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In this chapter I will try to navigate a path through these thickets. I will begin by setting out the administrative state and a discursive democratic alternative in ideal-type terms, and examine their strengths and weaknesses in a way that is comparative but static. This comparison will come down in favor of discursive democracy as being intrinsically more likely to promote ecological values. However, diagnosis of the faults of the administrative state can be instructive, not just by pointing to the qualities that any institutional alternatives should seek, but also in identifying traps into which these alternatives might themselves fall. I then move to a more nuanced and analysis of the relationship between the administrative state and democracy, showing that green democratization of the administrative state is a worthwhile project but exactly how and when it can take place depends crucially on the political-economic context.

In this chapter I will try to navigate a path through these thickets. I will begin by setting out the administrative state and a discursive democratic alternative in ideal-type terms, and examine their strengths and weaknesses in a way that is comparative but static. This comparison will come down in favor of discursive democracy as being intrinsically more likely to promote ecological values. However, diagnosis of the faults of the administrative state can be instructive, not just by pointing to the qualities that any institutional alternatives should seek, but also in identifying traps into which these alternatives might themselves fall. I then move to a more nuanced and analysis of the relationship between the administrative state and democracy, showing that green democratization of the administrative state is a worthwhile project but exactly how and when it can take place depends crucially on the political-economic context.

Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political control.

Introduction: While the perestroika reform movement that began in 2000 has shaken US political science, the virtual absence of methodological argument on any side means that the dispute is mostly political rather than intellectual. The discipline has been shaken but not stirred. The movement may change the balance of power within the profession, but otherwise leave the practice of political science unchanged. This paper is intended to help move methodological debate, with "methodology" taken in its broad sense of reflection upon the conduct of inquiry (so it also covers epistemology). The existing – now faltering –hegemony (usually identified with rational choice theory and quantitative methods) may be indefensible, but perestroika proposes only an empty pluralism in its place. Perestroika's heart may be in the right place, but its head needs to catch up. I discuss a critical disciplinary pluralism, not as an alternative program for the discipline, but as a way of making the best of existing political science practice.

While the Perestroika reform movement that began in 2000 has shaken US political science, the paucity of productive methodological argument means that the dispute becomes political rather than intellectual. The discipline, like James Bond's vodka martini, has been shaken but not stirred. The movement may change the balance of power within the profession, but otherwise leave the practice of political science unchanged. This paper is intended to help move methodological debate, with "methodology" taken in its broad sense of reflection upon the conduct of inquiry (so it also covers epistemology). The existing – now faltering – hegemony (identified with rational choice theory and quantitative methods) may be indefensible, but Perestroika may portend only an empty pluralism in its place. I discuss a critical disciplinary pluralism as a way of making the best of existing political science practice – and redeeming Perestroika's promise. Space limitations preclude full documentation of the impoverished state of the methodological debate, though a flavor can be gained by a look at a symposium of disciplinary stars organized to address the issues raised in the Perestroikan critique, published in the June 2002 issue of PS: Political Science and Politics under the title of "Shaking Things Up? Thoughts About the Future of Political Science." One common theme that emerges from the symposium is the degree to which the contributors point to their own work as a model. Asked to reflect upon the shape of the discipline, these distinguished political scientists reflect mainly on, and implicitly advocate, their own work. Strikingly, none of the contributors, even those associated with hegemony, opposes pluralism in the discipline.

For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the rise of deliberative democracy coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This paper considers the degree to which deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the case is made for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereignty and a more contestatory deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semi-detached from the state.

For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the rise of deliberative democracy coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This paper considers the degree to which deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the case is made for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereignty and a more contestatory deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semi-detached from the state.

Deliberative democracy is usually presented as a polity in which legitimacy is achieved by deliberative participation on the part of those subject to a collective decision. But cast in these terms, the theory runs headlong into the long-recognized impossibility of directly involving more than a few members of any large-scale democracy in decision making. After canvassing the available solutions to this problem, an argument is made for conceptualizing deliberative democracy in terms of the contestation of discourses in the public sphere, and public opinion as the provisional outcome of this contestation as transmitted to the state. Legitimacy is then achieved to the degree collective outcomes respond to the balance of discourses in the polity, to the extent this balance is itself subject to dispersed and competent political control.

Social science often fails as policy analysis due to insensitivity to the context of its intended use. A number of different modes of policy analysis are explored to determine the circumstances in which the application of each is appropriate. It is argued that each mode is appropriate only under a fairly limited set of conditions; many of the problems policy analysis encounters are a result of attempts to apply a mode outside its niche. Greater use should be made of what is developed here as a hermeneutic model of policy analysis, appropriate in a residual set of conditions which none of the traditional models of policy anlaysis copes with adequately. 61 References. HA.

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the determinants of social inequality in a quantitative cross‐sectional analysis of developed Western nations. The underlying dimensions of these determinants are classified as political and economic development on the one hand and cultural homogeneity coupled with class politics on the other. It is found that the homogeneity‐class politics dimension explains a considerable proportion of the cross‐national variation in social equality, but that the development dimension has little discernable impact upon degree of equality.

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Part 1 - Prelude -- Ch.1 - Reconsidering the Policy Field -- Part 2 - Frames of Reference -- Ch. 2 - Welfare Economics -- Ch. 3 - Public Choice -- Ch. 4 - Social Structure -- Ch. 5 - Information Processing -- Ch.6 - Political Philosophy -- Part 3 - Knowledge Orientations -- Ch.7 - From Technical Frames toTheories of Knowledge -- Ch.8 - Positivism -- Ch.9 - Piecemeal Social Engineering -- Ch.10 - From Rationality to Relativism -- Ch.11 - From Relativism toCritical Enlightenment -- Part 4 - Choice -- Ch.12 - Reasoned Selection -- Ch.13 - Toward Policy Design -- Bibliographical Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Normative deliberative theory has contributed much to an understanding of ideal procedural standards, but there is considerable uncertainty regarding the appropriate nature of desired deliberative outcomes. In this paper we identify two inter-related conc

Democratic theorists often place deliberative innovations such as citizen's panels, consensus conferences, planning cells, and deliberative polls at the center of their hopes for deliberative democratization. In light of experience to date, the authors chart the ways in which such mini-publics may have an impact in the "macro" world of politics. Impact may come in the form of actually making policy, being taken up in the policy process, informing public debates, market-testing of proposals, legitimation of public policies, building confidence and constituencies for policies, popular oversight, and resisting co-option. Exposing problems and failures is all too easy. The authors highlight cases of success on each of these dimensions.

While consensus is often taken to be the ideal way to secure political legitimacy, a more robust pluralism has many defenders too. We attempt to reconcile arguments for pluralism and consensus. Pluralism ought to be accepted and valued at the simple level of values, beliefs, and preferences. Pluralism at this level can nevertheless coexist with normative, epistemic, andor preference meta-consensus, all of which have qualities that should attract even pluralists. However, close attention must be paid to the content of meta-consensus and the conditions of its production or discovery.