deals, such as tax abatements, with limited transparency, using exceptions to public records laws or other strategies for nondisclosure. In this article we explore the motivations of firms for keeping economic development deals out of the public eye. We explore legal challenges to public records requests for deal-specific, company-specific participation in a state economic development incentive program. By examining applications for participation in a major state economic program, the Texas Enterprise Fund, we find that a company is more likely to challenge a formal public records request if it has renegotiated the terms of the award to reduce its job-creation obligations. We interpret this as companies challenging transparency when they have avoided being penalized for noncompliance by engaging in nonpublic renegotiations. These results provide evidence regarding those conditions that prompt firms to challenge transparency and illustrate some of the limitations of safeguards such as clawbacks (or incentive-recapture provisions) when such reforms aren't coupled with robust transparency mechanisms. We speculate that the main motivation for these challenges is to limit scrutiny of these deals that could lead to backlashes against future economic development agreements.

AbstractPrevious literature suggests that economic performance affects government approval asymmetrically, either because voters are quicker to blame incompetence than to credit ability (grievance asymmetry) or because they understand that the degree to which policy-makers can affect the economy varies depending on economic openness (clarity of responsibility asymmetry). We seek to understand whether these asymmetries coexist, arguing that these theories conjointly imply that globalization may have the capacity to mitigate blame for bad outcomes but should neither promote nor reduce credit to policy-makers for good economic outcomes. We look for evidence of these asymmetries in three survey experiments carried out in the USA and Canada in 2014 and 2015. We find ample experimental evidence in support of the grievance asymmetry, but our results are mixed on the impact of economic openness on blame mitigation, with some evidence of this phenomenon in the USA, but not in Canada.

Using data on international investment arbitration, the authors catalog the types of state actors involved in disputes and the actions that lead to arbitration. We find that the majority of disputes are the result of actions taken by the executive branch.

Using data on international investment arbitration, the authors catalog the types of state actors involved in disputes and the actions that lead to arbitration. We find that the majority of disputes are the result of actions taken by the executive branch.